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 vii 
ABSTRACT 
 
The theme of this master project in sociology is to study the relationship between privatisation and 
income inequality in Western China. The main research theme is whether a higher degree of 
privatisation is related to greater income inequality. China has experienced massive economic 
growth in the reform period over the last 30 years. In the planned economy, the private sector was 
nearly non-existent, and the growth of the private sector has been a central factor in the 
transformation towards a market economy. The aim of the project is to investigate how this 
development has affected the wage structures in Western China in respect to income inequality. 
 
In the reform period, millions of people have been lifted out of poverty and experienced improved 
living conditions. However, increased income inequality across many social dimensions has been 
following in the wake of the economic growth, and created new challenges and social problems. 
The Western region has been lagging behind in regards to development compared to the coastal 
provinces, and this regional dimension is important in relation to income inequality in China. 
 
I use cross-sectional data from the Medow survey, which was conducted in 2004-2005 in 11 
provinces in Western China. The survey was designed and carried out by Fafo, in cooperation with 
Chinese partners. Medow is the largest living condition survey that has been conducted in Western 
China, and has data on both household and individual level on a wide range of topics. I use 
multilevel analysis to study both individual and structural aspects in relation to income inequality. 
 
The level of income inequality in a society is influenced by many factors. I chose to focus on five 
social structures - education, sector, occupation, urban-rural diversity, and migration, and how these 
social structures affect income inequality, in relation to the process of privatisation. I draw on a 
range of theoretical perspectives, to frame how privatisation can influence the five social structures, 
with further consequences for income inequality. I employ neoclassical economic theory with an 
emphasis on human capital and market mechanisms related to the labour market, market transition 
theory with a focus on transitional China and increased returns to education, segmented labour 
market theory which directs attention to the diversified occupational structure, social closure 
approach with an emphasis on social categories that establishes boundaries and inequality, and neo-
Marxism/Structuralism which is related to uneven regional development and migration issues.   
 viii 
  
In general, the main findings confirm that a higher level of privatisation co-exists with greater 
income inequality between different social groups in Western China. Prefectures with more 
privatisation tend to have increased income distance between individuals with different educational 
attainment, between individuals working in the agricultural sector and other sectors, between 
different occupational positions, between urban and rural citizens, and between migrants and 
residents. However, income differences between individuals in the state and private sector are found 
to decline in prefectures with a higher degree of privatisation. 
 
There has been much research on income inequality in China within sociology and economy, but 
less attention has been given to study this in the context of the Western region. There has also been 
less focus on the relationship between privatisation and income inequality. My study has both an 
empirical and theoretical purpose. Empirically, my findings challenge the simplistic view that 
market economic reforms promote equality through development and the “trickle-down” effect of 
economic growth to wide segments of the population. I show that privatisation in itself not 
necessarily contributes to increased equality, but can be seen to maintain and create income 
inequality. Theoretically, the study contributes with a critical discussion of boundaries and 
processes of social exclusion in the Chinese labour market, and how they are affected by 
privatisation in the developing market economy. I discuss how different social groups such as 
peasants, rural migrants, people with low education and low occupational positions have limited 
possibilities to improve their life chances. An important implication is that the social boundaries are 
often reinforced by the practice of and ideology behind privatisation.  
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 Chapter One. Introduction 
 
This master project in sociology is about the relationship between privatisation and income 
inequality in Western China. Through several reform waves over the last 30 years, China has 
transformed its planned economy into a market economy (with “Chinese characteristics”), and 
become integrated in the world economy. The transformation has been accompanied by high 
economic growth rates, and the income and living standards have improved substantially for large 
segments of the population. The reforms have changed the distribution system of the planned 
economy, and the market economy has created new dynamics throughout the economy and in the 
labour market. Privatisation and the creation of a private sector has been a central development. 
Many state-owned enterprises have been merged, closed down, or privatized. The private sector has 
become an important aspect in the national economy.  
 
However, the development has also been accompanied with growing economic inequality. Uneven 
distribution and increasing levels of inequality may lead to problems such as social instability, 
marginalisation, reduced inter-personal trust and polarised class relations. Egalitarian values are still 
central for the Chinese government, since socialist ideology continues to play an important role in 
China. The Chinese government has been concerned about increasing regional disparities, and have 
expressed concerns about the rising income inequality.  
 
Western China has fallen behind in the reform period, and the regional disparities between Eastern 
and Western provinces have grown. Therefore, the central government launched the Western 
Development Policy in 2000. The plan focused on economic development and building of 
infrastructure in the West, in addition to improve living conditions, reduce poverty, promote social 
and political stability and reduce regional disparities. This economic development strategy has been 
strongly connected to expansion of the market economy, with focus on expansion of open markets, 
support to private initiatives, increased foreign direct investments and growth of the private sector.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
Many social factors can contribute to create income inequality in a society. I chose to focus on five 
social structures, and how these social structures affect income inequality, in relation to the process 
of privatisation. These structures are: 1) changing returns to education, 2) sectors in the labour 
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market, 3) occupational structure, 4) the rural-urban divide, and 5) migration.  
 
My research hypotheses are: 
 
1. The higher degree of privatisation, the higher income inequality between individuals with 
different educational attainment. 
 
Education is one of the most important structures for social stratification. Earlier research on 
income inequality in China has concluded that increasing returns to education is a central factor for 
overall income inequality in China (Gustafsson et al. 2008: 112). The educational impact on income 
and wages are also expected to increase. With a stronger market orientation in a society, the returns 
to education are expected to increase, since enterprises in the private sector reward employees with 
higher human capital and competence, in order to stay competitive in the market (Nee & Cao 2004: 
47). 
 
2. The higher degree of privatisation, the higher income inequality between individuals working in 
different sectors. 
 
I further study income inequality between different sectors in the labour market. Privatisation 
affects the sector relationship, for example through the growth of profit incentives in the private 
sector, and downsizing of the state sector. Furthermore, it is important to study how the largest 
sector in Western China, the agricultural sector, is affected by privatisation in relation to the other 
sectors.  
 
3. The higher degree of privatisation, the higher income inequality between individuals with 
different occupational positions. 
 
I have chosen to study income differences between occupations, because this opens up for studying 
connections between labour market stratification, issues of class relation, and returns to education. 
In the evolving market economy, occupation status is import for income and social status (Bian & 
Zhang 2002, Li & Sato 2006, Shue & Wong 2007). 
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4. The higher degree of privatisation, the higher income inequality between rural and urban 
citizens. 
 
Urban-rural income inequality is considered to be one of the most important factors for increased 
income inequality in China (Gustafsson et al. 2008: 23, Khan & Riskin 2008: 78). It is debated how 
privatisation will affect income differences between urban and rural citizens. Economists often 
argue that the process of modernisation and privatisation will contribute to reduce regional 
inequality, through the “trickle-down” effect (Dollar 2007). However, many empirical studies argue 
that the process of market transformation contributes to increased urban-rural disparities in China 
(Wahl 1998, Gustafsson et al. 2008). 
 
5. The higher degree of privatisation, the higher income inequality between migrants and residents. 
 
Finally, I have chosen to include migration, since the growth of labour mobility has been important 
in the reform period, and migration is a central characteristic of a more open labour market in the 
market economy.  
 
1.3 Former Research and Theoretical Approach 
 
In this study I focus on Western China as a region. The study draws on views and perspectives from 
both sociology and economics. Studies of China as a transitional society have been important (Nee 
1989, Zhou 2000, Walder 1995). Studies of factors contributing to income inequality are also 
central (Gustafsson et al. 2008, Sicular et al. 2010). There have also been studies on the relation 
between privatisation and income inequality (Zhou 2000, Xu & Zou 2000). Relatively little research 
has been done on Western China as a region. There are several studies from specific areas in 
Western China, but limited research have aimed to draw general, statistically informed conclusions 
about the Western region as a whole. Most studies based on large-scale surveys have ambitions to 
cover all regions of China, in order to be able to generalise about nation-wide changes of income 
inequality. To my knowledge, such studies have not given much attention to within-region 
conditions of Western China.  
 
On one side, it is important to have a contextual perspective, and be alert to conditions that are 
specific to this region. The Western region is special in some respects, being economically the most 
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backward region, and with a majority of the population working in the rural sector. On the other 
side, Western China is also intimately woven into the general social fabric of nationwide social and 
economic processes, which affects all regions. Processes related to privatisation affect labour 
market institutions and income distribution throughout China, and it is important to view processes 
in Western China in relation to wider social transformations that affects all of China. Therefore I 
also view the situation in Western China from a more general perspective.  
 
I use various theoretical approaches when studying the relationship between privatisation and 
income inequality, through different social structures. The theoretical perspectives I draw upon are 
market transition theory, segmented labour market theory, neoclassical economic perspectives, 
historical-structural/neo-Marxist approaches, and social closure theory. The explanatory scope of 
the theories varies to some extent. Perspectives most related to returns to education are the 
neoclassical perspective, segmented labour market theory, market transition theory and social 
closure theory. The perspective that focuses most directly on inequality between sectors is market 
transition theory. When it comes to inequality between different occupations, the most relevant 
perspectives are neoclassical theory, segmented labour market theory and social closure theory. In 
regards to rural-urban inequality, the neoclassical perspective, structuralist/neo-marxist perspective 
and social closure theory are most relevant. And concerning migration, the neoclassical perspective, 
segmented labour market theory and structuralist/neo-marxist views are most applicable.  
 
1.4 Data and Method 
 
My study is based on a living condition survey (Medow) in Western China, which was conducted 
by the Fafo Research Institute and Chinese partners in 2004-05. The total sample size is 44,000 
households and 144,000 individuals across 11 provinces. These can further be divided into 128 
prefectures. From this dataset I constructed individual-level variables concerning income, education 
level, work sector, occupation, rural/urban registration and migrant status. I also constructed a 
structural-level variable of privatisation, and finally the variable of income inequality with both 
individuals and structural characteristics. Privatisation is defined as the share of workers employed 
in the private sector. I focus on the prefecture level, which corresponds to administrative units 
below the province level. For the statistical analysis I use multilevel technique, which makes it 
possible to study individuals nested in prefectures. The advantage of this statistical technique is that 
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it can provide rich information of both individual characteristics and their social positions, and the 
structural impact on income inequality.  
  
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
In chapter two I review the situation of inequality in China and Western China based on former 
research. I also discuss the concept of privatisation, and give a historical overview of the reform 
period, with an emphasis on sectors of the labour market and privatisation. In chapter three I present 
theories which frame how privatisation can be related to income inequality, based on five main 
theoretical approaches. These theories will be discussed in relation to relevant social structures and 
the impact of privatisation on income inequality. In the end of chapter three I summarise main 
points from the theoretical perspectives, and present the hypotheses. In chapter four I present data 
and variables used in the statistical analyses, and the research method. The results from the analyses 
are presented in chapter five. Finally, in chapter six, I first go through the hypotheses, and review 
which hypotheses are supported and which are rejected, and then bring together the findings in light 
of the theoretical and contextual aspects relevant to Western China. Then I go through weaknesses 
and limitations of this project. The chapter ends with concluding remarks and possible further 
research.  
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Chapter Two. Income Inequality, Privatisation and 
Historical Background 
 
In this background chapter, I will first give an overview regarding income inequality in China, both 
on the national and regional level in Western China. Then I give a brief account of former research 
on factors contributing to income inequality in China. Afterwards I account for privatisation in 
general, and privatisation in China. The last part of the chapter is a historical overview of changes 
in the reform period, with a focus on privatisation.  
 
2.1. Inequality 
 
2.1.1 Inequality in China 
 
China has experienced a rapid economic growth over the last 30 years. This development has 
improved the living conditions for large segments of the population, lifted millions out of poverty, 
and raised living expectancies. However, there has been a substantial rise in overall income 
inequality in the same period. The Gini-coefficient is a statistical measure of income inequality in a 
society.1 In 2002 the overall Gini for equivalised disposable household income in China was 0.45 
(Gustafsson et al 2008: 20). This level of inequality puts China among the top most unequal 
countries in Asia, on level with Thailand (0.43) and the Philippines (0.46) (Lu & Neilson 2004). 
Figure 2.1 shows the development of the Gini-coefficient in the period 1980-2002. The national 
inequality includes the income difference between rural and urban areas, and this relationship 
significantly boosts the income inequality level throughout the period. Generally, low and middle-
income countries are more unequal than developed high-income countries, and large countries 
usually have higher inequality than small countries. In the early 1980s, China was a low-income 
country with the world’s largest population, but its degree of inequality was as low as some high-
income, small to medium-sized Western countries such as Sweden (0,25) and Germany (0,28) 
(Naughton 2007: 217).  
 
 
                                                
1 The Gini-coefficient is ranged from 0 to 1, from total equality to maximal inequality. A value placed between these 
extremes indicates how unequal the income distribution is. As the value rises, the degree of income inequality is higher. 
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Figure 2.1 Patterns of inequality in China 1980-2002, measured by Gini-coefficient. Source: 
Naughton 2007: 218. 
 
 
The trend of increasing income inequality has been pronounced throughout most of the period. 
There was a drop in national inequality in the early phase in 1982, when the agricultural reform 
raised the income of farmers, improved the rural economy, and decreased the urban-rural gap 
(Whyte 2010: 14). In the years after 1990, the growth of national inequality was especially high. It 
reached a top in 1994, and then dropped to a lower level. This drop was partly caused by the 
downsizing and privatisation of state-owned enterprises, which created much urban unemployment 
and decreased social welfare. The inequality steadily climbed up again until the last year of 2002. 
Gustafsson et al. (2008) find that overall income inequality when comparing 1995 and 2002 was 
relatively stable.  
 
2.1.2 Western China and Regional Inequality 
 
Income inequality in China follows several dimensions. Internal rural inequality has been 
significantly higher than urban inequality throughout the period, unlike many other countries, which 
exhibit larger urban than rural inequality. However, the income gap between urban and rural areas 
seems to play an important role in pushing up the total inequality level, and this gap clearly 
increased in the 1990s (Naughton 2007: 219). Furthermore, there are large regional differences in 
Chapter Two. Income Inequality, Privatisation and Historical Background 
 
9 
China, and one important aspect of this is the regional inequality between Western and Eastern 
China (Chow 2007: 178).  
 
Western China consists of twelve provincial-level administrative areas. Among these are six 
provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan), one municipality 
(Chongqing) and three autonomous regions (Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang). The western region 
covers an area of 6.9 million square kilometres, which amounts to 74 per cent of the whole national 
territory. The population was 367 million in 2002, which was 29 per cent of China’s total national 
population (Lu & Nielsen 2004).  
 
The provinces of Western China are diverse socially, culturally and economically, with important 
variations within the provinces. Xinjiang has had the highest economic growth, and the highest 
GDP per capita. Other provinces have highly developed industries, such as Sichuan, Shaanxi, and 
Chongquing. Some provinces are on the other hand very poor, such as Guizhou and Gansu 
(Goodman 2004: 6). Western provinces also have many characteristics in common. Most of them 
have problems with weak communication and infrastructure in many areas. Agriculture is generally 
important in western China. According to statistics from 2005, almost 68 per cent of the workforce 
works in the agricultural sector. Five per cent works in the industry, and six per cent in construction 
(Yao et al. 2007: 72). There are important disparities between developed economic centres and 
lagging peripheries, and between different ethnic groups. Regional disparities are large, and there 
are many difficulties for poor areas and rural areas to develop their economy, connected to social 
issues such as poverty, low social services and welfare insurance, unstable employment, income 
and distribution, food price, etc. (He et al. 2008: 24).  
 
In 2002, the combined economy of Western China accounted for only 17 per cent of total GDP in 
China, and income per capita in the West amounted to only 40 per cent of that in Eastern China (Lu 
& Neilson 2004). In the same year, the mean income in the eastern region was two times higher 
than the mean income in the western region (Gustaffson et al. 2008: 50). However, the income level 
in the central region is closer to the western level, being only 1.2 times higher.  
 
Sicular et al. have found that there are significant regional variations regarding rural-urban 
inequality inside each region. As showed in table 2.1, there was largest rural-urban difference in the 
western region in 2002, and lowest in the eastern region (Sicular et al. 2010: 93).  In the West, the 
urban-to-rural income ratio was 4.3 in 2002. The annual urban mean wage was 8,582 yuan, and the 
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rural wage 2,006 yuan. The rural-urban ratio is lower in both central and eastern provinces. In 
eastern provinces, a more rapid economic development in rural areas has taken place, leading to a 
higher rural income level, and a decreased rural-urban gap. Meanwhile, there was relatively low 
development and income growth in central and western regions, and rural-urban inequality grew in 
these areas (Sicular et al. 2010: 93). Knight and Song have argued that the ratio of urban to rural 
mean income per capita was much higher in poorer provinces, on the basis that the urban wage 
level was more or less the same across the whole country, but that the rural economy in poorer 
provinces was much worse than in more developed provinces, thus creating a larger income gap  
(Knight & Song 1999: 115). The income difference between western and eastern provinces is also 
noteworthy, in that urban workers in eastern region earn 4,431 yuan more than urban workers in the 
West. 
 
Table 2.1. Income in Different Regions, 1995 and 2002 (yuan). Source: Sicular et al. 2006: 9.2 
 
 
 
2.1.3 Western Region Development 
 
In 2000, the Chinese government launched a development strategy for Western China, which was 
intended to create increased economic growth, raised living standards and modernisation in the 
West. Another goal was to decrease regional differences between the east and the west. The project 
                                                
2 Based on survey data from several provinces in each region. Western provinces: Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, 
Gansu. Central provinces: Shanxi, Jilin, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan. Eastern provinces: Beijing, Hebei, 
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Guangdong.  
Region 1995 2002 
Western provinces 2140 4137 
   Urban 5036 8582 
   Rural 1168 2006 
   Ratio of urban to rural 4.31 4.28 
Central provinces 2240 4555 
   Urban 4172 7941 
   Rural 1559 2652 
   Ratio of urban to rural 2.68 2.99 
Eastern provinces 4259 8509 
   Urban 7498 13013 
   Rural 2537 4526 
   Ratio of urban to rural 2.96 2.88 
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had three main goals: First, the reform projects emphasized ecological construction, cross regional 
transportation of resources, and construction of the Qinghai-Tibet railway.3 Secondly, realising 
plans for improving the infrastructure such as building new roads, power plants, electricity, 
telecommunications, and promoting urban development. The third goal was to improve people’s 
living standards through increased economic growth (Ding and Neilson 2004: 263). The plan 
includes measures such as privatisation of state-owned companies, tax concessions that encourage 
investment from both Chinese and foreign investors, increased educational levels among people in 
the west, better healthcare, encouraging research, preserving the environment, developing 
agriculture, restructuring the industry, developing tourism, and so on (The Central People’s 
Government of the PRC 2001).  
 
The development strategy also emphasized the economic reform, privatisation, promoting foreign 
direct investment, and sustainable development (Chow 2007). The political economist McNally has 
drawn attention to how the development strategy is promoting important aspects of the market 
economy to the western provinces. He writes:  
 
“The Open Up the West campaign is pushing the structural transformations that are already 
gripping coastland provinces westward. The infrastructure for accelerated capital 
accumulation is being put in place, including political and economic support by the state for 
market forces, property rights and private holders of capital.” (McNally 2004: 115) 
 
There are some reports about how this plan works. An annual report published in July 2009, shows 
that the GDP of Western China has increased from 1.5 trillion yuan to 5.8 trillion yuan from 1998 
to 2008, and the average annual growth rate in west was about two per cent higher than China’s 
average growth. At the same time, income inequality has also increased in the area, both when 
comparing provinces, and inside richer provinces, for example through wider income gap between 
urban and rural. But Western China is still the poorest region in China (Ren et al. 2009). This 
confirms findings from other scholars, which show that the East-West gap continues to increase, 
despite of the initiatives and efforts implied by the Western Development Strategies (Wei 2000: 
19). 
 
 
                                                
3 In detail, this project includes the transportation of gas and electricity from west to east, and the transportation of 
water from south to north, 
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2.1.4 Inequality in China: Former Research 
 
Inequality in China has attracted much scholarly attention, and generated a wide and interesting 
research literature in several fields, such as economics, sociology, political science, development 
studies, social geography and culture studies. Since the research field is so broad, I have no 
ambition to cover it thoroughly here.4 In the following account, I focus on central research themes 
related to income inequality in China as a whole. Limited research attention has been given to 
Western China as a region in the inequality-literature. Most studies based on large-scale surveys are 
on a national level, covering all regions in China. There are, however, some other studies that have 
been based on case-research or much smaller samples, drawn from a limited amount of cities or 
rural areas, in one or two provinces. 
 
Economists have made important contributions to the study of income inequality in China, and an 
important focus has been the factors contributing to inequality, particularly the urban-rural income 
inequality (Sicular et al 2010, Gustafsson 2008). Related topics are within-urban inequality (Xu & 
Zou 2000), and within rural inequality (Benjamin et al. 2006). Other factors include returns to 
education and human capital, the role of inflation, land ownership, party membership, ethnicity and 
gender. Regional dimensions such as the east-west divide has received some attention in the 
inequality literature (see for example Ho et al.: 2002, Gustaffson et al. 2008), but somewhat less 
than the other factors.  
 
Another factor has been the impact of privatisation. In above-mentioned research, privatisation is 
sometimes defined as the reduction of state-owned enterprises. Using panel data from 1995 and 
2002, Xu and Zou (2000) found that a decreased share of state-owned enterprises leads to higher 
income inequality, together with other factors such as economic growth, inflation and urbanisation. 
The sociologist Zhou (2000) have focused on the reduction of state-owned enterprises and growth 
of the private sector, and concluded that these processes have contributed significantly to income 
inequality. Privatisation, both in terms of the reduction of state-owned enterprises, and growth of a 
private sector, is a central feature of the marketisation of the Chinese economy, and therefore a way 
to measure the extent of the reform transformation. Zhou has also emphasised the active role of 
state institutions in the evolving market economy (Zhou 2000: 1141). 
 
                                                
4 Gustaffson (2006) has compiled an overview over case and small-sample studies. Some studies on village level have 
been done in Western China, such as several studies done by Xing et al. about income inequality in villages in the 
Guizhou province (Xing et al. 2006, 2009).  
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Using data from 1995 and 2002 from the CHIP-survey (Chinese Household Income Project), 
Gustafsson et al. (2008) studied the importance of a set of factors that have received much attention 
in the literature, in investigating the impact of increased inequality. Through the use of regression-
based income decomposition, they isolated each variable’s impact on income inequality. They 
found that returns to education, and especially to higher levels of education, were a large 
contributor to inequality (Gustafsson et al. 2008: 112). They related this finding to the expansion of 
markets in China, and to increased demand for skilled and highly educated employees. 
Furthermore, the analysis confirms that place of residence is important, a finding that reflects the 
differences between urban and rural residence status. They also find that factors such as party 
membership, ethnic minority status and health contributes to increasing inequality, but less so in 
2002 than in 1995, and the impact of these factors were modest. The ownership of farmland, 
expected to be important for many rural households, contributed little to decrease inequality 
(Gustaffson et al. 2008: 113). 
 
A sociological debate has been about changing mechanisms of income distribution in transitional 
economies. A central contribution is market transition theory proposed by the economic sociologist 
Victor Nee (1989). Nee proposes that the development towards a market economy creates changes 
in the income distribution, with the result that more capital is being channelled to individuals active 
in the growing market sector. Individuals connected to the state apparatus and political positions 
lose their privilege in income distribution, and so do the organisational hierarchies from the planned 
economy system. Others contend that there is a complex interplay between the market and state 
forces, and that state institutions continue to play central roles, also in the evolving market economy 
(Zhou 2000, Walder 1995). In empirical research, these issues have been studied by comparing 
returns to education with returns to political positions such as party membership (for e.g. Nee and 
Cao 2004). Most findings report that while human capital have become more important in the 
reform period, the returns to political capital have also remained influential. 
 
Other topics in sociological research related to inequality have been the transformation of the class 
structure (Zhang 2000), labour markets (Knight & Song 1995), gender inequality (Hu 2007), social 
mobility (Knight & Yueh 2006), and social boundaries (Wang 2008). For an informative review of 
sociological research related to inequality and income distribution in China, see Bian (2002), 
“Chinese Social Stratification and Social Mobility”. 
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2.2 Privatisation 
 
As we have seen, a whole range of factors contributes to create income inequality. I have chosen to 
focus on privatisation, and to what extent privatisation contributes to income inequality in Western 
China. There are several reasons for studying privatisation in this region. The growth of the private 
sector is a central aspect of the development process towards a market economy. This sector creates 
changed dynamics in the labour market, in prestige hierarchies, possibilities for social mobility, in 
distribution mechanisms, and in relation to many other important aspects in society. To study such a 
development is to study a society in transition, from a pure planned economy to a mixed market 
economy. Some claim that this development will create more development and overall wealth, 
which all citizens benefit from, and that increased inequality is not necessarily linked to economic 
development. However, if the distribution of resources becomes more unequal, this can lead to 
growing unrest among people, to social problems and instability. Chinese leaders, when launching 
the plan for development of the Western areas in 2000, acknowledged the importance of 
diminishing regional inequality and to promote widespread economic growth also in the western 
provinces, in order to create increased stability and quality of life for people in the West. If growing 
inequality can be seen to be connected with the economic development, these goals may be 
undermined.  
 
2.2.1 Definition: Generally about Privatisation 
 
Privatisation is defined generally as a process where public and state property is converted into 
private assets, and processes where the ownership of industry, business, and service enterprises 
changes to being under private control (Roland 2008: 200). But there are also various arrangements 
for shared ownership of enterprises, for example when the state owns a part of the total shares of a 
company, and private interests own the rest.  
 
The idea of privatisation in neo-classical economic theory is often based on the standard market 
model. According to this model, the market consists of free, independent agents who maximise their 
profit by buying and selling goods and services in the market place. Buyers and sellers are expected 
to have the same knowledge about product characteristics, and how the market operates (Sclar 
2000: 7). The state should have a limited role, and not operate in the market as a player. Supporters 
of privatisation often argue that a higher degree of free market, combined with profit motivation, 
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will lead to initiative and competition, and this will in turn result in increased managerial 
productivity, effectiveness, profits, and better quality of products and services. According to this 
perspective, privatisation is viewed as a rational and logical response to the problems of increasing 
state expenses, inefficient state-owned enterprises and the negative consequences of state control, 
for example in terms of limiting human initiative and creativity.  
 
The subject of privatisation versus state ownership is a controversial political debate in many 
countries. Scholars, also among economists, claim that privatisation does not have the positive 
effect on achieving efficiency as proponents have argued, and that inefficiency is not necessarily an 
inherent characteristic of state enterprises and public ownership (Sundaram 2008: 199, 201). 
Privatisation can be difficult to implement successfully as a solution for an inefficient state, in 
sectors where real costs and benefits are difficult to measure, for example in health care where the 
quality of service can be difficult to assess (Sclar 2000).   
 
Several factors can work together and affect how privatisation works. Among others, the type of 
goods and services that are to be privatised, the involved parties in the process of privatisation, and 
the transition cost of institutions (Araral 2009: 175). Similarly, the characteristics of the processes 
of privatisation can also matter to the outcome of privatisation, as well as the economic, political 
and historical context of the region or country where privatisation takes place (Birdsall & Nellis 
2003: 1621).  
 
2.2.2 Privatisation in China 
 
Privatisation has been a central aspect of the reform processes. The term privatisation primarily 
refers to ownership change of state-owned enterprises. It can also refer to the growth of the private 
sector, especially in China, where there was no private sector before the reforms. Furthermore, the 
general withdrawal of state or public services in certain areas can be viewed as a form for 
privatisation, since it is a reduction of state responsibilities, and increased reliance on private 
service providers. This creates opportunities for private parties and enterprises in areas such as 
private schools and private health care in both urban and rural areas.  
 
Reform changes in China have been much more gradual and step-wise than the “shock therapy”-
reforms of the early 1990s in Russia and Eastern Europe (Nee & Cao 2004: 25). In China, local 
levels of the state have played vital roles, such as province, prefecture, and county level 
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governments. They have been in charge of developing and implementing political, economic, and 
institutional changes in their areas. Furthermore, many institutional changes were first tested out in 
local areas to gather valuable experience, before being implemented nation-wide through wide 
reforms decided by the central government. 
 
There has been a massive sector reconfiguration in the Chinese economy, and of the labour market. 
The public sector has declined substantially in terms of number of employees, especially due to the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises and collective town- and village enterprises from the mid-
1990s. The private sector has grown from being nearly non-existent in 1978, to employing 36 per 
cent of the entire work force in 2003, because of growth of individual businesses in urban and rural 
areas, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and private ownership of town- and village 
enterprises. The agricultural sector has decreased in size, from employing 69 per cent of the work 
force in 1978, to 47 per cent in 2003. The most important change in this sector is the shift from 
collective farming to household farming in the early 1980s.  
 
An understanding of China’s modernisation should be contextual, with attention to China being a 
post-socialist state. The Communist Party has remained firmly in control, and represents political 
continuity and stability in a rapidly changing economy. The continuity of the socialist ideology has 
also been important (Sun 2008: 106-109). Because of this continuity of party ideology and the 
socialist legacy, it is still highly controversial to use the term “privatisation” in the China, due to its 
obvious connections to the capitalistic system. Chinese authorities prefer more neutral descriptions 
like “reform and opening-up”, “to build a socialist economy with Chinese characteristics” and 
“restructuring the Chinese economic system”.  
 
2.3 Historical background: Privatisation in the Reform Period 
 
The first phase of the reform process started in 1978 and lasted until the early 1990s. Central in this 
period is reforms in the agricultural sector with independent peasant farming, the introduction of 
managerial autonomy and market competition for state-owned enterprises through the contract 
responsibility system, and the evolving private sector (Naughton 2007: 97).  
 
The reform process slowed down in the beginning of the 1990s, but gained further momentum from 
the middle of the decade. In the second phase of reform, the state established new and modern tax 
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institutions, financial and banking systems, and introduced new laws in order to create transparent 
rules for the fast growing non-state sector and the market economy (Naughton 2007: 103). 
Economic growth continued to be high, and most Chinese citizens experienced improved living 
conditions. However, the massive changes in the labour market also created instability such as 
widespread lay-offs, unemployment, more job insecurity, and increased differences between rich 
and poor.  
 
In the following historical overview of the changes in the reform period, I start with a brief account 
of the situation in the pre-reform planned economy. Then I focus on reforms in the agricultural 
sector, the growth of town and village enterprises and privatisation in the late 1990s, the reform and 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and finally the growth of the private sector, which is partly 
a result of processes in the other sectors.  
 
2.3.1 Sectors in the Planned Economy 
 
The Chinese planned economy in the period from 1949 to 1978 was a command economy, with the 
state controlling the economy. Central and regional government levels decided what to produce, 
how much to invest, assigned production targets, allocated production requirement and distributed 
services and goods (Chai & Roy 2006: 32, 33, Naughton 2007: 57, Chow 2007: 29). The socialist 
priority of rapid industrial growth was at the expense of agricultural production and consumption. 
China struggled with serious shortcomings of food and basic consumer goods. In 1978 there were 
rationing for 20 everyday products, including grain, clothes, soap, tofu and bicycles (Naughton 
2007: 81).  
 
Almost the entire work force was employed in labour organisations owned by the state. In 1978, the 
total labour force was 402 million. Of these, 69 per cent worked in collective farming, 14 per cent 
in state-owned enterprises, 6 per cent in township and village enterprises, five per cent in urban 
collective organisations, four per cent in government and public service units, and two per cent in 
rural non-agricultural enterprises (Naughton 2007: 182). The private sector was virtually non-
existent. The Chinese labour market was strictly organised, and very few were able to change jobs 
or experience social mobility. The household registration system called hukou has separated people 
living in urban and rural areas since its implementation in 1958. It was nearly impossible to change 
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place of residence, and although the system has been liberalised to some extent, it has remained 
active throughout the reform period (Whyte 2010: 20).5  
 
2.3.3 Rural Reform  
 
The death of Mao and the following imprisonment of the Gang of Four in 1976 opened up for new 
policy directions and more open discussions in the communist party. The reforms started in 1978, 
with Deng Xiaoping as the lead reformator. New reform visions were established, through 
influential slogans like “Don’t argue, try bold experiments and blaze new trails”. 
 
The transformation of the agricultural sector was the initial step in the reform period, with the 
introduction of the household responsibility system in 1981. The agricultural sector struggled with 
the task of producing enough food for a growing population, because of old farming methods and 
technology, inefficient organisation, and much farmer discontent caused by the rigid collective 
system (Chow 2007: 49). The new system was based on experience drawn from local-level 
experiments in Sichuan and Anhui in 1978-79. The reform introduced household peasant farming. 
Each rural household rented a piece of land from local authorities. A certain quota of their 
production was to be given to the state as tax, and the farmers could keep the rest. This they would 
either use for own consumption, or sell in local, open markets (Chow 2007: 49). Accompanying the 
reforms were also increased grain prices, contributing to increased farmer income.  
 
The new system gave farmers increased autonomy. They were free to decide the use of the land, 
what type of grain to grow, to experiment with new agricultural products, to grow specialized crops 
and sell their products. They could also rent the land out to others, and work in other sectors (Whyte 
2010: 14). The reform significantly increased agricultural productivity. In the period 1978-1985, 
agricultural production increased more than six per cent annually (Knight & Song 1999: 36). By the 
end of 1992, more than 90 per cent of Chinese households in the agricultural sector were working 
independently in the family unit (Naughton 2007: 239). 
 
An important development that followed from the rural reform, was the reduction of rural public 
services and welfare support. The pre-reform rural collective organisations were important in 
                                                
5 Usually, only residents with local hukou registration have access to the welfare benefits in their area, while people 
living outside their registered residency do not have the access to the same rights as local residents. This has been 
especially problematic for rural to urban migrants, for example struggling with getting school place for their children. 
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providing public services as education, medical care, and support to acquire farmland. After the 
household responsibility system was established, the role of rural collectives was reduced, and this 
also led to reduction of public services (Naughton 2007: 238). In the end of the 1970s, the health 
services covered about 70-80 per cent of rural residents. By the middle 1980s, less than 10 per cent 
of the rural population was covered by cooperative health service system, and the majority of rural 
citizens with health insurance were living in rich eastern coastal areas (Naughton 2007: 243-246).  
 
An important development in the late 1990s has been the rise of off-farm rural work opportunities, 
creating a more diverse rural economy outside of farming. These other sources of work include for 
example town and village enterprises, non-agricultural rural businesses and migration to other areas 
in off-seasons. In 2000, 76 per cent of the age group 16-20 had some kind of off-farm work 
(Naughton 2008: 191). 
 
2.3.4 Township and Village Enterprises 
 
Rural industry and small enterprises, known as township and village enterprises, grew to become an 
important sector in the 1980s and 1990s, especially in rural areas. In 1978, this sector accounted for 
about six per cent of GDP, and had 28 million employees. This increased to 135 million employees 
in 1996, with a share of GDP of 26 per cent (Naughton 2007: 274).  
 
There were several reasons for this growth in the reform period. Because of the increased efficiency 
in agricultural production, many farmers became available for non-farm work, especially in off-
seasons, and town and village enterprises were ideal to absorb this excess work force (Whyte 2010: 
14). Since these enterprises were collectively owned firms, they were not in open conflict with the 
socialist ideology. Relaxation of regulations on rural industrialization allowed rural enterprises to 
participate in the evolving market economy, and to evolve as an alternative to state-owned 
enterprises and create more open markets. Local governments were interested in supporting such 
initiatives, in order to increase revenue and reduce unemployment (Chow 2007: 288).  
 
From the mid-1990s, many town and village enterprises were transformed into privately owned 
enterprises. These changes were very important for the general dynamics of the reform changes in a 
market-oriented direction, and they swept across rural areas all over China. In 2003, a total of 135.7 
million people were employed in township and village enterprises. Only 9.1 per cent of these 
worked in collective/state -owned enterprises, amounting to 12.4 million employees. Instead, 28.5 
Privatisation and Income Inequality in Western China 20 
per cent were employed in enterprises under private ownership, 22 per cent in individually run 
enterprises, and 12.1 per cent in various stock enterprises, including limited liability arrangements, 
stock cooperatives, joint stock, and jointly operated enterprises (Naughton 2007: 291).  
 
2.3.5 Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises 
 
Reforms of the state-owned enterprises were more careful and limited than the rural reforms in the 
period 1978- 1992, and the reform processes became more radical from the mid-1990s. Reforms of 
the state sector were more complex, due to the central factor these industries played in the Chinese 
economy, and the tight economic and political integration this sector had with the state and the 
Party (Chow 2007: 51). Main reasons for reform were problems with productivity and heavy debt 
burdens of many state enterprises.  
 
The contract responsibility system (also named the dual track system) was introduced in the period 
1984-1987, inspired by the agricultural reform (Chow 2007: 48). The system gave greater 
autonomy to each enterprise in deciding what to do, but did not change the ownership situation of 
state-owned enterprises. The enterprises were obliged to fulfil certain defined tasks and pay the 
state a specified tax. They were free to sell the surplus production in the evolving open markets, and 
use the profits for bonus to employees and new investments. By the end of 1987, about 78 per cent 
of all state-owned enterprises was organised according to the contract system (Wu 2005: 147).  
 
In the early 1990s, local governments struggled with heavy debt burdens and inefficiency in their 
enterprises. In 1994, the central party congress decided to abandon the contract management 
system, and opened up for converting state-owned enterprises into shareholder corporations, thus 
paving the way for the possibility of private ownership of former state-owned enterprises (Gan et al. 
2008: 6).  
 
Under the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party September 1997, the Party leadership 
officially set the course to restructure the state-owned industrial enterprise sector. The congress was 
considered as a “milestone in China’s privatisation”, and redefined the public ownership strategy. 
The private sector was acknowledged to be an important factor in Chinese economy, and 
entrepreneurship and private initiatives were applauded. The shareholding system and co-operative 
enterprises were viewed to be beneficial forms of modern economic development, and this 
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development was underlined to be consistent with Chinese socialist ideology (Lau 1999: 70). 
General Secretary of the Communist Party Jiang Zemin announced the new goals: 
 
“… To create large-scale enterprises that has competitive strength, in different industries, 
with multiple ownership forms, located in different regions, and even transnational 
businesses, through the link of capital. To speed up the development of smaller state-owned 
enterprises through reorganization, re-unionization, merging, leasing, contract-management, 
stock cooperation, sale-out, etc.” (The Central People’s Government 2007a) 
 
What followed was a massive wave of privatisation and structural changes in the economy. 
Significant reform initiatives were carried out, including downsizing, restructuring and transferring 
of state enterprises. The local governments had power and incentives to reorganize state-owned 
enterprises, in order to improve the economy in their local area. The policy principle of “keeping 
the large and let the small go” acted as a guideline for local level governments. The reforms had a 
focus on privatisation of smaller enterprises, especially those below county level. Certain sectors 
were still kept firmly under state control, like post and telecommunication, railroad, electric power, 
mass media, the banking system, the school system, and several large industrial enterprises. 
Thousands of small and medium sized state-owned enterprises where privatised across the country 
(Wu 2005: 198). While approximately 78 million people worked in state-owned enterprises in 1995, 
the number of employees had been reduced to 30 million in 2004, amounting to a reduction of 61,5 
per cent (Naughton 2007: 106). 
 
Privatisation of state-owned enterprises was carried out in several ways. Enterprises were converted 
to joint stock corporations and the shares were sold. This created diverse ownership situations, 
ranging from the state being sole or majority owner (especially of large enterprises), to the state 
being minority owner and private parties controlling a majority of the shares, to complete 
privatisation with all shares sold to private investors. Selling shares to employees have also been 
widespread, since it resonates with the socialist ideology. Other important privatisation methods 
have been through management buyout, auction sales, mergers and acquisitions, declaring 
bankruptcy and form new companies with changed ownership, lease contracts, and joint venture 
arrangements with foreign capital (Naughton 2007: 105, Garnaut et al. 2006).  
 
 
 
Privatisation and Income Inequality in Western China 22 
2.3.6 Growth of the Private Sector 
 
The changes accounted for above in other sectors have been central for the growth of the private 
sector. Privatisation of state-owned enterprises and town and village enterprises has been central in 
this respect. Furthermore, the increase of foreign-invested capital and foreign companies 
establishing in China have also contributed to private growth.  
 
The growth of small-scale private businesses is another important factor. In the early 1980s, the 
authorities eased up strict regulations limiting small-scale private businesses. In rural areas, the 
household responsibility system meant that farmers could sell their products in markets and keep 
the profit, and this led to flourishing local marketplaces and bazaars. This led to a massive wave of 
small-scale economic activity both in rural and urban areas, and growth of service providers of all 
sorts, like small retail family businesses, restaurants, and privately run stores (Bian and Zhang 
2002). However, there were strict limitations on the allowed size of these companies, at least until 
the mid-1990s and the 15th Party Congress’ appraisal of the private sector. The size of the urban 
informal sector was 13 per cent of the total labour force in 2003, with correspondently 20,5 million 
people. The ownership in this informal sector is predominantly private. This is a diverse group 
consists of service and retail providers, construction and building firms, migrant workers and so on. 
 
2.3.7 Sector Overview 
 
As a result of these processes, the structure and size of different sectors in 2003 had changed 
considerably, both when comparing to the beginning of the 1990s, and when comparing to 1978. 
The total labour force had grown to 744 million. The private sector now amounted to 36 per cent of 
the total labour force, approximately 268 million people. Included in this sector is the urban 
informal sector (employing 13 per cent of total work force), household businesses (3 per cent), 
private companies (3 per cent), companies with foreign owners (1 per cent), and notably non-public 
town and village enterprises (16 per cent) (Naughton 2007: 182). The public sector now amounted 
to 14 per cent of the total workforce, including employees in state-owned enterprises (4 per cent), 
government and public service unit employees (5 per cent), publicly owned town and village 
enterprises (2 per cent), and employees in reformed corporations with mixed state/private 
ownership (3 per cent). The number of state administration employees has not changed much 
compared to 1978, so the biggest decrease has been in the state-owned enterprise sector, and the 
town and village enterprise sector. The agricultural sector was large also in 2003, with a share of 47 
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per cent of the work force, but this was a significant reduction of the sector’s share of the total work 
force, compared to being 69 per cent in 1978.  
 
The new political direction created a more diverse economy, with the growth of self-employed 
businesses, private enterprises, foreign-owned enterprises, and non-governmental organisations. 
However, the massive structural changes of the second half of the 1990s created much 
unemployment and instability in the labour market (Naughton 2007: 106).
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Chapter Three. Theoretical perspectives 
 
My main research question concerns whether privatisation is related to increased income inequality 
in Western China. The theoretical perspectives I use are neoclassical labour market theory, 
structuralist/neo-Marxist perspective, market transition theory, segmented labour market theory, 
and social closure theory. These theories are used to study how privatisation and income inequality 
are connected together in the Chinese labour market, through social structures of education, 
occupation, sectors, rural-urban diversity, and migration. These five social structures are much 
studied in previous research, and provide different perspectives on income inequality. They are 
differently affected by processes of privatisation and economic transformation in China. 
 
I employ a range of theories and concepts to study the impact of privatisation on the social 
structures, and how this affects income inequality in China. Each perspective is used to frame some 
of the social structures, but some perspectives also have more general importance. I use the 
neoclassical perspective to focus on education, migration, rural-urban divide and occupational 
stratification. Market transition theory focuses on returns to education and inequality between 
sectors. The structuralist/neo-Marxist view is mostly related to urban-rural inequality and migration. 
Segmented labour market theory emphasise occupation and migration, and social closure theory is 
relevant to education, occupation and rural-urban differences. In the end of the chapter I present the 
five hypotheses, together with relevant and central points from the theories. 
 
3.1 Neoclassical Economic Perspective 
 
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that price is determined by the relationship between supply 
and demand in a market. This model is also applied to wages and income distribution in the labour 
market. Individuals who sell their labour force are suppliers, and employers are demanders. When 
there are less qualified candidates for a job, the wage will be higher because of limited supply 
(Becker 1975: 105). Privatisation can be a process where some abilities become more appreciated, 
and this leads to increased demand and higher wages for people with these qualities. Central in this 
regard is returns to educational attainment, where higher education is viewed as being an important 
qualification for individuals to get a better-paid job. Privatisation is also viewed as a process in 
which labour is set free, in terms of labour mobility across regions, and between different kinds of 
work. 
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In a modern market economy, it is important for enterprises to have skilled and productive 
employees to be competitive. This leads to increased demand for people with relevant skills and 
education, and higher wages for these people. In neoclassical theory, this is conseptualised as 
increased returns to educational attainment. Privatisation is also viewed as a process in which 
labour is set free, in terms of labour mobility across regions, and between different kinds of work. 
 
According to neoclassical theory, in the early phases of an evolving economy, higher returns to 
education might lead to higher income inequality between skilled and non-skilled workers in a 
shorter time frame. However, in a more mature open market economy with economic growth, and 
viewed in a long-term perspective, the results will be increased living conditions and a more equal 
income distribution, due to the “trickle-down” effect of resources that also will benefit the poor. An 
important model for this neoclassical view is the Kuznets Curve (Kuznet 1955). The model states 
that in a developing economy with economic growth, in the initial stages there will be higher 
inequality, but this will be reduced again in later, more advanced stages when the economy 
functions better and the economic growth is distributed more evenly throughout the population. 
Based on this, the neoclassical view can be seen to be positive towards the consequences of 
economic development on income inequality. Furthermore, the degree of privatisation can be 
conseptualised as a sign of how mature the market economy is, especially in a transitional economy 
as is the case in Western China. 
 
3.1.1 Demand for Competence: Human Capital Theory and Technological 
Changes 
 
Human capital is the value of an individual’s education or work experience. Human capital theory 
states that it is rational for firms to employ people with higher education, because they are more 
productive and perform their work better. And since these people have invested more in their 
education through years of study, they also deserve to be higher rewarded for this (Becker 1975: 41, 
Becker 1993: 183, Bills 2003: 444). Work experience refers to how employees gain skills and 
knowledge from years of practicing their work, and seniority should be rewarded since they are 
more competent in their jobs. 
 
A theory related to the human capital concept, but more explicitly connected to societal and 
technological change, is called Skill-Biased Technological Change (SBTC). It was developed by 
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economists in the 1980s, with the goal of explaining rising inequality in Western countries at the 
time. The main argument is that changes in technology led to increased demand for highly educated 
workers. Since the demand for this group of workers was larger than the available supply, wages for 
individuals with relevant high education increased, and this changed the income distribution of 
modern Western societies (Lemieux 2007: 22). Following the development of new technology, 
scientific and technological knowledge became more important for production (Becker 1993: 24). 
Computers and high technologies replaced many workers in doing simple routine based tasks. 
While demand for low-skilled routine jobs often decreased, the demand for high-skilled employees 
increased. This trend favoured individuals with higher education, and created a more stratified wage 
structure. 
 
In the labour market, workers are allocated to positions on the basis of their education and skill 
level, is viewed to be more meritocratic and efficient than a labour market with institutional 
boundaries decided by the state. In China, such boundaries include the hukou system that limits 
mobility, the importance of political connections and political capital for job allocation, and the lack 
of education possibilities that limits individuals’ potential. Through the formation of a more open 
labour market with a growing private sector, and increased importance of human capital, the 
neoclassical perspective expects decreased inequality over time, and directs the blame for creating 
income inequality at state-implemented institutional boundaries in modern China (Dollar 2007). 
Privatisation and market economy is viewed to have an equalising effects on the inequalities created 
by the state distribution system. 
 
In the plan economic system in China, human capital in general played a very limited role. The 
allocation and distribution of jobs and people were politically and administratively decided upon. 
There were no open labour markets, and distribution of jobs and allocation of personnel were 
solved by organisations such as the work-units (danweis) in urban areas, and collectives in rural 
areas. In these systems, the system favoured political loyalty and political positions, not competence 
and education credentials. Individual characteristics like differences in education played a very 
limited role (Zhao and Zhou 2002: 342).  
 
The growth of the private sector and more open labour markets contribute to the growing 
importance of human capital and returns to education in China in the reform period (Gustaffson et 
al. 2008: 112). Furthermore, there have also been important technological development and 
modernisation in China in the reform period (Sigurdson 2004). Liberalisation of wage-setting 
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mechanisms in state enterprises and the technological changes has changed the previously 
centralised wage structures. In a market-oriented economy, technological changes in China 
favoured higher educated individuals, and contributed to develop a more stratified wage structure 
with increased income gaps between individuals with lower and higher education (Liu et al. 2007: 
18, Liu 1998: 698, 721).  
 
3.1.2 Rational Choice and Free Mobility: Migration Promotes Equality 
 
According to neoclassical economists, market liberalism and privatisation function as central 
mechanisms that increase migration. Further, they argue that this liberation of labour mobility will 
create processes that lead to more equality, both between migrants and non-migrants, and between 
rural and urban areas. Neoclassical economics emphasise individual rationality through utility 
maximising and/or profit maximising. Related to migration, the neoclassical perspectives propose 
that migration is the result of individuals’ rational choice, and migration has positive effects on 
economic development. Accordingly, migration contributes to increased income equality, when 
comparing the sending and receiving side of migration (de Haas 2008: 4).  
 
For neoclassical economists, an individual chooses to migrate based on a rational calculation of 
costs and benefits from employment opportunities, and the prospects of obtaining a higher wage is 
the most important motive for migrating (Torado 1969: 138). The neoclassical perspectives resonate 
with the modernisation theory and the “push-pull” model, by assuming that rural-urban migration is 
part of a general economic development, determined by either individual choice, or equilibrium 
between supply and demand sides of the labour force (Harris & Todaro 1970: 127). Harris and 
Todaro (1970) have also pointed out that the elasticity of the induced migration contributes to 
change urban-rural wage differentials, and urban employment probabilities. Since migrants earn 
more from urban work, and send remittance back to their families, increased migration will lead to 
decreased inequality between urban and rural areas. Further, if processes connected to privatisation 
and more job opportunities leads to increased migration, this would promote equality in an overall 
perspective.  
 
As an extension of the neoclassical perspective, transitional migration theory emphasises a 
perspective of different stages of development. While rural-urban migration often will increase 
inequality in earlier stages of development, in later stages it will contribute to decreased inequality, 
when development has reached a certain momentum (Zelinsky 1971: 233). Accordingly, income 
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inequality will decrease when migrant networks are established, the migration system is improved, 
and when cost and risks of migration are reduced (de Haas 2008: 40-41). The transition theorists 
also refer to many empirical studies which conclude that migration over time leads to higher 
development.  
 
Migration was limited in China, and the state sector restricted access to job possibilities. But there 
has been increased demand for migrant labour after the economic reform, related to downsizing of 
the state sector, privatisation, and the extension of the private sector. Migrants represent a cheap 
and flexible labour force, and many work in the more informal private sector. When there is a high 
surplus of low-skilled migrant workers, the wages for this social group may be even lower. This can 
lead to higher income inequality between rural migrants and urban residents. 
 
3.1.3 Neoclassical Development Theory: Urban-Rural Diversity 
 
Neoclassical development theory is concerned with spatial development. This theory focuses on 
how the economic development is determined by market operation and price mechanisms, and that 
the state’s main role is to ensure that the market institutions works well, to allow private 
competition, and to encourage economic growth (Brown & Warner 1991: 31). Neoclassical scholars 
believe that different interests will be balanced in the market mechanism. The economic growth will 
have a “trickle down” function in a society, and over time also benefit the poorest segments of the 
population. Modernisation theorists claim that increased rural-urban inequality is caused by the 
failure of backward rural areas to implement modern capitalist principles (Wahl 1998: 110). 
Accordingly, state distribution and governmental controls are the main reason for the urban-rural 
diversity. It is expected that with the emergence of open markets, modernisation, and privatisation, 
inequality between rural and urban areas will decrease. Lewis’ model of urban-rural studies 
supports this idea, and predicts reduced urban-rural disparity following economic development and 
privatisation. Accordingly, industrial development depends on the elastic supply of rural work 
force. With further development, this elastic supply of rural labour will be changed. When the price 
for agricultural production is relatively improved, the wages for rural labour will be increased. In a 
competitive labour market, the urban wage will also raise. It is a win-win situation; the rural-urban 
transfer of labour will contribute to increased trade between rural and urban, and lead to less 
inequality (Knight & Song 1999: 4).  
 
However, many studies show that although there is a higher degree of market economy and 
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privatisation, the urban-rural disparities have continued to increase throughout the reform period in 
China. While urban Chinese is enjoying both market profit and state benefits, peasants are more 
disadvantaged (Knight & Song 1999, Gustafsson 2008, Sicular et al. 2010, Whyte 2010). The 
understanding of urban-rural income difference should be connected to spatial context and different 
types of households, ownership, and locations. Knight and Song (1999) point out that in some well-
developed rural areas, the blooming of township and village enterprises and rapid development of 
rural industries raised the income level of rural residents, and income disparity between these rural 
areas and cities declined. But in some other rural areas, local economy was not developed, and 
income inequality was still increasing. 
 
 3.2 Structuralist and Neo-Marxist Perspectives   
 
Both Structuralists and Neo-Marxists focus on the structural impact on social phenomena. Their 
perspectives on inequality often overlap each other. While structuralists are interested in studying 
underlying social structures, neo-Marxists emphasise the importance of contradictory class 
positions and conflict. I mainly use these theories to gain another perspective on the rural-urban 
income gap, and migration situation. The Neo-Marxists conflict perspective argues that the 
expansion of capitalism is the reason for inequality, and capital penetration and exploitation are the 
key concepts. More expanded private sectors and privatisation can in practice be viewed as a 
process towards a more capitalist society. In this process, rural peripheries are exploited by the core 
areas, exporting rural resources and rural labours, in order to support urban development. Rural 
areas lose the valuable labour forces, are marginalised from development, and trapped in 
disadvantaged positions.  
 
3.2.1 Market, Inequality, and Privatisation  
 
There is much discussion about the factors contributing to inequality. Liberalism argues that the 
free market solution creates human initiative and growth, which will further benefit all in society 
through a trickle down-effect. Market economy represents a possibility for equality. Social 
inequality is, according to this view, a result of the state or political groups interfering with the 
redistribution of resources, creating benefits for the political elite (Sun 2008: 104). In contrast, neo-
Marxism claims that the market institutions with their focus on competition, profit maximizing and 
practices of exploitation are the roots of social inequality. There is an interdependent relationship 
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between the capitalists and the workers, where the workers are excluded from access to the profits 
derived from their own labour, and exploited by capitalists. Capitalists, on the other hand, benefit 
from the exclusion of the workers, and generate inequality (Wright 2005: 23).  
 
Further in the neo-Marxist perspectives, capitalism is tightly connected with private ownership and 
privatisation. In a capitalist production relationship, the means of production is privately owned 
(Wright 2005:10, Hughes et el. 2003: 50). In this sense, privatisation can be viewed as one of the 
basic characteristics for capitalism. Thus, the process of privatisation, and the transition from a 
previously socialist state to a capitalist state, can be related to increased inequality. The unequal 
distribution is not only connected to the capitalist exploitation of working class, but also combined 
with a more “natural” process of social reproduction of inequality in the process of privatisation, 
and various legitimated social boundaries. This will be discussed more in the section of social 
closure theory.   
 
3.2.2 Development or Exploitation? Regional Disparity 
 
One central perspective of neoclassical economists is that market promotes development, while 
state distribution creates inequality. One interesting debate is about uneven regional development. 
Dominant neoclassical economic theories argue that the emergence of urban-rural disparity is 
mainly due to failures of introducing modern capitalist operating methods and technology for 
industrialisation in rural areas (Wahl 1998). Some have criticised that the government policies 
systematically favour urban development and urban industrialisation. Accordingly, the expansion of 
privatisation and free market is the only way to reduce urban-rural inequality, and to promote 
development (Dollar 2007).  
 
This perspective is controversial, and much discussed. Economic structuralism stresses the external 
and internal context of a society. According to this perspective, urban-rural inequality is created by 
different market conditions in different economic sectors. In some sectors there are too much 
supply, and in others too much demand. Such unstable supply-demand relationships can contribute 
to uneven regional development, and can explain the disequilibrium and polarisation of uneven 
wealth distribution (Brown & Warner 1991: 31).  
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Critical neo-Marxism focuses on class conflict, capital penetration, and exploitation, and represents 
another set of tools that can be used to frame rural-urban inequality. One such tool that is closely 
related to neo-Marxism is dependency theory. A central term is “uneven development”, which 
implies that rural areas are excluded from economic development. It argues that the priority of 
urban areas is mainly caused by capital accumulation and monopoly capitalism. Urban industrial 
development is the first priority, since this sector has large potential to create fast economic growth 
through higher productivity and expansion of markets both internally and externally. Rural industry 
and agriculture is marginalised and exploited, since resources in these sectors are channelled to 
support urban development. Furthermore, in order to ensure production and avoid conflict among 
urban workers, social welfare benefits are channelled to urban citizens (Wahl 1998: 110). An 
essential theorist of the dependency approach is Wallerstein with the world systems theory. One of 
his most relevant concepts in relation to the urban-rural relationship is the dichotomy between core 
and periphery. The main reason for differentiation between regions is the economic interests of the 
rich and developed core areas, and their exploitation of the underdeveloped periphery. This 
exploitation obstructs internal development in peripheries. The hegemonic interest is powerful and 
there is limited possibility to change the social structure (Brown & Warner 1991: 31).  
 
Privatisation is an important aspect both regarding the social transition from a socialist society to a 
capitalist economy, and the economic reforms in Western China. Therefore, it can be related to the 
increased urban-rural inequality. More privatisation can be a measure of a higher degree of capital 
monopoly, which is further related to income inequality between social groups and individuals. 
Neo-Marxist theory and Structuralism give a different picture of inequality than neoclassical 
economic perspectives. Their focus on the exploitative character of the urban-rural relationship is 
central. In these perspectives, privatisation is no longer a mechanism for promoting equality, but in 
contrast, privatisation becomes a practice of and expanding capitalist system, or a process of 
capitalist exploitation, which will bring about and co-exist with higher income inequality. 
 
3.2.3 Free Labour Mobility or Exploitation: Migration theories 
 
Some dominant neoclassical economy theories contend that the relationship between supply and 
demand will lead to equality between migrants and non-migrants in an open market economy. The 
historical-structural theory and neo-Marxists gives an opposite perspective. According to the 
structuralist perspective, migration leads to asymmetric growth and increased regional disparity (de 
Haas 2008: 26-30). When the access to political and economic resources is unequally distributed 
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between different regions, a certain dynamic evolves, where the underdeveloped regions are 
determined to lose. Capital and labour (migrants) float from the underdeveloped peripheries to 
developed centres, the peripheries are exploited by the core areas, and underdevelopment of rural 
areas follows this dynamic. Structural functionalism looks at the social relationship in a society, and 
shares much of the above-mentioned perspectives. For example, Parkin (1975) emphasised the 
contradictions between rural migrants who lost their land, and the landlords with surplus land. 
Through the land policy, rural areas are supplying both production and wage labour to the capitalist 
development.  
 
Neo-Marxists view increased inequality between regions as a bi-product of practices related to 
capital accumulation and the spread of capitalist market principles (Massey et al. 1998: 36). In a 
capitalist society with less government regulation, regional inequality is growing (de Haas 2008: 
27). Capital streams, privatisation, and cheap involuntary migration benefit urban development, 
while rural areas are trapped in disadvantaged positions (Castles & Miller 2003: 25). According to 
neo-Marxists, migrating rural workers are separated from their production means (the land they 
own), and enter the capitalist production sphere where they sell they labour-power. Some argue that 
when regional inequality occurs, polarisation between rural and urban will be enforced. 
Underdeveloped peripheries are trapped in poverty, and developed centres are facing even faster 
growth. Inequality thus becomes even larger. 
 
Migration is viewed as a result of the expansion of capitalism, and migration can contribute to 
increased income inequality between urban and rural sectors, through adverse effects of migration 
inside rural areas (Gerold-Scheepers & van Binsbergen 1978: 5). First of all, migration causes a 
drain of valuable labour force in rural areas, mainly young men that could contribute greatly in 
agricultural activities and production, but also women and girls who migrate to work in for example 
textile factories. It is argued that migrants often come from economically advantaged families that 
can afford the cost of migration, as well as from more open-minded and better-educated people. 
When losing these bright young people with relatively high levels of human capital, the growth and 
development of rural areas are negatively affected. Secondly, inequality is increasing in rural areas, 
because better-off families are becoming even wealthier, since they receive significant amounts of 
remittance from their migrant family members (Lipton 1980: 11). Even though some capital of 
migrant remittance floats back to the rural areas, little capital are invested in developing the 
stagnant local economy and larger enterprise ventures, but are used for family savings and daily 
consumption (Lipton 1980: 12). Even if some of the money is used in business activity, they are 
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mainly put into small family and self-employment businesses like retail and service firms, which do 
not contribute much to overall economic rural growth (Penninx 1982: 802). The income differences 
will thus increase inside rural areas.  
 
3.3 Market Transition Theory 
 
Neoclassical economic theories and structuralist/neo-Marxist perspectives study inequality from 
different perspectives. The first mentioned are generally more optimistic, while the other ones are 
more pessimistic. However, both approaches research inequality as a static phenomenon situated in 
certain social condition. Market transition theory focus on how the changes of the reform period 
affect social stratification and income distribution in China. It was formulated by the economic 
sociologist Victor Nee (1989), and has created a wide debate. The theory’s main position is that the 
growth of the market sector will reduce the importance of the public sector. The legacy from the 
planned economy is the prevalence of the state redistribution system and power connected to 
privileged positions in this system. This continues to be important also in reform China, but the 
growing market and especially the private sector changes the game. This development, which is 
termed “marketisation”, will lead to important changes in the distribution of power and income in 
China. The hierarchy in the public sector is based on political capital and positions. The main 
principle in the market sector is human capital and returns to education, but of course controlling 
capital and investments is also important. Market transition theory proposes that as the market 
grows, market mechanisms will gradually replace political mechanisms when it comes to 
distribution of income (Nee & Cao 2004). Individuals with market power will gain advantages, 
while the advantages of individuals with political power will gradually be reduced. Human capital 
and returns to education has received much attention in the transition debate, as this is taken to be 
the central feature of the market sector. 
 
This development has important consequences for income inequality. In the initial phases of reform, 
a growing market sector may cause increased equality, because it provides an alternative for 
entrepreneurs and other people who did not have positions in the redistribution system. However, as 
the market sector gradually becomes more important, this sector has much potential for generating 
higher inequality levels than before the reforms, particularly after the sector had been legitimized 
and actively supported by state, as the case was in China from the mid-1990s and onwards (Sun 
2008: 104).  
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3.3.1 Increased Returns to Human Capital 
 
A key point in market transition theory is that human capital becomes more important in regards to 
income distribution, with the growth of the private sector. According to Nee, “the transition to a 
market-like economy should result in higher returns to human capital characteristics” (Nee 1989: 
674). In the market economy, there is increased competition between firms, and between 
individuals in the labour market. In order to increase profits and maintain market position, the 
demand for skilled-personnel with necessary knowledge and qualifications increases. The increased 
demand for skilled workers creates higher wages for educated employees, and a consequence of this 
is increased inequality between skilled and non-skilled, highly educated and low educated workers. 
The wage structure becomes more stratified and diverse, especially in the private sector.  
 
This mechanism of income inequality emphasises the significance of institutional change. The 
emergence of more open labour markets creates a competition-oriented environment where 
educational credentials become more important, and receive higher rewards (Nee & Cao 2004: 47). 
If these principles are central in the private, market-oriented sector, then increased income 
inequality can be the result of a larger private sector.  
 
Most research on returns to education in China and income inequality connected to market 
transition is on the national level. When it comes to the mainly rural Western China, the 
development towards a more open market sector can also be central for income inequality. In rural 
areas, income from agricultural sources remains to be the most important way of income for a large 
group of farmers. However, the growth of town and village enterprises has also created more non-
farming work opportunities in many rural areas in the West, and this has contributed to increased 
inequality within villages in rural regions. Xing et al. find that human capital is an important factor 
when explaining wage differences between farmers in Western China, in addition to other factors 
like prices on agricultural crops and access to land (Xing et al. 2006: 2). Returns to education are 
expected to be even more important in urban areas in the West. Zhao and Zhou compared returns to 
education in 1978 and 1993, based on a sample of 4,600 urban respondents in six provinces from all 
regions of China. They found that the growth of income related to educational attainment was 
substantial, especially in non-state sectors where market mechanisms are even more important 
(Zhao & Zhou 2002: 370). 
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Critics of market transition theory have noted that education becomes also more important in other 
sectors than the private, as for example in the public sectors (Zhao & Zhou 2002). Increased 
demand for skilled employees becomes a general phenomenon in modern China, and more people 
aim to have higher education. It results in a competitive educational race (Wang 2008: 122).  
 
3.3.2 Income Inequality Between Sectors 
 
The effects of privatisation on wage level are ambiguous and points in several directions. There can 
be different effects for various groups of employees. The private sector is more diverse in terms of 
different kinds of jobs and tasks, divergent educational and skill requirements, and larger variation 
of wages in the occupational structure. The income of skilled employees in higher positions is 
divergently affected by privatisation, than the income of workers in low-paid, manual jobs, such as 
migrants (Hebel & Schucher 2006: 26). In the state sector, the wages of employees were 
administratively decided in the planned economy, and there were low levels of inequality inside the 
state sector before the reforms. The logics in the market economy are different, with the central 
drive towards higher efficiency and increased profits. In later years, the use of part-time and 
temporary contracts also in the state sector have become more widespread, making the labour 
market more insecure.  
 
Some research points to that the competitive environment in the private sector may increase wages 
for employees in privatised firms, especially for skilled workers in demand (de Fraja 1993: 468). 
Sociologist Zhang Zhanxin has analysed income differences between employees in private- and 
state-owned enterprises, based on data from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) in 1995. 
He finds that persons employed in the private sector generally had higher income than those who 
worked in government sectors, while there is often lower and less differentiated wages in state-
owned enterprises (Zhang 2007: 114, 121). An explanation for this can be that employees in private 
sector over time receive higher wages, because the private enterprises are more successful in 
implementing effective production, and generate more profits which employees in turn benefit from 
(Nee & Cao 2004: 24). A growing private sector, combined with higher wages compared to the 
state and collective sectors, can create increased income inequality between people employed in 
private and state sector.  
 
With the growth of the private sector, there is more focus on the principle “high-skills pay-off” and 
returns to education in the private sector (Ho et al. 2002: 661-662). Employees in the state and 
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public sectors are facing reduced protection and income when economic policy is turned in a more 
market-orientated direction, while individuals in private sector, who basically have higher income, 
may get even better wages through the restructured effective system. Income distance can therefore 
be even larger, and privatisation can thus lead to higher wage inequality between sectors. However, 
economists Haskel and Szymansky (1992) points out that wages in the public sector were 
previously privilege, but can be expected to decrease as the enterprises are privatised and expenses 
cut. They maintain that wage levels will even out, and be at roughly the same level in different 
enterprises across sectors.  
 
3.3.3 Bonus Systems and Occupational Stratification 
 
Occupation has become one of the most important determinants for social stratification, and several 
studies of wealth distribution and income inequality in China have found that occupation is one of 
the factors that have significant influence on individuals’ income level and economic situation (cf. 
Bian & Zhang 2002, Li & Sato 2006, Nee & Cao 2004).  
 
A special feature of privatisation is the use of bonus arrangements in the private sector to increase 
incentive and productivity. This rewards successful employees, creates a more competitive 
environment, and contributes to create a more stratified and diverse wage structure (Nee & Cao 
2004: 24). If the bonus arrangements are more likely to be used to award high-skilled employees, 
there will be larger wage differences between occupations based on different educational types and 
levels. Furthermore, this can lead to and overall increased income inequality between occupational 
positions.  
 
Principles found in the market economy and private sector can also affect wage levels and social 
stratification elsewhere. From the implementation of contract management system in the 1980s, the 
use of bonus arrangements has also steadily increased in the state sector. It contributed to larger 
income differences within the state sector. The reforms from 1994 are especially influential, which 
underscored the importance of the private sector and accelerated the privatisation of state 
enterprises. New incentive mechanisms were introduced, in order to boost employee productivity in 
the remaining state-owned enterprises. Many enterprises faced growing pressure when competing 
with private enterprises in the open market economy. Wages became more stratified according to 
educational and occupational positions; more carrier schemes and promotion mechanisms were 
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introduced; seniority remuneration was strengthened; the bonus- and reward-systems became more 
important awarding high-performance workers (Knight & Song 1999: 48, Chow 2007: 51). 
 
3.3.4 Sector Changes and Work Organisations 
 
Different sectors have different forms of work organisations, which are important for income 
distribution. The economic reforms have influenced these work organisations in the various sectors 
in different ways, which affects income inequality both within sectors and between sectors. The 
traditional state work units, danwei, are a form of work organisation from the plan economic 
system. It has continued to play an important role also in the reform period in urban areas. In the 
planned economy, the danwei system was used as an effective mechanism for controlling and 
distributing social resources, and had special socio-economic significance and responsibility to 
regulate capital, resources, and workers. The division of labour was only a symbol for different 
working tasks, and occupations were thus not important for social position (Lin & Bian 2002).  
 
The structure of danwei system has changed in the reform period, but is generally recognised to still 
play an important role concerning income distribution in urban areas (Xue et al. 2009: 3). The 
distribution of benefits like housing, health insurance, and other welfare arrangements are reduced, 
but danwei-arrangements continue to be important for earnings. This system generally promotes 
equality for people inside the organisations. However, the benefits of the danwei system are not 
available for everyone, so it maintains systems of inclusion and exclusion. Migrants are for example 
excluded, and people working in less organised sectors such as private enterprises. Furthermore, 
there has been a reduction of the danwei organisations, partly because of the reduction of state 
owned enterprises and growth of the private sector. In this way, privatisation can be seen to 
undermine the work organisations related to the older state distribution system, and the result may 
be worsened living conditions and reduced wages and benefits for state employees.  
 
3.4 Segmented Labour Market Theory 
 
Segmented labour market theory is an alternative to neoclassical economic views, which may be 
criticised for having an abstract and theoretical view of labour markets, with little empirical focus 
on how labour markets are organised and works in practice (Hebel & Schucher 2006: 8). 
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Segmented labour market theory is also an alternative to Marxist perspectives, which focuses on 
relationships of exploitation between capitalist and workers.  
 
3.4.1 Primary and Secondary Segments 
 
The main point in segmented labour market theory is that labour markets are not unified, but 
divided into segments with different logics and norms. There are different ways to define these 
segments. One is to divide between primary and secondary sectors, such as Piore did when studying 
the US labour market in the 1970s (Piore 1975). The primary sector consists of well-paid and stable 
occupations with higher wages, status and position in the work organisation. The secondary sector 
consists of job with low demands concerning skills, lower wages, worse working conditions and 
more job instability (Piore 1975: 126). Piore divided the primary sector further into an upper tier 
and a lower tier. The upper tier occupations were defined as being high-skilled professionals and 
leaders in management positions. Individuals with these occupations have higher wages, have 
higher possibilities for career and possibilities for promotion, and are associated with high mobility. 
There are internalised codes of behaviour within this social class, and the boundary between the 
upper and lower primary sector is based on formal prerequisites of educational credentials and 
various certifications (Piore 1975: 127).  
 
Instead of dividing between primary and secondary sector, one can use the concept of internal and 
external labour markets, to focus on processes of exclusion and closure (Hebel & Schucher 2006: 
9). This perspective is especially relevant to understand income distribution connected to certain 
groups which are institutional discriminated, such as migrant workers. It is also relevant when 
comparing rural and urban areas in China. While the urban areas represent a more developed 
economy with higher wages, poorer rural residents are often limited or excluded from being a part 
of the high economic growth. Segmented labour market theory has also been central when studying 
transitional economies, such as countries in Eastern European and in China (Hebel & Schucher 
2006: 9). Segment theory terms like “core” and “periphery” have been used when analysing the 
labour market in China’s pre-reform planned economy. Workers employed in sectors close to the 
state system (such as steel industry and government administration) received much benefits and 
formed a core segment, while workers in sectors further from the state (such as collective and in the 
small-scale private sector) received much less benefits. Another way that labour market 
segmentation has been conceptualized in China has been done by sociologist Zang (2002), who 
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defined segments as being the private sector versus the public sector in a study of urban income 
inequality. However, in the following I will mostly refer to Piore’s concept of primary and 
secondary segments. 
 
3.4.2 Stratified Occupational Structure 
 
The economic reform and privatisation in China in the last three decades has created new forms of 
labour markets, employment relationships, and occupational patterns. The division of labour has 
changed, from being relatively unified and equal in terms of wages in the planned economy, to 
become a more complex and diverse in the market economy (Hebel & Schucher 2006: 10). 
Segmented labour market theory is an important perspective to understand occupational structures 
in China, and increased inequality between occupational classes.  
 
Transformations in the reform period have created a more diverse occupational structure. The 
private sector consists of more varied types of work, ranging from jobs demanding high skilled-
competent employees, to low skilled work with less formal requirements. The growth of the 
informal service sector has created many new job opportunities outside the public and agricultural 
sectors, although the wages are often low. Technological change and modernisation has contributed 
to increased demand for competence and increased complexity in many work organisations. The 
increased stratification in the occupation structure is especially important in private sector, but can 
also be found elsewhere, like in the public and agricultural sectors.  
 
The framework of segmented labour market theory is well suited to capture such processes. Jobs in 
the primary sector are highly rewarded and require high-skilled employees, while jobs in the 
secondary sector are low skilled and low-rewarded. These segments are open to different kind of 
individuals with different educational credentials and backgrounds. The increased differentialisation 
in the labour market can therefore be seen to contribute to increased income inequality overall, 
because these segments have different principles related to wages and compensation. For example, 
there is more use of reward and bonus arrangements in the primary segment, and higher returns to 
education.  
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3.4.3 Segmented Labour Market and Migration 
 
The growth of migration flows has been a central development in modern China. The rural reforms 
in the beginning of the 1980s is an important factor for increased migration, since more efficient 
farming created a huge surplus agricultural workforce and a wave of rural-to-urban migration 
(Cheng 1998: 25). 6 The private sector is less restricted and more open to hire migrant workers, and 
a growing private sector have therefore create more work opportunities and demand for migrants. 
The hukou system is still active, but restrictions have been loosened up to some extent.  
 
Migrants typically find work in the secondary segment of the labour market. Jobs in this segment 
are low-paid, with very modest demands towards formal skills and education.  
Employers often exploit the cheap migrant workforce. The jobs are generally temporary and 
unstable. Furthermore, there are very limited possibilities for migrants to gain higher positions in 
the organisational hierarchy, partly because of discrimination towards rural workers, and due to 
educational demands (Piore 1979: 17). Secondary segment jobs are mainly in trades like 
construction, hauling, manufacturing, handicraft, street-corner commerce, transport, and domestic 
service. These jobs are often dangerous, physically demanding or dirty, and not very popular among 
urban residents (Li 2001: 19, 28, 31; Gaetano & Jacka 2004). The institutionalisation and closure 
between the primary and secondary sectors of the labour market have led to increased income 
inequality between migrant workers and resident workers, and wider income disparities between 
rural and urban areas (Cheng 1998: 31). 
 
3.5 Social Closure Theory 
 
A sociological alternative to understand inequality is to view labour markets and different 
professions as social fields surrounded by boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. A framework 
based on social closure theory is developed by Weeden (2002) to explain how occupational and 
organisational groups create boundaries around them, in order to increase wages and social status 
for the group.  
 
Weeden has studied wage differences between different occupations in the United States, and 
identified five occupational closure devices in the labour market: Licensing, educational credentials 
                                                
6 By 1998, the surplus labour in rural China was roughly estimated to be 200 million (Cheng 1998: 31). 
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through the formal education system, certification through voluntary programs, representation by 
occupational associations, and unionization (Weeden 2002: 60). The necessity for individuals to 
obtain certain credentials, as for example particular levels of educational attainment and 
professional skills, serves as a systematic barrier of inclusion into a group and exclusion from a 
group. This limits access to particular labour markets (Weeden 2002: 58).  
 
Closure mechanisms can also go through other social institutions and structures, such as the 
institutional boundaries between urban and rural areas, or boundaries around labour organisations 
like the urban danwei. Privatisation can be related to inequality through its reinforcement of closure 
mechanisms. China is becoming a market-oriented economy with a higher degree of privatisation, 
and the impact of closure mechanisms increases.  
 
3.5.1 Social Closure in Education  
 
Educational certification provides access to certain occupational fields that demand formal 
diplomas and grades from trusted educational institutions. This function of educational 
credentialing works in two different ways. First, certification can refer to the real skills that are 
necessary to qualify for the work tasks, and serves as a standardized judgment for employers to 
evaluate their candidates. Secondly, certification works as a symbolic, social marker, that 
communicates an individual’s social belonging and cultural affiliation, and symbolise one’s 
membership in a social group (Weeden 2002: 60, 61). The process of privatisation in China can 
make closure mechanisms more important. The occupational structure in pre-reform China was 
relatively egalitarian, both in term of wages and request for entry, and the demand for people with 
high education was low. After the reform period, new demands to credential certifications were 
defined formally and informally. The closure mechanism restricts the number of potential 
candidates for a job, based on their educational level. This is especially relevant for larger 
enterprises in the private sector.  
 
Social closure theory further emphasise how professions can increase their wage level by limiting 
access to their own labour market. By establishing formal institutional barriers which emphasise 
formal requirements, obligatory diplomas, completed courses, and so on, practitioners inside for 
example fields like medicine, lawyers, IT-expert can increase their wage level. Such mechanisms 
can be relevant to a large number of especially high-skilled work positions, and can contribute to 
stratify the wage structure.  
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A related development in the reform period is the growth of private schools and school fees in 
public schools, both in rural and urban areas. The official educational policy strategy changed in 
1993, and local governments, non-state actors, and private interests were encouraged to provide 
educational services to the population (Mok et al. 2009: 506). School tuition and various fees were 
increased dramatically in order to finance school activities and pay the teachers. The average school 
tuition increased from 200 yuan per student in 1986 to 6,000 yuan in 2006. The number of private 
educational institutions in China has increased from 50,000 institutions with 11 million students in 
1998, to 70,000 institutions with equivalently 18 million students in 2004 (Mok et al. 2009: 507).  
 
The privatisation of the educational system makes it easier for some social groups to obtain 
profitable educational credentials than for other groups that are less well-off. Differences in 
educational attainment have further consequences, when educational credentials from the right 
schools are converted into occupational positions and economic capital (Wu et al. 2008: 311). In 
2005, the average cost for a university or college education was equal to a four years net income of 
a urban family, and 13 years net income for a rural family (Hansen & Thøgersen 2008: 144). 
Inequality in educational attainment are later converted into income inequality between individuals, 
households, and on a macro level creates increased regional disparities between rural and urban 
China, as well as rural poverty (Knight et al. 2009: 313, 332; Wu et al. 2006: 310-317; Li et al. 
2009: 378-380). 
 
3.5.2 Social Exclusion and Occupation 
 
Reviewing Weeden’s closure approach, inequalities reflected in occupation differences primarily 
results from social exclusion. Privileged social groups defend their economic interests by 
constructing social and legal boundaries, and impose demands for accessing certain occupations and 
positions (Weeden 2002: 59). The closure mechanisms rely on strategies such as restricting 
potential candidates for an occupation through increased legal and formal demands that limits 
access to these jobs, with the aim and result being higher wages for individuals who occupy the job 
positions in question. On one hand, various formal and informal demands are imposed and 
institutionalised: Individuals need educational credentialing and licensure for an occupational title 
in order to gain access to particular jobs. On the other hand, by signalling, labelling, and 
institutionalising the quality and importance of certain occupations through e.g. cultural stereotypes, 
formal certification, and unionization membership, the high wage level of these occupations are 
secured. Through these strategic closure mechanisms, inequalities between occupations are 
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institutionalised and legitimised (Weeden 2002: 60-68). Similar patterns are also recognised in 
China, and occupation serves to create social boundaries and enlarge inequality. Higher 
occupational position in Chinese market economy is associated with distributional power (Wang 
2008: 122, 125).  
 
Developing processes of privatisation and modernisation in China creates increased occupational 
diversity. While private sectors and entrepreneurs (especially in large private enterprises) are 
already adopting the credential-based stratification strategies, the occupational structure in 
traditional sectors such as state enterprises and government agencies may still more or less 
emphasise political power of party membership and cadre position.7 Therefore, occupational 
position can play a more important role for income inequality, when processes of privatisation 
become more widespread.  
 
3.5.3 Institutional Boundaries Between Rural and Urban 
 
One approach to explain regional inequality, such as urban-rural diversity, is by focusing on the 
institutional boundaries from the pre-reform period, and how these continue to affect inequality 
between rural and urban areas in the context of economic transformation and privatisation. This 
case can be discussed in the Chinese context. 
 
There are institutionalised boundaries between urban and rural areas in China, for example in 
regards to the household registration system. The rights- and welfare regimes are very different in 
urban and rural areas. Before the reform, urban work units and rural local collectives had the 
responsibility to arrange housing, medicine, schooling, and other social support to people (Whyte 
2010: 12). For most urban citizens, social benefits such as health care and schooling has been 
maintained at relatively high levels in the reform period. In rural China, reforms have significantly 
reduced the level of welfare support and public services, and fewer resources are channelled to rural 
areas (Knight & Song 1999: 342-343).  
 
In this sense, the differential treatment of urban and rural citizens is clear, and the hukou system 
emphasises the differences by limiting mobility, especially movement from rural to urban. This was 
                                                
7 Some of the closure strategies can also be found in the employment and promotion system in state sectors, as for 
example the strict demand of educational credentialing from formal educational institutions. However, since income 
level in state sector is still relatively equal, so occupational position and education credential play a less important role 
for income inequality, compared with in private enterprises. 
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written by Lipton as he described poor countries in general: “ The rural sector contains most of the 
poverty, and most of the low-cost sources of potential advance, but the urban sector contains most 
of the articulateness, organization and power” (Lipton 1977: 13). Privatisation, in a broader 
definition of the term including the withdrawal of state responsibility and the replacement of private 
solutions, can be viewed as contributing to this institutional boundary between rural and urban 
Chinese. In urban areas, there is more state welfare available to residents with urban household 
registration. In rural areas, the withdrawal of state services and growth of expensive private welfare 
services has increased living costs and burdens for rural citizens. 
 
3.6 Main Theoretical Points and Hypotheses 
 
3.6.1 Returns to Education 
 
Several of the theoretical perspectives are relevant to understand the relationship between 
educational attainment and income differences, and how privatisation contributes to increase 
differences based on educational attainment. The growth of a private sector, in conjunction with the 
general development towards a market economy both in China in general and in Western China in 
particular, creates increased returns to education, especially in the private sector, but also in other 
sectors. This development can be expected to create increased income inequality between people 
with different educational attainments.  
 
According to the neoclassical perspective, the importance of human capital and returns to education 
grows in a competitive market economy, because enterprises need skilled workers in order to be 
productive. Human capital is seen to be especially valued in the private sector. Increased returns to 
education will probably lead to increased income differences between individuals with lower and 
higher education, but this is in the initial stages of reform. When the economy develops to become 
more mature and modernised, inequality will decrease as economic growth is distributed more 
evenly. 
 
In market transition theory, human capital is viewed as the central distribution principle in the 
market sector. The market sector closely overlaps with the private sector. Wage distribution through 
human capital is conceptualised in opposition to political capital, which govern wage distribution in 
the state economy. As the private sector grows, human capital becomes more important for income 
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distribution, at the expense of political capital. Therefore, in the initial phases of reform, a growing 
private sector can function to equalise inequality created by state wage distribution, and therefore a 
growing private sector can contribute to overall decreased inequality. In later phases, however, 
market transition theory predicts that income inequality caused by the private sector will dominate 
and continue to grow.  
 
Social closure theory conceptualises the importance of returns to education in another way. It 
emphasises how formal demands for educational credentials create boundaries that limit who gains 
access to job positions. Furthermore, especially professions with high education can establish such 
credential limits around their labour markets, in order to increase their wage level by restricting the 
number of competitors. A related development is the growth of private schools with expensive 
school fees, with restricts access to education, especially in rural areas.  
 
New occupational hierarchies form, and educational attainment seems to be an important factor 
which influences this formation. Segmented labour market theory focuses on how a primary 
segment which consists of educated employees receive higher wages, while employees in the 
secondary segment receive lower wages, and have more instable jobs. This development contributes 
to create larger differences in the open labour markets. In rural areas, the growth of town and 
village enterprises and other sources of non-agricultural income have also led to the increased 
importance of education also in rural areas, where the mean education level is low.  
 
Based on these theoretical perspectives, my hypothesis regarding educational attainment is: 
  
Hypothesis 1: The higher degree of privatisation, the higher degree of income inequality between 
people with different educational attainment. 
  
3.6.2 Between Sectors 
 
In the study of inequality based on sector differences, my main distinction is between the state 
sector, private sector, and agricultural sector. Market transition theory focuses on differences 
between the state and private sector. While the state sector was dominant in the planned economy, 
the private sector has grown substantially in the reform period. In the beginning this would even out 
inequality, but as the private sectors grows, it could contribute to increased inequality both between 
sectors, and inequality overall. However, the situation is complicated, since the private sector is a 
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stratified sector with large internal differences. People working in private sector gain more 
advantages from the market development, while many in the state sector also fall behind compared 
to the pre-reform period. According to market transition theory, as the stratified private sector 
becomes more important at the expense of the formerly egalitarian state sector, this will lead to 
important changes in the distribution of income. And while the state sector earlier was more 
egalitarian, the influence from market economic principles has led to increased income differences 
also inside the state sector. In addition, income in the agricultural sector has also become more 
diverse, with a growth of off-farm income sources for farmers. However, farmers to a lesser extent 
than workers in the sectors benefits from the gains related to economic growth in the market 
economy.  
 
Neo-Marxist theory and some structural scholars maintain that the agricultural sector faces a more 
disadvantaged situation in a more market-oriented society. When a society is transformed towards a 
capitalist production regime with the expansion of private sector, other sectors, especially the 
agricultural sector, will be exploited for the development of capitalist production and reproduction. 
In this sense, peasant can be exploited as a flexible labour force to work in the capitalist sector. The 
agricultural sector is in this way served as a resource for capitalist development, and the economic 
differences between peasants and people working in other sectors can increase. 
 
Neoclassical theory maintains that the private sector is more productive and generates higher 
economic growth than other sectors, because it is competitive, flexible and benefits from valuing 
human capital more than other sectors. Regarding sector differences, my hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher degree of privatisation, the higher degree of income inequality between 
people working in different sectors. 
 
3.6.3 Occupational Positions 
 
With increased marketisation and privatisation, the occupational structure has become more diverse, 
with more differentiated types of industries, different work tasks, and different jobs. The transition 
towards a market economy with an expanding private sector, weakens the role of traditional work 
units and collectives. The work units and collectives were distribution systems of wages and social 
benefits which had an equalising effect with regard to intra-urban and intra-rural inequality in the 
planned economy, and whose effects continued to matter in the reform period. As reviewed under 
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market transition theory, the use of bonus and reward systems especially in the private sector is 
likely to have a stratifying effect on wage inequality when comparing different occupational 
positions. 
 
Segmented labour market theory emphasises how dynamics related to the private sector create 
increased wage stratification and increased income inequality, through the formation of separate 
segments in the labour market. The competitive principle in the market economy makes private 
enterprises emphasise more on human capital, and this leads to increased importance of returns to 
education. The formation of a more diverse and stratified occupational structure is an important 
characteristic of the private sector. The primary segment consists of well-paid jobs with high formal 
educational demands, while the secondary segment typically consists of low-paid, low-skilled jobs. 
The growth of the private sector has opened up the labour market, and created many jobs in the 
informal secondary segment, for example migrants working in the informal urban sector in 
construction and service industries.  
 
Social closure theory focuses on how certain professions use closure mechanisms to limit access to 
the profession-internal labour market, by establishing formal educational demands. This will limit 
the supply of workers, and raise the wage level. Such strategies are mostly available to groups with 
high education, or professions with special competence that is in high demand. Furthermore, it 
contributes to legitimise the high wages of these professional groups. Such strategies may be more 
common in the private sector, where there is a more competitive milieu and demand for skilled 
workers. In this way, mechanisms related to social closure strategies, which are especially 
important the private sector, may contribute to increase income inequality between occupational 
positions. 
 
Based on these theoretical perspectives, I aim to study whether privatisation has affected income 
inequality through increased wage stratification of occupational positions, and my hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher degree of privatisation, the higher degree of income inequality between 
people with different occupational positions. 
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3.6.4 Urban-Rural Differences  
 
The impact of privatisation on rural-urban inequality is much discussed between different social 
approaches. Neoclassical economists believe that processes of market expansion and privatisation 
will affect rural development in a positive way, and decrease rural-urban inequality. According to 
the neoclassical perspective, main reasons for the large rural-urban inequality in China are 
institutionalised state boundaries, such as the hukou system, political capital, and state ownership. 
Such institutions limit mobility, entrepreneurial initiatives and individual potential, and maintain 
repressive hierarchies of income stratification, especially related to urban-rural differences. The 
backwardness of rural areas is also caused by lack of technology and modern market institutions. 
The growth of the private sector in both rural and urban areas is viewed to create a more well-
functioning market economy. This entails increased efficiency, higher productivity, free labour 
mobility, and higher economic growth. Free movement of knowledge and technology across rural 
and urban boundaries are also contributing factors. Benefits from economic growth are believed to 
trickle down also to poor segments of the population over time.  
 
Neoclassical migration theory maintains that migration leads to reduce rural-urban income 
differences, also through remittance. Migrant workers earn higher wages in the urban labour market 
than they can in the rural, and send money back home to their family. This increases capital 
circulation in rural areas, and contributes to decrease income differences between urban and rural 
areas. 
 
These neoclassical perspectives are based on the premise that there is perfect competition in the 
market, and they operate without external influences that messes up the models. However, social 
structure is a more complicated and intertwined process. Market competition is not perfect as these 
economic theories assume, and neoclassical economists often ignore the external institutions, norms 
and social context (Granovetter & Swedberg 1992). In addition, their perspective on privatisation as 
a rational process can often be simplified and politicised.  
 
In contrast, structural and neo-Marxists argue that transformations related to the developing market 
economy are important for growing urban-rural diversity. Neo-Marxism terms the urban-rural 
differences as uneven development, caused by capital forces which give priority to develop industry 
and economy in rural areas, while channelling people and resources from rural areas. This 
strengthens urban economic growth, and has negative effects on rural development. These 
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processes, which are integrated into the way the market economy functions, contribute to increase 
the urban-rural income gap. Market actors seek economic growth, and are ignorant to the 
detrimental effects of their actions in other areas. Dependency theory conceptualises this in a 
similar way, through the terms core and periphery. According to these perspectives, dynamics 
within the expanding market economy is expected to further increase the income inequality between 
urban and rural residents.  
 
When studying the context of transitional China, an additional factor is institutionalised boundaries 
between urban and rural areas. The market-oriented reform caused the decline of public services in 
rural areas, and the disadvantaged social positions for rural citizens. Based on these perspectives, 
my hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The higher degree of privatisation, the higher degree of income inequality between 
rural and urban citizens. 
 
3.6.5 Migration 
 
I have reviewed migration theories related to the neoclassical perspective, segmented labour market 
theory, and historical-structural/neo-Marxist approach. Privatisation and growth of the private 
sector seems to create increased motives for mobility and thus contributes to migration, because it 
opens up for more job possibilities, less restrictions, and increased demand for cheap labour force in 
cities. Segmented labour market theory emphasises that the growth of the private sector has created 
many jobs in the informal, low-paid secondary segments of the labour market, especially in urban 
areas. Many migrants find work in this sector, since the wages are higher than what they could earn 
in their rural locality. The inflow of low-paid work force contributes to create a more stratified 
wage structure, and more income inequality in urban areas between residents and migrants.  
 
The structuralist/neo-Marxist perspectives maintains that the migration should be conceptualised as 
urban capitalist interests exploiting rural workers, or the core exploiting the periphery in 
dependency theory terms. This dynamics have negative effects on rural areas, through drain of 
valuable human capital and labour-force. When it comes to income inequality, migration is viewed 
to cause more inequality between migrants and residents because urban residents are better 
integrated into the economic system in the urban core areas, while migrants are generally excluded 
and discriminated. They get the worst jobs, and are exploited as a cheap and flexible labour force. 
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Neo-Marxism also maintains, in contrast to neoclassical migration theory, that migration will not 
lead to decreased inequality in rural areas.  
 
Labour market theory and structuralism/neo-Marxism emphasises that migration contributes to 
increased income inequality between migrants and residents, between urban and rural areas, and 
within urban and within rural areas. The neoclassical perspective, on the other hand, argues that 
migration leads to growth, development and overall decreased inequality. However, the neoclassical 
understanding of wage and income for migrants is based on the determination of the relationship 
between supply and demand. The wage and income structure is more complicated, affected by for 
example external social structure as labour market institution, political interests as supporting 
capitalistic expansion and economic growth, social groups as urban residents and rural migrants 
compete for jobs in a more unsecure privatised labour market, and institutional boundaries as the 
household registration system. 
 
I will examine the impact of privatisation on income inequality between migrants and residents, by 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The higher degree of privatisation, the higher degree of income inequality between 
migrants and residents. 
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Chapter Four. Data, Measurements and Methods 
 
4.1 Data 
 
The study uses data from the survey Monitoring Social and Economic Development of Western 
China (MEDOW), a large living condition survey for households, gathered in 2004 and 2005. In 
total 167,000 individuals in 44,738 households participated in this survey, and it covers 11 
provinces, divided into 128 prefectures, in Western China. The survey project was headed by the 
Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies in Norway in cooperation with the National 
Research Center of Science and Technology of Development (NCRSTD) in China.8 The Medow 
survey gives rich information about many issues including population composition, health 
conditions and medical system, household economy, work force, employment and labour market, 
education, migration, living condition, environment, infrastructure, and agriculture. 
 
The Western Region of China is often divided into two main areas, which are the northwest area, 
consisting of Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, and the southwest 
area, which includes Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan. Tibet is also in the area 
of South West China, but is not included in the survey. The provinces included in the Medow 
survey cover 5.6 million square kilometres, 58 percent of the total country area, and have a 
population of 368 million people, 28 percent of the national total. 
 
4.1.1 Questionnaire  
 
The data in Medow were collected through the use of four questionnaires with different focus: A 
main household questionnaire, a questionnaire for adult female participants, a randomly selected 
individual questionnaire for household members, and a community questionnaire.  
 
The main household questionnaire focused on the household and individuals in the household. It 
was answered by an adult member who had good overview of the household situation and the 
situations of household members. Topics covered were the household economy, household 
infrastructure, housing conditions, agricultural activities and environmental threats. The household 
                                                
8 NCRSTD was reorganised and renamed in 2007, and became ”Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for 
Development” (CASTED). 
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questionnaire also contained information about individuals in the household: Their gender, age, 
hukou status, marital status, ethnicity, place of residence, migration status, education level, health 
condition and employment status. My subsequent data analysis is mostly based on data about 
individual information from this household questionnaire, combined with data about the household 
economy from the same questionnaire. 
 
4.1.2 Sample 
 
The sample size for the Medow survey is 44,000 households, and each of the 11 provinces in 
Western China were assigned with an equal sample size of about 4,000 households. The underlying 
framework for the sample is listed neighbourhood committees and townships, based on the Chinese 
Census in 2000 by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The neighbourhood committees are 
the second lowest administrative level in urban China, while the townships are the corresponding 
level units in rural areas. The last and smallest administrative units in urban and rural areas are 
respectively called residence committee and administrative village. The size of the chosen 
administrative units varies from a population of 491 to 260,535 individuals, and from 144 to 76,628 
households. 
 
The sampling process was done through several steps. Each of the 11 provinces were divided into 
18 replicate samples areas, and each of these replicate samples was further divided into 14 primary 
sampling units based on lists from the neighbourhood committees and townships. In each of these 
14 primary sampling units, the number of chosen households was 16 in rural areas and 20 in urban. 
This resulted in an ideal 4,032 households in each province, and a total of 44,352 households in all 
of Western China. The actual number differed somewhat from this because of non-response and 
oversampling. Primary sampling units were selected by a probability sampling with inclusion 
probabilities proportional to the population. The first step of dividing into primary sample units was 
based on neighbourhood committees and townships. Furthermore, secondary sample units on the 
level of residence committee or administrative village were drawn by the same method of 
probability proportionate to size, based on the size of the primary samples. The following step was 
to divide the sampling into two categories, by whether the neighbourhood committee or township 
selection had to be divided into smaller groups (segmented) or not. Under each category the last 
stages of sampling was performed, by selecting household units and randomly selected individual 
samples. Even though the sampling uses three to four to reach the household, it performs similarly 
to a two-stage sample, since only one-third (or fourth) stage unit is selected per first stage unit. 
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Of totally 44,738 households selected for interviews, there were 41,695 households that were able 
to participate; and 41,222 households of the selected households completed the interviews. This is a 
very high participation rate – of the households that were sampled, 94 percent were interviewed. 
Less than one percent (0.96 percent) refused to participate, and the reasons for non-response or 
incomplete interviews were that the interviewer could not find the household location, or that no 
household members were home, or that the interview was interrupted. Some of the absence is 
because of confused or obviously wrong answers. The sample can therefore be assumed to be 
representative for households and individuals in Western-China. 
 
4.2 Measures 
 
4.2.1 Geographic Indicator  
 
The variable geographic indicator uses the prefecture level when dividing between areas. Medow 
includes 11 provinces, and these provinces can further be divided into 128 prefectures. Provinces 
are the first level administrative units in China’s political and administrative structure. Prefecture-
level units are the second level, under provinces, and the county-level administrations are below 
prefectures. The population in prefectures in Western China varies much, from about 73,000 in the 
Ali-Prefecture in Tibet, to over 10 million in Chengdu. The sample size at the individual-level is 
167,456, and varies from 51 to 7,677 at the level of prefecture, with a mean of 1,308 and median of 
1,064. Only two prefectures have less than 100 corresponds. 
 
Using data on the prefecture-level gives much more detailed information compared to province 
level. It makes it possible to study the issue of urban-rural diversity in more local areas, and to 
separate administrative and institutional factors of prefectures from geographical factors (Herrman-
Pillath et al. 2002: 961). It is also possible to view the greater variation concerning degree of 
privatisation when comparing different prefectures, than when looking at the province as a whole.  
 
An alternative would be to base the study on the county level instead of prefectures. However, 
Herrmann-Pillath et al. have argued that the county-level is best suited when studying local 
development, or when there is only large prefectures become of a relatively small local population 
(Herrman-Pillath et al. 2002: 961). They also argue that when studying consequences of political 
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co-ordination and flow of funds, the prefecture level is better suited than lower levels because 
important political decisions are made on higher administration levels than county-level (Herrman-
Pillath et al. 2002: 962). The amount of privatisation in prefectures can be conceptualised as being 
connected to political decisions, since the growth of this sector in China is closely connected to 
permits and regulations issued by political decision-makers.  
 
4.2.2 Privatisation 
 
Data available in Medow makes it possible to measure the degree of labour privatisation in each 
prefecture by calculating the ratio of labour in private sectors in relation to the total labour situation. 
However, the Medow data concerning individual work relations suffer from the short timeframe in 
the questionnaire, since people were only asked what their work had been in the last seven days. 
This approach can exclude valuable information as for example temporary and flexible work 
arrangements. Another point concerning seasonal work is that the interviews were performed in the 
time period between July 2004 and February 2005. Information about individual’s employment 
situation from March to June is therefore not covered. The data can thus have a seasonal bias, by 
excluding work done in this period. This especially concerns work in the agricultural sector, which 
risks being systemically underestimated, since the missing months in some areas can be important 
periods for cultivation and other agricultural activities. On the other hand, work in state and private 
sector can be overestimated because of similar mechanisms.  
 
An alternative way to approach privatisation is to measure the degree of capital privatisation. The 
indicator of capital privatisation can be constructed by the ratio of private investments to the 
prefecture’s total investments in fixed assets in 2005. This indicator can be constructed by using 
data from Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2006, and it can be tagged as degree of capital privatisation. 
These private investments include joint ownership units, shareholding units, foreign funded units 
and units with funds from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. This measure of capital privatisation is 
based on a macro social condition, which directs the focus towards capital and investment funds on 
a general level in each province as a top-down process.  
 
My focus is on individual income inequality, and how this is affected by different social structures, 
such as an individual’s employment in different sectors, educational level, occupation, etc. These 
factors can also have connections between each other. In other words, this project is a study of how 
income inequality between individuals in different social positions and with different social 
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backgrounds is affected by privatisation processes. Therefore information about individuals 
presented in a unified dataset is ideal, and Medow provides this individual level data.  
 
However, social and economic processes in a macro-level perspective can also have a great 
significance on individuals’ income levels, and further influence income inequality between 
different social groups. An example of such a process is the activity of private investments in an 
area. This can generate more competition in product and labour market. This can in turn create 
pressure on the wage level as well as increase demands of employees’ educational and experience-
based competence. But to include such macro level data as a privatisation variable, together with 
the data about individuals, can be problematic. First of all, it can be difficult to unite the variables of 
two different dataset, which have basically different research samples on macro and individual 
level. Secondly, the study may run into problems of ecological fallacy, which means to draw 
conclusions about individuals based on findings in the macro-level data. They are not necessarily 
connected to individual level attributes (Hellevik 2006: 356). Finally, it can be difficult to combine 
these two alternatives, because the effect of capital investment on labour market can be slow in 
affecting employment patterns, and the number of private employees might grow after some years 
of private investment.  
 
Nevertheless, to demonstrate the last point, I examined the correlation between these different 
privatisation indicators on province level, since province level data was easier available for both 
datasets. On the province level, I found a weak and negative correlation between amount of private 
capital in a province, and the amount of employed persons in the private sector. This is mainly 
caused by the interesting phenomena that provinces with the highest degree of private capital 
privatisation (provinces with much private investments), have the lowest labour employment in 
private sectors. The tendency is shown clearly in Xinjiang (with the indicator for capital 
privatisation being 0.41 and labour privatisation 0.13), Qinghai (0.40, 0.16), Inner Mongolia (0.39, 
0.18) and Yunnan (0.34, 0.15). However, if these deviations are taken away, the correlation 
between these two indicators is showing to be positive and significant in the other provinces.  
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Figure 4.1. Correlation between capital and labour privatisation. 
 
 
On one hand, the indicator for labour privatisation has problematic issues in terms of the seasonal 
bias and by the fact that the geographic variation between provinces can be difficult to include in 
the analysis. On the other hand, the indicator for capital privatisation can have a delayed effect on 
the labour market, patterns of employment and maybe further on income inequality. To include 
both of them in further analysis work as independent variables could be beneficial in terms of 
grasping different important aspects of privatisation, as one indicator with its weaknesses may be 
complimented and strengthened by the other indicator.  
 
Medow provides rich information about labour privatisation on the local level and individual level, 
which makes it possible to study different social conditions in depth. When studying the degree of 
privatisation ranged by prefectures, the seasonal bias discussed earlier would not play an important 
role. Although there are geographical differences related to cultivation, the pattern of seasonal work 
affecting employment in different sectors would be the same. Therefore, the indicator of labour 
privatisation can still be a valid measure. It is practically more straightforward because it is 
connected with individual variables, and it corresponds directly to individual income levels. The 
indicator of labour privatisation may contribute to carry out more direct and easier data processing 
in forthcoming analysis, and I decided to construct this indicator from Medow in this project of 
studying income inequality. However, this variable can lead to ecological fallacy, in which I try to 
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draw individual character from aggregated data. In the later sections, I’m going to discuss more 
about this problem in method use and the construction of inequality variable, which may contribute 
to reduce the harm of the ecological fallacy.  
 
The degree of privatisation is defined as the ratio of the number of employees in the private sector 
to the total number of employees in the prefecture. In other words, the degree of privatisation is the 
share of the total labour force located in the private sector. The degrees of privatisation in the 128 
prefectures vary from zero to 0.45, with a mean value of 0.24, and standard deviation of 0.08. 
Standard deviation shows how much variation there is between degrees of privatisation, and the 
average mean level of privatisation.  
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Privatisation. 
Definition of Privatisation Mean (SD) Range N 
Labour force in private sector as ratio 
of total labour force 0.24 (0.08) 0-0.45 128 
 
The values of privatisation are proportional numbers. For the practice of interpretation, these values 
have been multiplied with 10. Therefore, when interpreting the coefficient of privatisation, it should 
be held in mind that this variable ascends with 10 per cent between each interval.  
 
4.2.3 Income 
 
The Income variable is defined as total yearly income earned from all income activities of the 
respondent, both for individual wage earners and members of household economic units. This 
variable is constructed by the sum of three categories in Medow: Individual income, agricultural 
income and family income. Individual income is the only category that gives information about 
yearly income for individuals. For agricultural and family income, households are the basic units 
for income. To find individual income in each of these last two categories, I divide total household 
income with the number of household members who participated in respectively agricultural work 
and family business work.  
 
In the category of individual income, I include wage earners’ yearly income before tax, and in 
addition their assessment of the value of material goods they have received instead of monetary 
payment. The household income is a category for the yearly income that households have received 
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from small business activity, small sales or household enterprise. To construct agricultural income I 
assembled yearly income the households had received from cultivation, forestry, husbandry, 
breeding livestock, fishery, gathering and hunting, and pasture. Included in this sum is the market 
value of products the households make and use themselves, and the market value of informally 
exchanged farm products. These three categories are independent of and do not overlap with each 
other, and thus the sum of these categories gives a general view of the income level of individuals. 
 
Since the focus in this project is to study the relationship between income inequality and degree of 
privatisation, and to identify alternative explanatory factors that may cause income inequality 
between individuals, I will emphasize individuals with income and job. Individuals who were 
unemployed or were out of work force will therefore be excluded in the analysis. This amounts to 
3,235 individuals. This group consists mainly of people younger than 33 years, and most of them 
are agricultural workers. 
 
4.2.4 Other Variables 
 
Age  
Age is an important factor relevant to work experience and income level. The age variable is based 
on individuals’ current completed age, but since the focus in this analysis is on income inequality, it 
has little meaning to include people outside the workforce. Therefore, I have excluded individuals 
under 16 and over 65.  
 
Gender  
Gender is important in relation to income distribution and income inequality, and much research 
has been done related to gender issues in China (Entwisle & Henderson 2000). A person’s gender 
has consequences for education possibilities, work opportunities and choice of profession, income 
level, issues related to pregnancy and health, and so on.  
 
Education 
The variable education is defined as highest completed education for individuals. This variable 
differentiates between six categories of educational attainment. 1) Persons who have never attended 
school, 2) persons who attended but did not finish primary school education, 3) persons who 
completed primary school, 4) persons with completed junior high school, 5) completed senior high 
school, and 6) people who have completed university or corresponding levels of higher education.  
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Economic Sector 
Economic sector is defined as the ownership situation of the work place (also including farming 
activities) that has been a participant’s main work activity in the last seven days before being 
interviewed.  
 
The focus on privatisation in China during its reform period demands a measure of China’s 
economic segmentation. The Chinese central government issued new laws and administrative 
regulations in order to lead the reforms of Chinese market and economic activities since 1979. 
Many studies of urban China referred to a three-sector economy formed since 1993, dividing 
between state sector, collective sector and private firms (Bian & Zhang 2002, Liu et al. 2006, Nee 
& Cao 2004).  
 
When the research subject is urban and rural areas in Western-China, it is necessary to develop a 
different model of sector-classification. I have chosen to divide the different ownership types in 
west China into three sectors: The state sector, the private sector and the agricultural sector. The 
state sector includes state enterprises, urban collective, township and village collective, public 
service unit, government and Party organisation, administration of village committee, and residence 
committee. The private sector includes private enterprises, joint venture, foreign investment and 
individual businesses. The agricultural sector includes self-employed peasants and working 
activities in household economy: Cultivation, agriculture, forestry, husbandry, fisheries, gathering 
and hunting and pasturing household business activities.  
 
The agricultural sector is central in Western China, since over half of the population is working 
with cultivation and family-run businesses in agriculture. The collective sector has been included in 
the state sector, because it is small compared to the other sectors and decreasing in importance. 
Other ownership types like peoples’ organisations, women’s federations, youth leagues and other 
nongovernmental organisations and foundations are small and marginal in terms of number of 
employees, and are therefore not included in the analysis. 
 
A weakness of the sector classification is that the questionnaire was based on the information of 
working activities participants had in the last seven days. The analysis therefore loses information 
about the flexible and changing nature of the labout market in Western China, as for example 
seasonal farming,  temporary work, and how people changes jobs that may be in different sectors.  
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Occupation 
In Medow, the occupational variable is classified into seven occupational categories. They are cadre 
and other leader, technician, office worker, service industry worker, blue-collar worker, other non-
agricultural worker, and agricultural workers. The term cadre refers to persons in leader and 
manager positions, usually in party or public government. He or she is more likely to be a party 
member, and this group only include one per cent of the labour force sample. Occupations such as 
technicians or office workers usually have a higher degree of human capital, in the form of higher 
education level. I simplify this by placing the seven occupational groups into three categories. 
These are service class, working class and agricultural workers. In the analysis I define and use 
three occupational groups: Service class, working class and agricultural class. The service class 
includes cadre and other leaders, technician and professions, and white-collar office workers. The 
working class includes service industry workers, blue-collar workers, and other non-agricultural 
workers, and the agricultural class includes agricultural workers. 
 
Urban or Rural Status 
The Hukou-system is the Chinese household registration system, which defines individuals with 
either urban or rural status. a The hukou system is a central divisionary principle in China, as it 
limits mobility between urban and rural areas, and gives different entitlements to welfare regimes 
and other rights. A person´s hukou status is registered at birth, and is usually inherited from the 
mother. This variable is used as an indicator to tell whether an individual is from an urban or rural 
district.  
 
Migration 
The migrant indicator divides between migrant workers and resident workers. Migration status 
refers to whether a person is registered in one place, but works in another, to describe it shortly. 
When making this variable, I defined migrant workers as the household members who live 
somewhere else, or normally live in the household, but are outside the prefecture for periods of 
time, because of work assignments or looking for work. At the same time, their registered hukou-
statuses were in the same community where the interview had taken place. In other words, any 
respondent who works outside the community he or she is registered in is defined as a migrant. This 
gives a general picture of the total migration situation in Western-China, regardless if a person is 
from urban or rural areas. 
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The residents are defined as they usually live in the dwelling and work in the same community the 
household is placed in, and they are registered in the same prefecture they work and live. Rural 
migrants is a separate variable, and they are defined as migrants working in cities but with rural 
hukou-register. Urban residents are residents with urban hukou-register. The variables of rural 
migrants and urban residents can be used to study a particular rural migrant group working in cities. 
Urbanites with urban hukou but who moved to somewhere else to work, are defined as urban 
migrants. Further, rural residents refers to the category of permanent rural citizens in the rural 
areas, and the combination of rural residents and rural migrants can be used to study the income 
differences between households for rural populations.  
 
4.2.5 Overview of Descriptive Statistics  
 
Below I have included descriptive table 4.2, which gives an overview of the content of the variables 
I use in my data analyses. It shows the distributions of different groups in each of the variables I 
use, and average annual income per capita for each groups. I will only shortly present important 
aspects in the tables.  
 
First, the distribution of school attainment is extremely skewed. More than 58 per cent of the 
selection has lower school attainment than junior high school, whereas 21 per cent never attended 
school, 16 per cent never finished primary school, and 21 per cent completed primary school. Few 
people attended higher education, as only about nine per cent of the sample completed senior high 
school education, and four percent completed university or higher education. 
 
Second, there is a special pattern of distribution for economic sectors in Western China. The 
agricultural sector has a majority share of total labour distribution, with a mean value of 67 per cent. 
The size of the state sector is smaller than the private sector, with respectively 12 and 21 per cent of 
the whole ownership situation. People working in the state sector have the highest income level 
among all sectors, and agricultural workers have the lowest. In general, a state employee gains a 
yearly income of 10,542 yuan, almost twice as high as a person who works within the private sector 
(6,044), and four times higher than an agricultural worker (2,452).  
 
The large agriculture sector is connected to the vast rural areas in China West. The theme of urban-
rural differences in China is much studied. The huge gap between urban and rural income level has 
been seen as one main contributor to income inequality (Benjamin et al. 2005, Chan 1999, Dolar 
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2006, Li 2006, Shue & Wang 2007). The same pattern can be seen in the data I use, where 17 per 
cent of the total population with urban status has an average yearly income of almost 10,000 yuan, 
3.5 times higher than their rural village neighbours. When considering the majority of the rural 
population (83 per cent), the annual income per capita is less than 3,000 yuan. When examining 
occupational differences, we can observe that 63 per cent among all occupations are agricultural 
workers. While annual income per capita in the service class varies from 11 to 16,000 yuan, 
agricultural workers on average earn 2,633 yuan. 
 
The last thing I will mention is the variable of migration. It includes individuals who migrate from 
rural to urban areas (rural migrants), between cities (urban migrants), and between rural areas. In 
general, a migrant earns almost twice a much compared to the mean of residents, when including 
both rural and urban residents, which takes down the mean value. Urban migrants earn the most, a 
thousand yuan more than urban residents. Rural migrants earn less than urban residents, but much 
higher than rural residents. The sample size for migrant groups is small, with only 1,793 rural 
migrants and 1,749 urban migrants. This is because of some weaknesses in Medow’s migration 
questionnaires.9 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Data for Other Variables Included. 
 % Mean Income (Yuan) N 
Age  100 4399 84199 
15-29 29 4425 25176 
30-49 51 5224 42689 
50-65 20 2958 16924 
Gender  100 4200 88172 
Men 55 4820 48395 
Women 45 3447 39777 
Education  100 4207 87633 
Never attended school 21 1831 18686 
Incomplete primary 16 2545 13649 
Primary school 21 3204 18315 
Junior high school 30 5006 26062 
Senior high school 8 7613 7255 
University+ 4 15100 3666 
Sector  100 4187 83994 
State sector 12 10542 10319 
Private sector 21 6044 17348 
Agriculture sector 67 2452 56327 
Occupation  100 4191 86539 
                                                
9 The part of migration questionnaire overlooked household members who don’t live in the same dwelling. 
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Service class: 8 12050 7183 
-Cadre/ Leader 1 16318 779 
-Technician 5 12357 4154 
-Office worker 3 11496 2337 
Working class: 29 6348 24664 
-Service industry  8 6395 7269 
-Blue collar worker 19 6290 16615 
-Others 1 7186 780 
Agricultural worker 63 2633 54606 
Urban/rural residency  100 3963 72497 
Urban 17 9814 12391 
Rural 83 2756 60106 
Migration  100 3960 72448 
Migrant: 5 8323 3542 
-Rural migrant 3 5985 1793 
-Urban migrant 2 10719 1749 
Resident: 95 3736 68906 
-Rural resident 81 2657 58291 
-Urban resident 14 9664 10615 
Total  4536  
 
 
4.3 Methods 
 
4.3.1 Analytical Strategies: Multilevel Analysis 
 
This paper aims to study whether a higher level of privatisation in a prefecture is connected to 
larger income differences, when comparing individuals with different social characteristics related 
to education, occupation, sectors, urban/rural, and migrants/non-migrants. The degree of 
privatisation and the outcome regarding income inequality is measured at the level of prefectures. 
The focus is not on what people earn individually, but the size of income inequalities that are 
measured at the level of prefecture. Therefore, instead of examining respondents’ individual 
incomes, I intend to analyse income inequalities among individuals in a prefecture, and the 
association between privatisation and income inequality at the level of prefectures.   
 
An ecological analysis is a study in which the analysis unit is a population, based on aggregate data 
for groups of individuals (Steel et al. 2006). Since I study both privatisation and income inequality 
at the ecological level, it should be relevant to use an ecological analysis. Privatisation is defined as 
the ratio of the labour force located in the private sector to the total labour situation in each 
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prefecture, and it has an ecological characteristic. A way to perform the ecological analysis would 
be to use ordinary least square (OLS) regression with the 128 prefectures as units, and to construct 
the variable of income inequality at the level of prefecture. One could use the Gini-index for each 
prefecture, or the ratio of the 90th to 10th percentile in the income distribution. These income 
inequality measures can thereafter be explained by the level of privatisation, adjusting for other 
prefecture variables such as average age and average educational level in a prefecture. 
 
However, such analyses face the problem of making the ecological fallacy, which means to draw 
conclusions on individual level by using aggregate statistics on the structure level. Income 
inequality can to a large extent be determined by the composition of the population, such as 
individuals’ age, sex, occupation, or other factors. In other words, there can be wrong estimates for 
the effects of privatisation on income inequality in the prefecture level. To avoid this problem, I 
choose to use the multilevel method.  
 
Multilevel analysis is suitable to test variations and diversity based on both individual and structural 
level. The dataset contains information both at the individual-level and the prefecture-level. At the 
level of individual, we have education, sector, occupation, and hukou registration. In addition, there 
are also three individual control variables, namely age, age-square, and gender. On the level of 
prefecture, I have constructed the variable of labour privatisation in each prefecture. A multilevel 
approach demands adequate numbers of groups on the second level, and the sample sizes for the 
observations at both level one and level two are important. Snijders and Bosker (1999: 44) note that 
the amount of groups on the structure level is regarded to be good if more than 100 units. When 
considering the group size, if it is higher than one hundred, the multilevel analysis can estimate 
more precisely the group level residual (the difference between group means and the grand mean) 
(Bickel 2007: 278). Because of the large individual sample size and the considerable amount of 
groups, I assume that multilevel analysis based on Medow data is reliable and valid on both 
individual and prefecture level. 
 
4.3.2 Multilevel Analysis: Level of Outcome Variable 
 
Regarding the use of multilevel modelling in this project, there is a challenge related to the macro-
micro situation in multilevel analysis. It is considered to be appropriate to use the multilevel 
approach when examining a dependent variable that is at the same level or lower than the 
explanatory variables (Snijder & Bosker 1999: 10-12). But when the outcome variable is on a 
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higher level than the explanatory variables, multilevel analysis can be difficult to use. In my case, 
when the outcome variable of income inequality is on the aggregate level, the multilevel analysis is 
difficult to perform. Although some scholars have found solutions to this problem (Croon & 
Veldhoven 2007), it is still complicated and requires complex mathematical and statistical 
techniques.  
 
In trying to deal with this level-related problem, I have constructed inequality variables that 
combine the individual and aggregate level. The variable of inequality is constructed as the 
difference between an individual’s income and the mean income of a particular reference group 
within each prefecture. In this way, both the outcome variable (inequality) and the independent 
variable (privatisation) are on the prefecture level.10 By modelling income inequality as the 
deviation from specified reference groups, the analyses can reflect the level of income inequality 
within each prefecture, based on particular social structure such as education, sector, occupation, 
urban/rural diversity, and migration situations. The level-problem is then transformed into an 
analysis that can be solved with common statistical techniques. Another beneficial point of using 
multilevel analysis is that it can estimate more valid confidence intervals and p-values for the 
coefficient. If simply using the single-level OLS regression with privatisation as an individual 
characteristic, it may be followed by biased standard errors and confidential intervals. Multilevel 
techniques can estimate these values more validly.  
 
In the following analysis, the study of privatisation and its association with income inequality will 
be performed in several steps. First, index variables for income inequality are constructed. These 
index variables are to be examined separately, while other explanatory factors will be taken into 
account. The first two hypotheses are examined by using two statistical techniques: OLS 
regressions and multilevel analysis. Multilevel analysis is the most important technique, and is used 
to estimate how effects on inequality from different structures change with prefecture-level 
measures of privatisation. By comparing OLS models with multilevel analyses, similarities and 
differences of these statistic techniques become visible.  
 
4.3.3 Variables of Income Inequality 
 
I choose to use deviation values to show the income inequalities, expressed as percentage numbers 
in relative terms. It is difficult to discuss whether relative differences can describe the situation of 
                                                
10 The specific reference groups are listed in table 4.3. 
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inequality better than using absolute income distances as the measure for inequality. The main 
reason for doing so is the huge differences between prefectures. Some prefectures have better 
economic situations and generally higher income level. The absolute income differences in these 
prefectures might therefore be higher than in prefectures with generally lower income level. 
Although low-income prefectures may appear to have lower inequality with the measure of absolute 
income differences, inequality for these prefectures can still be more important, especially when 
considering Western China. The absolute distance between rich and poor can usually be higher in a 
more developed prefecture, and maybe especially in cities. However, the most important economic 
activity in Western China is agriculture, and Western China mainly consists of rural areas. The rural 
sector is generally less developed than the urban, and the average income level is also lower. If 
using the absolute measure of income distances in Western China, rural areas can appear to be less 
unequal. This can lead the attention away from the underdeveloped and basically poor rural areas.  
 
Therefore, I choose to use individual’s income as a percentage of a particular reference group in a 
prefecture. An index-variable is constructed by calculating the annual income of individuals with 
lower social positions, as a percentage of the mean income level for the group with higher social 
positions in the prefecture. These groups are defined within each field in question, as for example 
occupational sector, education level, urban/rural status and occupation.  
 
The equation to calculate the values for each of the inequality variables can be expressed like this: 
 
€ 
Inequalityiʹ′  = (
€ 
Incomei / 
€ 
IncomeH ) 
€ 
× 100 
 
€ 
Inequalityiʹ′ is the value of income inequality for individual i in the new constructed inequality 
variable. 
€ 
IncomeH  is the mean income of the reference group in the prefecture; and 
€ 
Incomei is the 
income of individual i in the original income variable. i is a lower ranked individual who does not 
belong to the reference group. The value of 
€ 
Inequalityiʹ′ expresses the difference in income between 
individual i and the reference group in a prefecture. It shows the income of individual i, in percent 
of the average income value for the hierarchically high ranged social group. The higher this value of 
€ 
Inequalityiʹ′ is, the lower income inequality there is.  
 
I will show an example on how this is calculated. First, I want to make an index variable of income 
inequality that incorporates degrees of education and income differences. This can be done by 
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subtracting the income of the individual in question from the mean income of persons with senior 
high school education or university education. It can be formulated like this: 
 
€ 
Inequality(education)iʹ′ = (
€ 
Incomei / 
€ 
Incomehigh.education ) 
€ 
× 100. 
€ 
Incomehigh.education  is the average annual income for people with higher education level, i.e. persons 
who have completed senior high school or university level degrees. The reason that I merge these 
two educational levels is that there are so few people with university level. The average annual 
income for these high-educated groups is 7169.22 yuan in Baiyin Prefecture, Gansu Province. From 
this we subtract the income of a random individual from the same local and with lower educational 
level than senior high school, for example 2000 yuan.  The calculation is then: 
 
€ 
Inequality(education)iʹ′ = (2000 / 7169.22) 
€ 
× 100 = 27.9 
 
The number shows the yearly income difference between the person without higher education and 
the persons with higher education. The annual income of this randomly selected individual is 27.9 
percent of the average income for a higher educated person in Baiyin Prefecture.  
 
4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics: Income Inequality 
 
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics on the variables of income inequalities. There are seven 
variables of income inequality, based on the five social structures. These variables are constructed 
independently in each of the five social structures, and expressed in the form of individuals’ income 
as percentages of mean value in certain reference categories in prefectures, defined in 4.3.3. The 
mean values of the outcome variables vary much, from the mean of occupation-based income 
inequality of 34 per cent, to rural/rural inequality of 70 per cent. The higher the mean value is, the 
less relative inequality for this category. Based on the descriptive statistics, we can observe that 
income inequality based on migration status is relatively low. Rural/urban inequality, occupation 
inequality, and inequality between agricultural sector and other sectors are relatively high. This may 
give a general picture of the situation in Western China, based on different social factors that may 
affect income inequality.  
 Table 4.3 D
escriptive Statistics for V
ariables of Incom
e Inequality. 
Social structure  
D
efinition of variable 
O
bject of study (N
) 
M
ean (SD
) 
M
ean (SD
) 
Education 
R
espondents’ incom
e as a percentage of m
ean incom
e of 
individuals com
pleted senior high-school or university: 
(Incom
e for individuals w
ith 1-4 level education / M
ean incom
e 
for 5-6 level education) * 100 
R
espondents w
ith low
er 
than senior high-school 
educational attainm
ent. 
(76,712) 
 42.1 (51.7) 
3.2 (1.0) 
Sector (i) 
Incom
e for agricultural w
orkers as a percentage of m
ean incom
e 
of individuals w
orking in private and state sectors: 
(Incom
e agricultural w
orkers / M
ean incom
e state and private 
em
ployees) * 100 
R
espondents w
orking in 
agricultural sector. (56,327) 
38.1 (46.9) 
3.2 (0.9) 
(ii) 
Incom
e for respondents w
orking in private sector as a percentage 
of m
ean incom
e of individuals w
orking in state sector: 
(Incom
e private em
ployees / M
ean incom
e state em
ployees) * 100 
R
espondents w
orking in 
private sector. (17,348) 
65.1 (72.4) 
3.8 (1.0) 
O
ccupation 
R
espondents’ incom
e as a percentage of m
ean incom
e of 
individuals in service class: 
(Incom
e for w
orking class and agricultural class / M
ean incom
e 
for service class) * 100 
R
espondents in w
orking 
class and in agricultural 
class. (79,270) 
33.7 (45.7) 
3.0 (1.0) 
R
ural/U
rban 
R
ural citizen’s incom
e as a percentage of m
ean incom
e of 
urbanites: 
(R
espondents w
ith rural registration / M
ean incom
e for 
respondents w
ith urban registration) * 100 
R
ural respondents. (60,106) 
37.1 (64.1) 
3.1 (1.0) 
M
igration (i) 
N
on-M
igrants’ incom
e as a percentage of m
ean incom
e of 
m
igrants: 
(R
esidents / M
ean incom
e for m
igrants) * 100 
N
on-m
igrants. (68,906) 
62.6 (86.1) 
3.6 (1.1) 
(ii) 
R
ural m
igrants’ incom
e as a percentage of m
ean incom
e of urban 
residents: 
(R
ural m
igrants / M
ean incom
e for urban residents) * 100 
R
ural m
igrants. (1,793) 
70.1 (108.1) 
3.6 (1.2) 
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The standard deviations are large, and this means that the data is spread out over a large range of 
values. This reflects the large variation between individuals’ income in Western China. The largest 
values of these inequality variables can be over 1,000, but there are few of them. For instance, when 
examining the frequencies for education-based inequality, approximately 92 per cent of the values 
are under 100. For both sector- and urban/rural inequality, only five per cent of the values are over 
100. However, the huge values may cause skewness. I therefore introduce the natural logarithm of 
these variables to reduce this tendency. This will be discussed in the following section.  
 
4.3.5 Natural Logarithm: Outcome Variables for Multilevel Analyses 
 
Income inequality is expressed as deviations calculated as percentage, and the outcome variable in 
my analysis is the natural logarithm of the corresponding proportional values for income inequality. 
There are several reasons why income inequality is not used directly as the dependent variable.  
 
First of all, one of the assumptions of the ordinary least square regression model is that the errors 
are normally distributed, and when the sample is large, this assumption can imply that the 
distribution of the dependent variable is distributed normally as well. When I checked the 
distribution of the errors (residuals) and the density of the index-variable of income inequality, I 
found that they do not follow the normal distribution, and in fact, that the distribution is very 
skewed. The residuals get bigger for higher values. This is because the change in the value of an 
inequality variable is constructed as a percentage value, rather than an absolute value. In the case of 
percentage values, variables with higher values often have higher absolute errors, as well as higher 
residuals.  
 
Secondly, the estimated models can be heteroscedastic, which means that the variation around the 
regression line would not be equally distributed for all values of the independent variable. 
One possible reason is that in the income variable, all zero-values were taken away. The inequality 
variables are limited from zero and can therefore not range freely. When examining the scatter 
plots, the residual plots show the residuals are not normally distributed, but pulled out towards the 
top of the plot. 
 
To deal with this problem, I use natural logarithms of the values of the inequality variables in my 
analyses. The error of a dependent variable is often a percentage. After the logarithm 
transformation, the percent error is transferred from a multiplicative factor to the same additive 
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error.11 In this way, log-transformation tends to reduce the residuals for the higher values. When I 
control the natural logarithm of inequality-variable (based on education), the residuals and density 
for the outcome variable are more normally distributed. However, the residual plots show some 
skewness towards the bottom of the plots. 
 
4.3.6 How to Interpret Coefficients 
 
When interpreting the result of a coefficient, it should be held in mind that the outcome variable is 
the natural logarithm of income inequality. Income inequality is thus related to the exponential 
value of the coefficients. When a coefficient is positive, the corresponding exponential value is 
higher than 1. Therefore, when moving from lower to higher value in the corresponding 
independent variable, the inequality-variable will increase. However, an increased inequality-
variable means that there is a smaller income distance between individuals and the reference group. 
On the other hand, when a coefficient is negative, the exponential value is somewhere between 0 
and 1. When the value of the corresponding independent variable increases, the value of the 
inequality-variable will decrease, resulting in higher income inequality. 
 
To conclude, when a coefficient has a positive value, the corresponding independent variable is 
related to lower income inequality. When a coefficient has a negative value, the corresponding 
independent variable is related to higher income inequality. Changes or differences are often 
expressed as percentages, and the logarithm-transformed analysis can provide more precise 
estimates of the percent change. The coefficients can often be interpreted as a percentage when it is 
multiplied by 100 (Wooldridge 2008: 42-45).12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 Since ln (y
€ 
⋅
€ 
ε) = ln (y) + ln (
€ 
ε), the percent error ε becomes the same additive error. 
12 To say it more correctly, for the coefficients with small values and being at least on 0.05 significant level, the 
interpretation can be simplified as being approximately equal to a percentage, multipling by 100. For coefficients with 
much higher values, the exact percent difference is 100(eb - 1), where eb means the exponential value of the difference, 
provided by the logarithm-transformed variable. For details, see Hopkins (2009). 
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5.1 Education 
 
I will begin the data analysis by focusing on the first hypothesis, namely whether the income 
differences between people with high- or low educational level increases when the degree of 
privatisation is higher. To repeat, my hypothesis states that the higher degree of privatisation, the 
wider income inequality there is between individuals with different education. The sample in this 
part of analysis is only individuals with lower educational attainment, while the group with higher 
education serves as reference group with a calculated mean. The degree of income inequality is 
measured by the income of lower-educated individuals as a percentage of the mean income of 
higher-educated people in the prefectures. The higher educated reference group includes individuals 
with completed senior high-school or university education. Other control variables are gender, age, 
education, sector, occupational dummies, and urban/rural residency. Education is also included as a 
control variable, since the income distance to the high-educated reference group may vary 
significantly for different educational degrees. Income inequality is expressed by percentage values, 
and the outcome variable is the natural logarithm of income inequality.  
 
5.1.1 The OLS- models 
 
The first step of studying income inequality is to map out the general situation of relationships 
between variables. At this stage, I use the method of preliminary ordinary least square regression 
analysis (OLS). These analyses do not take the hierarchical data into account. Therefore, in the first 
phase of regression analysis, individuals are not treated as nested in different groups as in 
prefectures. The nesting structure is not in focus, and in this case, we assume that the impact of 
privatisation is the same across different geographic locations. 
 
The results of OLS regressions are summarised in Model 1 and 2 in Table 5.1. In Model 2 the 
variable of privatisation is added. The linear regression in Model 2 shows that there is a statistically 
significant connection between privatisation and income inequality.  
 
 
   Table 5.1. Single- and M
ultilevel R
egression A
nalysis: The Effect of Privatisation on Incom
e Inequality betw
een Low
er-Educated Individuals and the 
M
ean Incom
e of the R
eference G
roup w
ith H
igh Educational level (D
eviation in Percentage). N
 = 76,712. 
 
Linear R
egression: O
LS-m
odels 
M
ultilevel A
nalysis: R
andom
 Intercept M
odels 
 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
M
odel 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
ender (w
om
en =
 0, m
en =
 1) 
.164 (.008) *** 
.146 (.008) *** 
 
.155 (.008) *** 
.154 (.008) *** 
Age (16 year =
 0) 
.038 (.001) *** 
.042 (.001) *** 
 
.039 (.001) *** 
.039 (.001) *** 
Age squared 
-.001 (.000) *** 
-.001 (.000) *** 
 
-.001 (.000) *** 
-.001 (.000) *** 
Education (never attended school) 
.142 (.004) *** 
.155 (.004) *** 
 
.116 (.004) *** 
.116 (.004) *** 
O
ccupation (ref: agriculture) 
 
 
 
 
 
   W
orking class 
.361 (.012) *** 
.407 (.012) *** 
 
.422 (.011) *** 
.422 (.011) *** 
   Service class 
.821 (.026) *** 
.846 (.026) *** 
 
.898 (.024) *** 
.898 (.024) *** 
U
rban/rural registration (rural =
 0) 
.295 (.015) *** 
.295 (.015) *** 
 
.282 (.014) *** 
.282 (.014) *** 
Privatisation 
 
-.174 (.005) *** 
 
 
-.142 (.038) ***   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
2.405 (.015) *** 
2.714 (.018) *** 
3.391 (.037) *** 
2.528 (.040) *** 
2.845 (.092) *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
-square 
0.152 
0.168 
 
 
 
A
djusted R
-Square 
0.152 
0.168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sigm
a u  
 
 
.173 (.022) 
.168 (.022) 
.150 (.020) 
Sigm
a e  
 
 
.978 (.005) 
.777 (.005) 
.777 (.005) 
IC
C
 (intraclass correlation) 
 
 
.150 
.177 
.162 
-2LL 
 
 
199,381.2 
152,385.7 
152,372.5 
-2LL change 
 
 
 
46,995.5 
13.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ote:  
a. Significant levels for coefficients: ^ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
b. D
ependent variable: ln (
€
 
Incomei  / 
€
 
Income
high.education ) 
c. Sam
ple: R
espondents w
ith low
er than senior high-school educational attainm
ent. 
d. The education-variable is divided in intervals.
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To repeat, the value of variable privatisation has been multiplied with 10, so this variable increase 
by 10 per cent between each interval. A positive coefficient corresponds to lower inequality, while a 
negative coefficient shows the variable is connected to higher income inequality (as I discussed in 
4.3.6). The coefficient for privatisation is -0.174. The coefficient is negative, and this means that 
privatisation is related to increased income inequality. When other variables are held constant, for 
each ten per cent higher privatisation, income distance will increase by 1-0.174 = 82.6 per cent. It 
supports the hypothesis that the higher degree of privatisation in a prefecture, the higher income 
inequality there is between people with low and high educational attainment.  
 
All control variables have significant effect on income inequality. The two OLS-models share 
similar coefficients. To summarise in short: There is a larger income distance between women’s 
income and the reference group, than the income deviation between men and the reference group. 
The higher education a person achieved, the smaller the income distance is when comparing his 
income with the average income of the reference group. When studying occupation, we observe that 
income for the service class is closest to the reference group, while the agricultural workers have 
the largest income distance to the high-educated group. Finally, the income inequality is higher for 
rural citizen than for urban citizens.  
 
5.1.2 From OLS to Multilevel Regression 
 
The OLS regression is single-levelled. Therefore, these analyses do not permit coefficients to vary 
from group to group, and this excludes divisions between geographical groups. I intend to examine 
whether income inequality varies with the degree privatisation in different prefectures, and 
therefore, individuals are clustered in geographical groups. In this second phase of statistic analysis, 
I use multilevel regression, and add the contextual variable of prefecture. The results of multilevel 
analysis are presented in Model 3 to 5 in Table 5.1.  
 
The use of random intercept models in multilevel analysis is supposed to be sufficient when the 
numbers of structural groups on the second level are large, as well as when having large enough 
group sample sizes (Snijder & Bosker 1999: 44). The data I use meets these conditions, with 128 
prefectures and a mean of over 1,300 correspondents in each prefecture. Thus, the data contains 
enough information about both the residual between group means for one specific prefecture, and 
the grand mean for the whole sample, and the group dependent parameters are estimated more 
precisely with small standard errors. In this case, the random intercept models are adequate.  
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When comparing OLS models with multilevel regression, it is expected that the estimated 
coefficients differ in these two techniques, and that there are larger standard errors for the 
multilevel regression. The significance of variable effects is also expected to be higher in the OLS-
models (Bickel 2007: 12). We can observe that the coefficients for the same variable are different in 
these two different analytic procedures. In the multilevel analysis, the prefecture-level indicator is 
added, and this technique takes the geographical differences into account. There is very little 
difference between the standard errors for the same individual variables, but the standard errors are 
different for the prefecture-level variable (privatisation) in the two analytic techniques. The 
differences between coefficients are caused by the impact of prefecture, and multilevel analysis is 
therefore advantageous.  
 
In Model 5, on the level of prefecture, we observe that the effect of privatisation is stronger in the 
multilevel regression than in the OLS regression in Model 2, and the standard error for the variable 
of privatisation has increased. In the OLS model, the coefficient of privatisation is estimated 
without contextual effects, and treated as an individual characteristic. But in the multilevel model, 
this variable has an aggregated characteristic on the level of prefecture. The contextual effects are 
included. Therefore, there is a specification error in the OLS-models, resulting in lower absolute 
value for the effect of privatisation. 
 
5.1.3 Multilevel Analysis 
 
Models 3 to 5 examine education-based income inequality in the prefecture, using multilevel 
technique. Model 3 is an empty model before independent variables are added. In Model 4, 
multilevel analysis tests the variables on the individual level. In Model 5, the variable of 
privatisation is included as a prefecture level indicator. The expected statistical significance of 
variables on individual and prefecture level can be different, because of the huge difference 
between analytical entities on these two levels. The sample size in this analysis is over 130,000, 
while the mean group size is somewhere over 1,000. For a multilevel statistical analysis, the 
coefficients on the structural level can be discussed and interpreted to be significant when the p-
value is around 0.10 (Strabac 2007: 187). In the multilevel analyses of education-based inequality, 
the coefficients for privatisation and all other control variables are clearly significant. 
 
When studying model changes, -2LL can be used to measure how well the model represents the 
sample. The lower value, the better one’s model is (Strabac 2007: 191). Looking at the model fits (-
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2LL changes), I find that the -2LL values in the last two models are much lower and change 
significantly from the empty model (model 3). The changes between all three models are significant 
when testing with Chi-square test: The deviation of -2LL values between Model 3 and Model 4 is 
46,995.5, much higher than the critical value (24.3) for seven degrees of freedom at 0.1 per cent 
significant level. In Model 4 and 5, the deviation between -2LL values is 13.2, which is higher than 
the critical value (10.8) at 0.1 per cent level. These likelihood ratio tests show that the model fits are 
improving, and that there is a statistically significant variation of privatisation’s effect between 
prefectures in this sample. 
 
The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) for model 3 is estimated to be 0.15. This component of 
the variance estimates that 15 per cent of the total variance is on level-2. In other words, about 15 
per cent of the variability in income inequality occurs between prefectures, with the remaining 85 
per cent occurres within prefectures. The intra-class correlation is high, and this means that the 
structural factor plays an important role when studying income inequality, supporting that the use of 
a multilevel model is appropriate. Model 3 to 5 show that the within prefecture-variance, sigma e, is 
much greater than the between prefecture-variance, sigma u. This points to that the unexplained 
variance in income inequality within a prefecture is much higher than the variance between 
prefectures. At the same time, we can observe that the values of unexplained variances are changing 
across the models. When individual variables in model 4 are added, both individual (sigma e) and 
structural level variances (sigma u) are dramatically reduced compared to the empty model (model 
3). The unexplained individual variance is reduced because the additive individual variables are 
included. When concerning the reduced structural level variance in model 4, we can expect that 
some of the variations of income inequality between different prefectures can be associated to, and 
explained by, the individual compositions. When the structural variable of privatisation is added in 
model 5, the individual variance (sigma e) is not reduced, but there is a significant reduction of 
structural variance (sigma u). 
 
5.1.4 Interpretation of Coefficients in the Multilevel Analysis 
 
Model 3 to 5 show results from the multilevel analysis. Model 3 shows that, in general, income for 
lower educated individuals is 29.7 per cent of the reference group with high education. This model 
does not include any of the independent variables, and the estimated value of the intercept is the 
grand means for all individuals in the sample, not considering prefecture differences.  
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Further, the variables on individual level are added in model 4, and in model 5, the variable of 
privatisation is included as a level-two indicator. The effects of all included variables are shown to 
be statistically significant. When looking at the intercept in model 4, it is equivalent to the estimated 
average value of income inequality of the respondents with zero- value for all independent 
variables. An ideal zero-value individual is a sixteen-year-old peasant woman with rural hukou and 
work inside agricultural sectors, who never attended school. The income distance between this 
group and the referent group is huge: their income is only 12.5 per cent of the reference income.  
  
In model 5, the multilevel regression shows that there is a statistically significant connection 
between privatisation and income inequality. When all other variables are held constant, ten per 
cent higher privatisation in a prefecture corresponds to 14.2 per cent higher income inequality. The 
analysis supports hypothesis 1: With a 0.1 per cent level of significance, when there is a higher 
degree of privatisation in a prefecture, there will be a higher degree of income inequality for people 
with different educational attainment.  
  
When compared to the reference group, the income distance is revealed to be 15.4 per cent higher 
for women than for men, when keeping other variables constant. It is also revealed that the higher 
education a person has achieved, the less income difference there is when comparing her income 
with the average income of the higher educated social group. Ranged from never attended school to 
finished junior high school, the predicated value of income inequality is reduced with 11.6 per cent 
points for each increased educational level, when controlled for other variables. The income 
distance to the reference group is 1.9 (= 1 + 0.898) times higher for agricultural class than the 
service class; and 1.4 times higher (1 + 0.422) for agricultural class than for the working class. 
Finally, there is larger income difference between rural citizens and the reference group, than for 
urban citizens. This effect is also significant.  
 
5.2 Sector 
 
There are three sectors in the analyses: state, private, and agricultural sector. When studying the 
relationship between prefectures with various degrees of privatisation, and income inequality 
between sectors, two separate analyses are performed. First, I look at the income difference between 
agricultural sectors and the other two sectors. Second, I examine the difference between the state 
and the private sector. Both OLS-models and multilevel analyses were used in the analyses. 
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5.2.1 Agricultural Sector in Focus 
 
The dependent variable here is the natural logarithm of the sector-based index-variable for income 
inequality. The sample is the agricultural sector, while the state and private sectors in a prefecture 
are merged together, with their mean income used as a reference for comparison. The index-
variable for sector-based income inequality is the relative income of people working in the 
agricultural sector. It shows the income of people working in the agricultural sector as a percentage 
of the mean income for individuals working in state and private sectors. The reason that I chose to 
merge state and private sectors is basically because of the interest of studying how privatisation 
influences the huge agricultural sector in the mainly rural Western China. 
 
Table 5.2.1 represents two different analytical procedures for income inequality based on sector 
differences. Model 1 and 2 show results from the OLS regressions, and model 3 to 5 show results of 
multilevel analysis. Again, the differences between coefficients, and between standard errors for 
privatisation in these two statistic procedures show that the multilevel analysis is beneficial. Model 
3 in multilevel analysis is improved significantly when the individual variables are added, and the -
2LL change between model 3 and 4 is significant at 0.1 per cent. When the structure-level variable 
is added in model 4, the model improvement is significant at 0.5 per cent level. This shows the 
relevance of studying individuals nested in groups, with a focus on both individual and prefecture 
level factors.  
 
Model 3 shows that the income of agricultural workers amounts to 27.5 (=
€ 
e3.314 ) per cent of the 
income of individuals working in the state or private sectors. This model doesn’t include any 
control variables, and the prefecture-level is not taken into account. The coefficient of privatisation 
in model 5 is -0.117, significant at 5 per cent. When controlled for other variables, for each 10 per 
cent increment of privatisation, there is a statistical tendency that the income distance between 
individuals working in agricultural sector and the reference mean increases by 11.7 per cent in a 
prefecture. All individual variables, except the hukou-registration variable, are statistically 
significant. Controlled for other variables, income inequality is 13.7 times higher for women then 
for men, compared to the average income in the reference group. Each higher level of education 
corresponds to 9.7 times lower income distance between individuals and the reference group. 
   Table 5.2.1 Single- and M
ultilevel R
egression A
nalysis: The Effect of Privatisation on Incom
e Inequality betw
een Individuals W
orking in A
gricultural 
Sector and O
ther Sector (D
eviation in Percentage). N
 = 56,327. 
 
O
LS 
M
ultilevel A
nalysis: R
andom
 Intercept M
odels 
 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
M
odel 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
ender (w
om
en) 
.148 (.009) *** 
.133 (.008) *** 
 
.137 (.008) *** 
.137 (.008) *** 
Age (16 year) 
.035 (.001) *** 
.038 (.001) *** 
 
.036 (.001) *** 
.036 (.001) *** 
Age squared 
-.001 (.000) *** 
-.001 (.000) *** 
 
-.001 (.000) *** 
-.001 (.000) *** 
Education (never attended school) 
.116 (.004) *** 
.125 (.004) *** 
 
.097 (.003) *** 
.097 (.003) *** 
O
ccupation (agriculture) 
 
 
 
 
 
   W
orking class 
.245 (.022) *** 
.264 (.022) *** 
 
.276 (.021) *** 
.276 (.021) *** 
   Service class 
.662 (.101) *** 
.685 (.100) *** 
 
.763 (.094) *** 
.763 (.094) *** 
U
rban/rural registration (rural) 
.045 (.022)     * 
.052 (.022)     * 
 
.039 (.021)     ^ 
.039 (.021)     ^  
Privatisation 
 
-.141 (.005) *** 
 
 
-.117 (.038)  * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
2.678 (.016) *** 
2.922 (.018) *** 
3.314 (.036) *** 
2.756 (.038) *** 
3.019 (.092) *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
-square 
0.067 
0.080 
 
 
 
A
djusted R
-Square 
0.067 
0.079 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sigm
a u  
 
 
.157 (.021) 
.151 (.020) 
.136 (.019) 
Sigm
a e  
 
 
.792 (.005) 
.722 (.004) 
.722 (.005) 
IC
C
 (intraclass correlation) 
 
 
.165 
.173 
.159 
-2LL 
 
 
135,087.9 
124,181.2 
124,172.1 
-2LL change 
 
 
 
10,906.7 
9.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ote:  
a. Significant levels for coefficients: ^ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
b. D
ependent variable: ln (
€
 
Incomei  / 
€
 
Income
State&
private ) 
c. Sam
ple: R
espondents w
orking in agricultural sector. 
d. The education-variable is divided in intervals 
e. The p-values for variable urban/rural registration are equal to 0.68 in both m
odel 4 and 5.
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The impact of occupation is substantial. Income inequality for people with higher occupational 
status is dramatically lower than for those who have lower occupational position. Controlling for 
other variables, the income distance between agricultural workers and the reference mean is 1.3 
times higher than the income difference between working class and the reference, and 1.8 times 
higher than the income distance between the service class and the reference group. 
 
5.2.2 Inequality Between State and Private Sector 
 
In this section, I examine the income diversity between individuals working in the state and the 
private sector. The index-variable for income inequality expresses income for private employees as 
a percentage of the mean income of the state sector in a prefecture. The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of the corresponding proportions of the index-variable, and the sample is people 
working in the private sector. 
 
The main finding is that a higher degree of privatisation is related to lower income inequality 
between state and private employees. When looking at Model 2 and Model 5, we can observe that 
the coefficients for privatisation are positive, and correspond to lower inequality. In model 5, the 
coefficient for privatisation is equal to 0.088, which means that controlled for other variables, when 
privatisation in a prefecture increases with 10 per cent, the income distance between private and 
state sector becomes 8.8 per cent lower. This effect is relatively weak, but statistically significant at 
the level of 5 per cent. Hypothesis two, which contends that privatisation is related to higher income 
distance between sectors, is therefore shown to not be correct when it comes to income distance 
between the state and private sector.  
 
When looking at other variables in this analysis, we can observe that income inequality between 
private and state sectors is higher among women than men, for younger people than older people, 
for lower educated than higher educated individuals, and for rural residents than for urban. One 
finding that stands out is sector-based income inequality among occupational status. The focus is on 
the income distance between state and private sectors, and in these two sectors we have agricultural 
occupations, working class, and service class occupations. The coefficient for working class is -
0.077, which means that income distance between the working class and the reference group is 7.7 
per cent higher than the income difference between agricultural labourers and the reference mean. 
However, this result is not statistically significant, and cannot be generalised to encompass the 
whole situation in Western China.
   Table 5.2.2. Single- and M
ultilevel R
egression A
nalysis: The Effect of Privatisation on Incom
e Inequality betw
een Individuals W
orking in State and 
Private Sectors (D
eviation in Percentage). N
 = 17,348. 
 
 
O
LS 
M
ultilevel A
nalysis: R
andom
 Intercept M
odels 
 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
M
odel 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
ender (w
om
en) 
.292 (.024) *** 
.298 (.024) *** 
 
.309 (.023) *** 
.310 (.023) *** 
Age (16 year) 
.065 (.004) *** 
.064 (.004) *** 
 
.061 (.004) *** 
.061 (.004) *** 
Age squared 
-.001 (.000) *** 
-.001 (.000) *** 
 
-.001 (.000) *** 
-.001 (.000) *** 
Education (never attended school) 
.198 (.011) *** 
.194 (.011) *** 
 
.187 (.011) *** 
.186 (.011) *** 
O
ccupation (agriculture) 
 
 
 
 
 
   W
orking class 
-.067 (.052)  
-.074 (.052)  
 
-.075 (.051)    
-.077 (.051)    
   Service class 
.320 (.065) *** 
.312 (.065) *** 
 
.333 (.064) *** 
.331 (.064) *** 
U
rban/rural registration (rural) 
.300 (.026) *** 
.301 (.026) *** 
 
.296 (.026) *** 
.296 (.026) *** 
Privatisation 
 
.058 (.015) *** 
 
 
.088 (.038)     * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
2.278 (.065) *** 
2.155 (.072) *** 
3.794 (.035) *** 
2.404 (.070) *** 
2.200 (.112) *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
-square 
0.403 
0.405 
 
 
 
A
djusted R
-Square 
0.162 
0.164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sigm
a u  
 
 
.134 (.021) 
.099 (.014) 
.091 (.017) 
Sigm
a e  
 
 
.868 (.010) 
.882 (.017) 
.883 (.014) 
IC
C
 (intraclass correlation) 
 
 
.134 
.101 
.093 
-2LL 
 
 
44,229.5 
21,697.7 
21,692.5 
-2LL change 
 
 
 
22,531.8 
7.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ote:  
a. Significant levels for coefficients: ^ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
b. D
ependent variable: ln (
€
 
Incomei  / 
€
 
Income
State ). 
c. Sam
ple: R
espondents w
orking in private sector. 
d. The education-variable is divided in intervals 
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5.3 Occupation 
 
In the analysis I have three occupational groups: Service class, working class and agricultural class. 
Service class is the contrast group here, and I show the income for individuals in working- and 
agricultural class as a percentage of the service class mean income. The sample here is the working 
class individuals and agricultural workers, and the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
inequality variable. Multilevel models in table 5.3 present the results. 
 
Table 5.3. Single- and Multilevel Regression Analysis: The Effect of Privatisation on Income 
Inequality between Service Class and Others (Deviation in Percentage). N = 79,270. 
 
Fixed effects Model 0 
Coefficient (SE) 
Model 1 
Coefficient (SE) 
Model 2 
Coefficient (SE) 
    
Gender (women)  .150 (.008) *** .151 (.008) *** 
Age (16 year)  .039 (.001) *** .039 (.001) *** 
Age squared  -.001 (.000) *** -.001 (.000) *** 
Education (never attended school)  .111 (.003) *** .111 (.003) *** 
Occupation (agriculture)    
   Working class  .421 (.011) *** .422 (.012) *** 
Urban/rural registration (rural)  .190 (.016) *** .190 (.016) *** 
Privatisation   -.104 (.044)     * 
    
Random effects Parameter (SE) Parameter (SE) Parameter (SE) 
    
Intercept 3.162 (.041) *** 2.349 (.043) *** 2.582 (.108) *** 
Sigma u  .208 (.027) .208 (.027) .199 (.026) 
Sigma e  .956 (.005) .765 (.005) .765 (.005) 
ICC (intraclass correlation) .179 .214 .306 
-2LL 190,277.8 147,469.6 147,464.2 
-2LL change  42,808.2 5.4 
    
Note:  
a. Significant levels for coefficients: ^ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
b. Dependent variable: ln (
€ 
Incomei / 
€ 
Incomeservice ) 
c. Respondents in working class and in agricultural class.  
d. The education-variable is divided in intervals 
 
Privatisation has a positive and significant effect on income inequality between occupations. For a 
10 per cent ascending degree of privatisation, the income inequality increases with 10.4 per cent, 
when comparing the working class and agricultural worker class to the referent category of service 
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class. This supports the hypothesis that different occupations receives more unequal wages in a 
prefecture where there is a higher degree of privatisation, on a 5 per cent significance level. 
 
Income distance between the referent occupational class and women is 15.1 per cent higher than 
when comparing male with the reference group. Each higher level of education corresponds to 11.1 
per cent lower inequality. The income distance to the average income level of the service class is 
42.2 per cent lower for the working class than for agricultural workers. Finally, for urban citizens, 
the level of income inequality is 19 per cent lower than for rural registered citizens.  
 
5.4 Urban and Rural Registration 
 
The study object in this section is people with rural hukou status, and the income difference 
between these persons and those who are registered as urban citizens. Income inequality for hukou 
registration is constructed by the deviation between rural citizens’ income and the mean income for 
urban citizens in the prefecture. Urban citizens are used as the reference group, and the rural-hukou 
holders are the samples in this study. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the index-
variable for inequality. 
 
A similar tendency is repeated in these models as in the previous tables. The economic and social 
position of women, younger people, lower educated individuals, and persons with low occupational 
status, are contributing to higher income inequality. The coefficient for privatisation is -0.138, 
which means that for each 10 per cent higher degree of privatisation, there is 13.8 per cent higher 
income inequality. The effect of privatisation is considered to be important for the increasing 
income inequality between urban and rural citizens in Western China. Again, the income distance to 
the reference group is higher for women than for men, for lower educated than for higher, and 
higher for the agricultural class than for working and service class. 
 
Table 5.4. Single- and Multilevel Regression Analysis: Preliminary OLS- and Random Intercept 
Models. The Effect of Privatisation on Income Inequality between Urban and Rural People 
(Deviation in Percentage). N = 60,106. 
 
Fixed effects Model 0 
Coefficient (SE) 
Model 1 
Coefficient (SE) 
Model 2 
Coefficient (SE) 
    
Gender (female)  .157 (.008) *** .157 (.008) *** 
Age (16 year)  .037 (.001) *** .037 (.001) *** 
Age squared  -.001 (.000) *** -.001 (.000) *** 
Chapter Five. Results 
 
 
85 
Education (never attend school)   .108 (.004) *** .108 (.004) *** 
Occupation (agriculture)    
   Working class  .382 (.012) *** .383 (.012) *** 
   Service class  .697 (.031) *** .697 (.031) *** 
Privatisation   -.138 (.051) ** 
    
Random effects Parameter (SE) Parameter (SE) Parameter (SE) 
    
Intercept 3.246 (.045) *** 2.605 (.048) *** 2.921 (.126) *** 
Sigma u  .248 (.032) .246 (.032) .231 (.030) 
Sigma e  .856 (.005) .769 (.005) .769 (.005) 
ICC  .225 .242 .231 
-2LL 149,096.1 142,597.2 142,590.1 
-2LL change   6,498.9 7.1 
    
Note:  
a. Significant levels for coefficients: ^ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
b. Dependent variable: ln (
€ 
Incomei / 
€ 
Incomeurban ) 
c. Sample: Rural respondents.   
d. The education-variable is divided in intervals 
 
5.5 Migration  
 
Migration can play an important role for income inequality both in urban and rural areas. Table 
5.5.1 examines the general income inequality between migrants and residents. Table 5.5.2 addresses 
the situation in urban areas, between urban residents and rural migrants, and table 5.5.3 studies the 
income inequality between rural resident population and rural migrants. These three analyses 
basically share the same pattern found in earlier sections, when studying the individual control 
variables of gender, age, education, occupation, and hukou-orientation in the last table. 
 
5.5.1 The General Migration Situation 
 
The main focus here is to study income differences between migrants and residents, independent of 
their hukou registration. Income for residents is calculated as percentages of migrants’ mean 
income. The inequality variable based on the general migration situation is designed to express the 
income of residents as a percentage of migrants’ mean income (Table 5.5.1). The sample is 
residents, and the dependent variable is the logarithm of the inequality-variable. 
 
When looking at the descriptive data for the four values in the variable of migration, we can 
observe that the income level varies much between these groups: Urban migrants on average have 
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the highest income level, compared to urban residents, rural migrants, and at last, rural residents 
with the lowest income among all these categories. It shows in the zero-model that the mean income 
of migrants is about 30 per cent higher than residents. 
 
Table 5.5.1. Single- and Multilevel Regression Analysis: The effect of privatisation on income 
inequality between migrants and residents (deviation in percentage). N = 68,906. 
 
Fixed effects Model 0 
Coefficient (SE) 
Model 1 
Coefficient (SE) 
Model 2 
Coefficient (SE) 
    
Gender (female)  .153 (.007) *** .153 (.007) *** 
Age (16 year)  .041 (.001) *** .041 (.001) *** 
Age squared  -.001 (.000) *** -.001 (.000) *** 
Education (never attended school)  .127 (.003) *** .127 (.003) *** 
Occupation (agriculture)    
   Working class  .398 (.011) *** .398 (.011) *** 
   Service class  .904 (018) *** .904 (018) *** 
Urban/rural registration (rural)  .406 (.013) *** .406 (.013) *** 
Privatisation   -.147 (.051)  ** 
    
Random effects Parameter (SE) Parameter (SE) Parameter (SE) 
    
Intercept 3.685 (.047) *** 2.762 (.049) *** 3.098 (.127) *** 
Sigma u  .264 (.035) .263 (.034) .246 (.032) 
Sigma e  1.021 (.006) .759 (.004) .759 (.004) 
ICC (intraclass correlation) .205 .257 .245 
-2LL 182,075.5 162,541.3 162,533.4 
-2LL change  19,534.2 7.9 
    
Note:  
a. Significant levels for coefficients: ^ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
b. Dependent variable: ln (
€ 
Incomei / 
€ 
Incomemigrant ) 
c. Sample: Residents. 
d. The education-variable is divided in intervals 
 
All coefficients for control variables are significant. The explanatory strength is relatively high for 
all variables, pointing to that individual factors can explain much of the inequality. Especially for 
people in the service class, the income differences are dramatically reduced, compared with other 
occupational classes. Privatisation’s effects on income inequality turned out to be significant at 1 
per cent level. The income distance between migrants and residents is higher in a more privatised 
prefecture, compared with a less privatised prefecture. Income inequality increases with 14.7 per 
cent, which corresponds to each 10 per cent increased degree of privatisation. The variable of urban 
registration turns out to be significant. For urban migrants as a group there is a much smaller 
income distance to the reference group.  
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5.5.2 Rural Migrant and Urban Resident 
 
This part of study focus on the income difference between rural migrants and urban residents, and 
the situation in urban areas. The dependent variable of income inequality is constructed as the 
natural logarithm of deviation between rural migrants and urban residents, and the income of rural 
migrants is represented as a percentage of urban residents’ average income. The sample consists of 
rural migrants. All individual control variables have important effects on income differences, and 
privatisation seems to be connected to lower income differences between rural residents and the 
mean income for rural migrants. But the coefficient for privatisation is small and not significant (p-
value is equal to 0.47). One reason for the insignificant result can be the limited sample size.  
 
Table 5.5.2. Single- and Multilevel Regression Analysis: The effect of privatisation on income 
inequality between rural migrants and urban residents (deviation in percentage). N = 1,793. 
Fixed effects Model 0 
Coefficient (SE) 
Model 1 
Coefficient (SE) 
Model 2 
Coefficient (SE) 
    
Gender (female)  .440 (.051) *** .442 (.051) *** 
Age (16 year)  .043 (.008) *** .043 (.008) *** 
Age squared  -.001 (.000) *** -.001 (.000) *** 
Education (never attend school)  .166 (.021) *** .166 (.021) *** 
Occupation (agriculture)    
   Working class  .572 (.055) *** .570 (.055) *** 
   Service class  .936 (.121) *** .933 (.121) *** 
Privatisation   .043 (.061)    
    
Random effects Parameter (SE) Parameter (SE) Parameter (SE) 
    
Intercept 3.625 (.058) *** 2.341 (.097) *** 2.240 (.171) *** 
Sigma u  .245 (.051) .174 (.038) .173 (.038) 
Sigma e  1.194 (.042) .904 (.032) .904 (.032) 
ICC  .170 .161 .161 
-2LL 5,296.8 4,786.0 4,785.5 
-2LL change  510.8 0.5 
    
Note:  
a. Significant levels for coefficients: ^ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
b. Dependent variable: ln (
€ 
Incomei / 
€ 
Incomeurban.resident ) 
c. Sample: Rural migrants. 
d. The p-value for privatisation variable is 0.47. 
d. The education-variable is divided in intervals 
 
For a multilevel statistical analysis, the coefficients on the structural level can be significant, when 
the p-value is near 0.10 (Strabac 2007: 187). In this case, the p-value is much higher than 0.10 
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(being 0.47), and it is clearly not significant. Therefore, we cannot draw a conclusion about the 
relationship between privatisation and income inequality and generalise to the whole population. 
Effects from other control variables correspond to the general tendency in other analyses. Women, 
and lower-educated rural migrants are suffering from higher income inequality when compared to 
the average income of urban residents. The lower occupational status an individual has, the higher 
income inequality there is.  
 
5.5.3 Rural Migrant and Rural Resident 
 
The last analysis studies income inequality between migrants and residents with rural hukou-
registration (Table 5.5.3). The dependent variable is the deviation between these two groups of rural 
citizens, with a focus on rural residents. Their income is represented as a percentage of rural 
migrants’ average income. The effect of privatisation is significant. For each 10 per cent higher 
degree of privatisation in a prefecture, income inequality becomes 20.2 per cent higher between 
rural migrants and rural citizens.  
 
Table 5.5.3. Single- and Multilevel Regression Analysis: The effect of privatisation on income 
inequality between rural residents and rural migrants (deviation in per cent points). N = 58,291. 
Fixed effects Model 0 
Coefficient (SE) 
Model 1 
Coefficient (SE) 
Model 2 
Coefficient (SE) 
    
Gender (female)  .151 (.008) *** .150 (.008) *** 
Age (16 year)  .037 (.001) *** .037 (.001) *** 
Age squared  -.001 (.000) *** -.001 (.000) *** 
Education (never attend school)  .106 (.004) *** .106 (.004) *** 
Occupation (agriculture)    
   Working class  .333 (.013) *** .333 (.013) *** 
   Service class  .642 (.033) *** .642 (.033) *** 
Privatisation   -.202 (.056) *** 
    
Random effects Parameter (SE) Parameter (SE) Parameter (SE) 
    
Intercept 3.826 (.050) *** 3.205 (.053) *** 3.664 (.137) *** 
Sigma u  .281 (.038) .287 (.039) .257 (.035) 
Sigma e  .835 (.005) .760 (.005) .760 (.005) 
ICC  .252 .274 .253 
-2LL 139,361.0 133,896.4 133,884.2 
-2LL change  5,464.6 12.2 
    
Note: a.Significant levels for coefficients: ^ p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
b. Dependent variable: ln (
€ 
Incomei / 
€ 
Incomerural.migrant) 
c. Sample: Rural residents. d. The education-variable is divided in intervals 
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6.1. Hypotheses and Findings 
 
In this project, I study the relationship between privatisation and income inequality between 
individuals with different characteristics, situated in different social positions. I have focused on 
five stratifying principles or social structures: individuals’ educational attainment, economic 
sectors, occupational class, rural-urban household registration, and migration status. In the 
hypotheses, I assume that when there is a higher degree of privatisation, there will be higher income 
inequality between individuals with different education, between individuals in different sectors, 
between individuals with different occupations, between individuals registered in rural or urban 
areas, and between migrants and residents. I analyse how privatisation on prefecture level varies 
with income inequality through multilevel analysis. In this section, I analyse my findings in relation 
to the hypotheses.   
 
Based on the first hypothesis, I expected that there would be higher income inequality related to 
educational attainment in prefectures with a higher degree of privatisation. A higher degree of 
privatisation means that a larger share of the employees works in the private sector. Through 
statistical analysis, I found that privatisation seems to be strongly related to income inequality 
between individuals with different educational attainment. Income inequality between lower 
educated individuals (a group which consists of people with educational levels ranging from never 
attended school to finished junior-high school) and higher educated individuals (including 
individuals who completed either senior-high school or university) is larger where there is a higher 
degree of privatisation. This confirms the hypothesis. Regarding the other control variables, 
education-based income inequality varies with individual and structural variables such as gender, 
age, occupation, etc. When comparing the income of individuals to the mean income of people with 
high education, this income distance is larger for women than for men, for older than for younger, 
for rural residents than urban residents, and for individuals in working and agricultural classes than 
for individuals in the service class. 
 
Regarding the second hypothesis, I expected that income inequality between individuals working in 
different sectors of the labour market would rise, when there is higher degree of privatisation in a 
prefecture. According to the analyses, privatisation affects income inequality differently when 
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comparing between different sectors. I found that when comparing agricultural sector with other 
sectors in a prefecture, higher income inequality occurs when there is a higher degree of 
privatisation. In this way, the hypothesis is confirmed. However, when studying income differences 
between state and private sectors, the result indicates that privatisation is related to lower inter-
sectoral income inequality. The effect of privatisation is weak but statistically significant, and 
therefore this finding contradicts my hypothesis. However, concerning income inequality related to 
the control variables characteristics, roughly the same tendencies can be seen for both sectoral 
relationships. The income difference to the reference group of high-income individuals is larger 
among women than men, for younger people than older, for less educated than higher educated, for 
work and agricultural classes than the service class, and for rural residents than for urban residents. 
 
The third hypothesis assumed that when there is a higher degree of privatisation in a prefecture, 
there would be higher income inequality between individuals located in different occupational 
classes. The multilevel analyses of this hypothesis seem to support this hypothesis. Higher 
privatisation is related to increased income difference between the service class reference group on 
one side, and agricultural- and working class on the other. 
 
The fourth hypothesis dealt with the relation of income differences between rural and urban 
individuals. Also here the analysis seems to be in accordance with the hypotheses, as the analysis 
indicate that in a prefecture with higher privatisation, it is also more likely that there are larger 
income differences between rural and urban citizens. 
 
The fifth and last hypothesis postulated a positive relationship between privatisation and higher 
income inequality between migrants and residents. When studying income inequality for migrants 
in general, the analysis shows that a higher degree of privatisation contributes to increased income 
inequality between migrants and residents. Further, I separated migrants and residents with urban 
and rural household registration, to study income inequality between urban residents and rural 
migrants. Although the relationship is weak and statistically insignificant, the analysis showed that 
income differences between rural migrants and urban residents declined in a prefecture with higher 
privatisation.  
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Table 6.1. Overview of hypotheses and support from data analysis. 
 Hypotheses Support 
H1 The higher privatisation, the higher income inequality between 
individuals with different educational attainment. 
Yes 
H2 The higher privatisation, the higher income inequality between 
individuals working in different sectors. 
Partly 
H3 The higher privatisation, the higher income inequality between 
individuals with different occupational positions. 
Yes 
H4 The higher privatisation, the higher income inequality between 
rural and urban citizens.  
Yes 
H5 The higher privatisation, the higher income inequality between 
migrants and residents. 
Yes 
 
 
6.2. Interpretation and Discussion  
 
6.2.1. Education-Based Inequality and Privatisation 
 
The results show that privatisation is related to higher income inequality between individuals with 
different educational attainment in Western China. This finding corresponds to some previous 
studies. Human capital theory and theory of skill-biased technological changes argue that individual 
with higher education is better rewarded in more market oriented and privatised societies, because 
of the need for higher-skilled labour in a modern society. Market transition theory emphasise 
increasing returns to human capital and decreased returns to political capital in the transitional 
Chinese society. The higher degree of market and private sectors, the higher return to education 
there is (Nee & Cao 2004: 47). Similarly, in an analysis of urban retrospective panel data, Zhou 
found that there are significant increasing returns to all levels of education in urban private sectors 
(Zhou 2000: 1163). Gustaffson et al. have found that increasing returns to education is one of the 
most important contributors to increased income inequality in China (Gustafsson et al. 2008: 112). 
 
Western China is experiencing economic restructuring and transformation, from the old planned 
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economy and state socialism to market orientation and privatisation, and the higher return to and 
emphasis of educational attainment seems to be an important factor for increased income inequality. 
Li points out that the private sector rewards individuals with high education, and the return to 
education increases when there is a higher degree of marketisation, especially in the less-developed 
and low-income provinces (Li 2003: 326).  
 
Perspectives related to neoclassical theory, skill-biased technological change and the human capital-
concept, can be criticised for underestimating the importance of institutional and contextual issues. 
Although I can not test which of the theories works “best” to explain the connection between 
privatisation and education-based income inequality, it seems that there is a link between 
privatisation and higher degree of social closure through educational credentials and 
institutionalised boundaries, through which some groups are more protected, while others are 
blocked out.  
 
In the multilevel analysis, the focus is on people with low education, and the measure of income 
inequality is the distance between their income and the mean income of the group of people with 
highest education. I observed that in some sectors and occupations, there are stricter demands which 
limit access. For example, when looking at individuals’ education and occupational class, we can 
observe from the descriptive data that while 95.3 per cent of agricultural workers and 84.4 per cent 
of working class have lower education, only 35.3 per cent of the service class have low education. 
In higher occupational classes, there is a smaller proportion of low educational attainment. In other 
words, the higher educational attainment an individual has, the higher possibility there is for him or 
her to get a job with higher wage. In the statistical analysis, I observed that the impact of 
educational differences on income inequality is particularly strong for people with lower 
occupational status. This can point to the possible situation that when there is higher privatisation, it 
is more difficult to achieve equality, since education functions as a stratifying principle between 
different occupational statuses.  
 
This is consistent with some earlier research. Based on empirical findings, Li et al. point to the fact 
that higher education attainment in China is used as a signal or symbol of an individual’s high 
productivity and elitist position, independent of his or her school performance and academic 
achievements. In other words, higher education is in itself treated as an efficient signal that 
symbolise an individuals’ ability and productivity (Li et al. 2009: 380). Hence, education functions 
as a meaningful, semiotic marker in labour market, and this can be seen as a mechanism of 
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exclusion, which contributes to higher inequality. Meanwhile, the underlying ideology of 
privatisation is to emphasise on different rewards connected to different individual abilities. The 
exclusive effect of education differences can be strengthened by privatisation, and therefore 
education-based inequality can vary with degree of privatisation. 
 
In Western China, many economically disadvantaged families, especially rural families, experience 
the increasing economic burden to pay for schooling, because of withdrawal or lack of public 
support, and growth of school fees in both public and private schools. When there is more 
privatisation in an area, there can be more profound ideological and practical boundaries between 
different social groups, marked by educational differences. The patterns of educational distribution 
also vary much between rural and urban areas. In my sample, the numbers of rural labour 
participants is about 3.5 times higher than urban labour participants in Medow. However, 30.6 per 
cent of high-educated individuals live in urban areas, while only 3.5 per cent of rural people have 
high education. Higher education is related to higher income, and in a prefecture with higher degree 
of privatisation, there are even higher returns to education. Similarly, when educational level is 
clearly differentiated between rural and urban people, income inequality between urban and rural 
areas will increase. 
  
6.2.2. Occupational Classes, Inequality, and Privatisation 
 
The analysis shows that privatisation seems to be related to income distance when comparing the 
service class to working and agricultural classes. The higher degree of privatisation in a prefecture, 
the higher income inequality there is between occupational positions. It seems that privatisation is 
connected to income inequalities, based on stratifying principles that reward individuals and social 
groups differently based on the individual’s occupational position, and that privatisation contributes 
to enlarge the wage differences between occupational positions. This finding can be conceptualised 
in terms of market segmentation theory. The primary segment consists of well-paid, high-skilled 
jobs, and the secondary segment consists of low-paid, low-skilled jobs. Jobs in the service class are 
typically located in the primary segment, while working class and agricultural jobs can be placed in 
the secondary segment. A larger private sector can contribute to increase wage stratification 
between different segments, partly because of rising returns to education, and increased use of 
bonus and rewards systems, especially in the private sector.   
 
The finding is in accordance with several earlier studies. Bian and Logan have pointed out that 
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occupational licensing is a new phenomenon that did not exist in the planned economy. Both 
occupational position and organisation of work are important contributors to higher wage inequality 
in the Chinese market transition process. Occupations, no matter if defined as political or market 
oriented jobs, have significant effect on income inequality (Bian & Logan 1996: 752). Zhou have 
found that rising urban income inequality is connected to rising returns to education, and that the 
work organisations are central for the distribution of resources. Furthermore, he concludes that a 
growing private sector has had substantial impact on the income distribution in the reform period up 
to 1994 (Zhou 2000). Park et al. found that rising returns to skilled labour is one of the important 
factors for increased wage inequality in China (Park et al. 2003: 15). Blecher (2005: 7-8) points out 
that the working class and agricultural class in China has been facing larger inequality and 
disadvantages in the market oriented economic reform period. Knight and Song (1995: 105) have 
also found wage differences in urban China caused by occupational differences during China’s 
economic reform. Moreover, Knight and Song found an important and strongly connected 
relationship between education and occupation, which means that education raises the income level 
both directly and indirectly as it improves an individual’s chance of getting a well-paid occupation 
(Knight & Song 1999: 105). 
 
I found as well that the occupational impact on income inequality is strengthened to a large extent 
when the degree of privatisation increases. Although it is difficult to directly compare which factor 
has the most important impact on income inequality, the multilevel analysis shows that class-based 
inequality is tightly connected to educational attainment, as assumed by Knight and Song. When 
comparing individuals with higher and lower education, the occupation-based inequality appears to 
decline. In other words, persons with higher education are facing less inequality when considering 
their occupational classes.  
 
Once again, the occupation-based inequality affects some social groups and individuals with certain 
characteristics differently than it affects other groups or persons without the same qualities. When 
comparing an individual’s income to the service class, factors that contribute to higher equality can 
for example include to be employed in higher occupations, or being urban resident, or to have 
higher educational attainment. Generally, there is also more equality for males than females. 
Individuals with one or several of these mentioned characteristics seems to be favoured across 
different social contexts, and they have less risk for income inequalities across all the social 
divisions I test in my analysis. These factors and certain characteristics connected to favoured social 
groups seem to function as boundaries between social groups, and point to important principles of 
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stratification, which contribute to the formation of income inequality in general.  
Occupational classes and education seems to serve as social categories that create and maintain 
social inequality and boundaries, while dividing between different social groups. As recognised by 
Wang, “members in such social categories share a characteristic that allows them to have access to 
resources and opportunities without being confined to a common, local physical space. 
Examples…include gender, ethnicity, citizenship, religion, geographical origin of ancestors, 
occupation, education, and age” (Wang 2008: 17-18). Further, in the context of China in the process 
of privatisation, Wang identified that inequality was not only created by coercive physical forces or 
political powers, but also by social boundaries that could reach goods and benefits without explicit 
forms of exploitation and forces (Wang 2008: 18). Privatisation can have a function of reinforcing 
social boundaries and exclusion mechanisms in a more market-oriented China, based on the 
ideology that individuals with different abilities should be rewarded differently, and that education 
and occupation are symbols for individual productivity and ability. However, it is arbitrary to 
conclude that there is a causal relationship between privatisation and higher income inequality, and 
we can neither claim that privatisation has a main effect on, or has caused or led to social 
boundaries such as education and occupational divisions. Even when we can observe that there is 
correlation between these two factors, we cannot control for all other variables on the structural 
level, and of course, other factors than privatisation contribute to uphold social structures. In 
addition, it is difficult to answer the question of why there in some prefectures is a higher degree of 
privatisation than others, and how privatisation is concretely connected to the social policy, 
economic development, and income distribution.  
 
6.2.3. Rural Sector and Agricultural Activities 
 
In Western China, the rural sector is the most important sector, as it amounts to over half of the 
output of total economic activities. In this paper, several analyses involve the rural sector and 
agricultural activities. Through studies of rural-urban disparity, agricultural sector, and agricultural 
occupations, I find that increased income inequalities between rural sector and other sectors are 
more or less related to a higher degree of privatisation. In the analysis of sector-based income 
differences, I observe that a higher degree of privatisation co-exists with higher income inequality 
between the agricultural sector and other sectors. When studying rural-urban income inequality, the 
results points to that in a more privatised prefecture, there will be a larger income distance between 
rural and urban areas. Multilevel analyses which study occupation-based inequality also shows that 
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income differences between the agricultural class and other occupational classes are likely to be 
larger, when there is a higher degree of privatisation.  
Some studies have concluded that the high inequality in China is mainly caused by disparity 
between rural and urban inequality, and within rural and urban entities there is relatively low 
inequality (Sicular et al. 2010, Gustafsson 2008). David Dollar argues that rural-urban disparity is 
caused by low economic development in rural areas, which are not sufficiently opened up for 
privatisation. Accordingly, to open up for more marketisation and privatisation is the best way to 
achieve common development and equality (Dollar 2007). However, my study of Western China 
points in another direction. Based on the statistical analysis, I observe that people in the rural sector, 
or people engaged in agricultural activities, basically have low income, and that the income distance 
between these people and other social groups seems to be even larger when there is a higher degree 
of privatisation, which can be seen as a marker for development towards a more open market 
economy. The development concerning income inequality therefore seems to go the opposite way 
compared to the view of Dollar, at least in the short-term perspective. Another factor that 
contributes to inequality is the differential organisation of social services in rural areas compared to 
urban. Rural citizens do not enjoy the same welfare treatment and social subsidies as urbanites, and 
therefore fall behind in terms of benefits and living conditions. With the state withdrawing from 
welfare obligations, private services fill the void with expensive services in rural areas. 
Furthermore, the ideology of privatisation contradicts the state’s role as a regulating mechanism 
that is responsible for public services and welfare system. I have, however, not included analysis of 
welfare subsidies in my analysis, but to study it would be relevant in order to gain a wider 
understanding on differences between rural and urban living conditions, and how privatisation can 
influence welfare regimes differently.  
 
Chinese peasants seem to be particularly disadvantaged in the market economy. Peasants have little 
experience with the market and little knowledge about how to efficiently improve production in a 
market economy. They also often lack information about markets, market demand, and have few 
bargaining options that could bring higher prices for their products. They are facing a more 
uncertain economic situation, where the previously secured income and protection from collectives 
are removed in the process of reform and privatisation (Oi 1999: 212). Market prices can be more 
floating in the local market, and peasants’ income mainly depend on the market price of their 
products. Oi points out that some peasants choose to sell their products to state agencies at lower 
prices than in the open market, with the advantage of getting safer deals with increased stability and 
higher income security (Oi 1999: 213). Lack of market information is another problem. There are 
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information centres that gives information of market opportunities, but the traditional way of 
getting information, and the channel many peasants still use, is still to turn to local leaders. These 
leaders, however, may have self-interests, and gives advice that contributes to their own personal 
gain (Oi 1999: 213). In addition, many state buyers and companies do not deal with individual 
peasants, but villages as a unit. Villages contract with specialised farming households as brokers, 
and individual or household producers are not getting more paid than the low state price (Oi 1999: 
214).  
 
In the statistical analyses, I observe that when there is a higher degree of privatisation, the income 
difference increases between agricultural sector and other sectors, and between rural and urban 
citizens. Economic reform and privatisation put individuals involved in agricultural occupations in 
more uncertain situations, as individuals in the agricultural sector are more vulnerable in the market 
economy without the necessary network, knowledge, information, welfare and social security 
benefits. If the reform continues to only focus on economic development and privatisation, and 
ignore the fact that many people in rural areas are trapped in a disadvantaged position, then the 
current income inequality might increase. 
 
6.2.4. Income Distance between State and Private Employees 
 
The income distance between people working in state and private sectors decreases in a prefecture 
with a higher degree of privatisation. This finding is in contrast with my hypothesis about the 
relationship between higher privatisation and higher income inequality.  
 
In the theory chapter, I argued that privatisation could be related to higher income inequality 
between state and private sector, based on sector-specific influences on for example wage 
arrangements and work organisations in the state and private sectors. I presumed that when there is 
a higher degree of privatisation and market orientation in Western China, the traditional work unit 
would decline, as well as the privileged wage levels from state enterprises. But state sector can still 
maintain its dominant role in economic life, while the weakening of danwei organisations as a 
mechanism of equalisation, can lead directly to increased income inequality, by reducing benefits 
for a large population. In a more privatised economy, the incentive and bonus system is developed, 
which can generate higher income inequality by contributing to a more stratified wage level for 
private employees. 
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However, the argument above did not take into account that the average wage level in the state 
sector is usually much higher than in the private sector in China. In the context of Western China, 
state institutions still have dominant power, both politically and economically. The wage structure 
seems still to be strongly influenced by state institutions established in the plan economy period. 
According to statistics from Medow, the average annual income per capita for state employees is 
10,542 yuan, compared to 6,044 yuan in the private sector. This means that when the income level 
increases in private sector, and decreases in state sector, it would actually lead to a decline in 
overall income inequality. This result is in accordance to market transition theory. It maintains that 
when Chinese society transforms from plan to market economy, the income inequality between 
state and private sectors will first decline in the beginning stages, and then rise again in later phases. 
The reason is that entrepreneurs, businessmen and people with positions in the market sector gain 
economic powers, at the expense of people with positions linked to political power (Nee & Cao 
1999, 2004). Inequality based on political power and political stratification is weakened when the 
Chinese society transforms from state socialism to market economy, and market logic replaces 
political mechanisms in distributing wealth and producing income inequality. In state socialism, the 
state sector controlled the distribution of wages, income, and goods. The advantaged position of 
being employed in the state sector seems to be reduced when there is a higher degree of 
privatisation, while the private sector seems to acquire a higher economic position in the market 
economy in Western China. The income distance between the prevalent state sector and the 
previously suppressed private sector seems to decrease, when the market sector process of 
privatisation is more widespread.  
 
6.2.5. General Inequality Between Migrants and Residents 
 
The study of migration analyse income inequality between migrants and residents, regardless of 
whether an individual has an urban or rural hukou registration. The result corresponds to my 
expectation that in a situation with a higher degree of privatisation, there will be higher income 
differences, on average, between migrants and residents. Furthermore, the migrant group has 
generally much higher income than residents, and this inequality increases in a more privatised 
prefecture. 
 
There are two groups of migrants, respectively migrants with rural or urban household registration, 
and they have been merged together as a category of migration and represent the general situation 
of migrants. The same approach was used to create a congregation of the residents group, 
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representing both rural and urban residents. But in order to understand inequality between migrants 
and residents in Western China, we have to disassemble these parts. When looking at the 
descriptive statistics, we can observe that the average annual income differs much between these 
four groups. For both urban and rural citizens, the mobile population seems to be more 
economically advantaged. Migrants with urban hukou on average earn one thousand yuan more 
than urban residents in a year, while rural migrants earns averagely 2.3 times more than the rural 
residents.13 With a higher degree of privatisation, the migrant-resident income inequality increases, 
especially for people with rural status. Furthermore, this inequality is especially clear for women, 
for lower educated individuals, and for individuals with lower occupational position.  
 
This pattern of inequality in Western China reflects the perspective of selectivity of migration. 
People who migrate are often not the poorest in for example their village, since they can afford the 
expenses and insecurity connected to leaving home. Therefore, the family of migrants are often 
located in a lower-middle class position in the local society, and migrants have on average higher 
education than other residents (Ha et al. 2009: 7). To send some family members to work elsewhere 
with better-paid jobs can not only secure the household, but also be a rational investment that 
improves the households’ economy. In turn, the remittance received from migrant family members 
can contribute substantially to the family budget. The process of privatisation opened up 
possibilities for labour mobility, and the number of migrants increased. This seems to contribute to 
reinforce income inequality in both rural and urban in the West, and can be used to understand 
increased inequality between migrants and residents when processes of privatisation spread further.  
 
Some scholars have predicted that remittance from migrants boosts the local economy, and that 
inequality therefore should be reduced between urban and rural areas (Todaro 1969: 139, Keely & 
Tran 1989: 500, Beijer 1970: 102, Kindleberger 1965: 253). Such tendencies cannot be directly 
observed in Medow, as it is a cross-sectional survey and does not follow the time dimension of 
development. In my analysis, migration is positively correlated with privatisation, and thus, it 
contradicts the argument that privatisation can reduce inequality. Money sent by migrants to their 
household might not be enough to pull up the whole economy in the local society (de Haas 2008: 
29). Chinese rural areas face many economic problems after economic reforms, and rural citizens 
have to spend much money on for example schooling and medical care. This situation is even more 
                                                
13 In the descriptive data, there is a hierarchical division of income level for these four groups: the urban migrants have 
the highest income level, with an average annual income of 10,719 yuan; the urban residents are on second place, with 
an average annual income of 9,664 yuan; the rural migrants have an average income of 5,985 yuan; and the rural 
residents have the lowest income of 2,657 yuan. 
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serious in the West. The process of de-collectivisation and privatisation has been important also in 
the rural West, but the economic conditions are poor, in addition to limited social welfare. Money 
sent from migrants is not enough to be invested in businesses, but much has been used for daily 
spending. It seems like income inequality between migrant and resident in Western China is not 
evened out by the development of private market and private job possibilities, and that the gap 
grows even more. 
 
6.2.6. Rural Migrants and Urban Residents 
 
Through multilevel analysis, I have found that privatisation has an insignificant but positive effect 
on equalising the income of rural migrants and urban residents. According to the theory chapter that 
the process of privatisation could bring with it openness and more migration, but at the same time 
create more channels for others to exploit migrant workers. The income distance between rural 
migrants and urban residents is large, and I expected it would increase when comparing it to 
locations with more privatisation. The data analysis does not correspond with my expectations, but 
the development trend is somehow in accordance with perspectives from the approach of 
neoclassical transitional migration theory, and the phases of development (de Haas 2008: 32). In the 
context of Western China, the private sector have more job possibilities for rural migrants, and 
meanwhile the migration policy is moving towards a more equal development, which benefits the 
migrants.  
 
The political and institutional framework in China is changing. One of the most important reasons 
for the disadvantaged positions of migrants is that they are exposed to institutional discrimination, 
created by the hukou system. However, there have been attempts to ease up on the restrictions. In 
the late 1980s and mid-1990s, some cities sold expensive “blue stamp urban hukou” to migrants. In 
1997, some towns and small cities gave urban hukou to rural migrants who had stable jobs and had 
lived more than two years permanently in the city (Fan 2008). In recent years, challenges related to 
finding solutions for people to cross the hukou-barriers are often solved by recruitment and human 
resource companies. Migrants have thus gained more possibilities for finding jobs. This 
development is parallel with the development of market transition and privatisation, which 
emphasise labour mobility. In addition, Chinese authorities have also implemented new rules in 
rural areas in order to reduce inequality, as for example releasing agricultural taxes and higher 
welfare support (Whyte 2010: 20). This can attract rural migrants to go back home, and lead to 
reduction of rural migrants in cities, and thus higher wages for desired employees. 
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The development corresponds to transitional migration theory, which divides between different 
phases of vital transition, and the different effect of migration in each phase. The development in 
Western China can be placed as situations for transitional societies (phase II and III in figure 6.1). 
In phase II, rural-to-urban migration increases, and in phase III rural migration first slows down but 
remains at high levels, and then decreases dramatically (Zelinsky 1971: 230-233). When the urban 
areas in Western China in the late transitional phase is characterised by a shortage of labour force, 
and there are more attractive circumstances to live in rural areas, the wage level for rural migrants 
would eventually increase in locations where more economic sectors expand, and thus reduce the 
income distances between migrants and residents. The development seems to be parallel to the 
process of privatisation. In cities where there is a higher degree of privatisation, there might be 
stronger ideological values connected to free labour movement, and thus rural to urban migration 
might be saturated and slowed down. Both later development phases and higher degrees of 
privatisation seems to be connected to lower income inequality, and it can therefore be used to 
understand why a higher degree of privatisation is related to reduced income inequality between 
rural migrants and urban residents.  
 
Figure 6.1. The effect of development on rural-urban migration patterns according to transitional 
models. Adapted from Zelinsky 1971: 233. 
 
 
6.2.7 Development and Inequality  
 
Privatisation and Income Inequality in Western China 
 
102 
One way to look at reform and privatisation is to view increased inequality as a price to pay for the 
economic growth, and that economic growth eventually will benefit the society as a whole. An 
important model in support of this view is the Kuznets curve, developed by the economist Simon 
Kuznets. The Curve has the shape of an inverted U, and the hypothesis states that economic 
inequality in developed societies will increase in the early phases of industrialization and 
modernisation, until it reaches a top level of inequality, and then declines. The model presumes that 
in a modernised economy, economic growth will be more evenly distributed in broad segments of 
the population (Kuznet 1955).  
 
Although influential, there is scarce support for the Kuznets hypothesis when considering the 
history of the second half of the 20th century. Most industrialised countries have experienced 
increased income inequality after the 1970s, such as the United States, France, Italy, Japan, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and former West Germany (Wang 2008: 173). A research of 
inequality based on 73 countries, performed by the World Institute for Development Economics 
Research and the United Nations Development Program, shows that during 1950 and 1995, 
inequality increased in 48 countries, and remained constant in 16 countries. These 64 countries 
accounted for 92 per cent of the world GDP purchasing power parties (Wang 2008: 173).  
 
The Kuznet hypothesis is also discussed in the context of China. Carl Riskin has researched if 
China can be viewed to have reached the top of the Kuznet’s curve, and whether decreasing 
inequality proposed by the model is really the case. Using data from an income inequality survey 
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), he found that in the period 1995-
2002 there was less income inequality within both rural and urban areas. Accordingly, the income 
inequality within rural areas was reduced because of the rise of labour market and policy of lower 
taxes, which have contributed to higher earnings for broader groups in rural areas (Riskin 2007: 32). 
But when looking at the macro level, inequality was reduced only to a small extent, because there 
was greater inequality between rural and urban regions. Riskin concludes that it is premature to say 
that China is about to become more egalitarian (Riskin 2007: 42). Wu and Perloff (2004) have 
concluded differently, when studying the same survey samples as Riskin. They found that 
inequality has increased for both rural and urban populations between 1995 and 2001, and that 
increased inequality within rural and urban areas has contributed to general inequality, as much as 
rural-urban inequality did. As Riskin has pointed out, the Kuznets curve focus purely on economic 
factors, and say little about other factors that can affect inequality. Economic inequality is also 
affected by social, political, and ideological conditions (Riskin 2007: 43). Therefore, it seems that 
Chapter Six. Discussion and Reflections 
 
103 
dynamics related to the economic structure and economic growth is not in itself enough to create a 
more equal society.  
 
My findings indicate that in prefectures with higher degrees of privatisation, there are increased 
differences between individuals categorised in different social structures. These findings indicate 
that the dynamics related to privatisation in the market economy create more income inequality. 
This can be compatible with the Kuznet’s curve, if Western China’s market economy in 2005 was 
not yet mature enough to reach the falling side of the curve.  
 
There is increased inequality in both rural and urban areas in Western China. In the rural areas, 
there are very limited possibilities for low-income peasants to improve their economic situation. 
People with relatively better-off situation move to cities as migrants, and the middle class is 
reduced in the rural areas. This leads to a polarisation of the class structure and increased inequality 
between the top and bottom groups of the income hierarchy, since the wealthy over-class and poor 
farmers tend to stay as residents. In urban areas, the rural migrant group often becomes an under-
class, and this has led to increased inequality in urban China. The structural changes after the 
economic reforms are not promoting a more even income distribution.   
 
The state has several alternatives. It can choose to continue with cheap industry supported by rural 
migrants by making agricultural activities unprofitable and unattractive by heavy agricultural taxes. 
Another alternative is to implement measures to improve the situation of the poor, and to reduce 
inequality between rural and urban areas. This would include more focus on the disadvantaged 
social groups such as peasants and rural migrants and reconfigured social structures, by for example 
better welfare arrangement and more support for local rural industry. 
 
6.2.8 New Social Policies 
 
When trying to understand various social phenomena, new development patterns in the labour 
market should be taken into account. At the time Medow was collected, it was not so long after the 
policy for Western China development was launched and set in process. We can believe that the 
expansion of industry and need for labour force was not at the same level as it is today; and in 
addition, the growth of labour rate in China has already slowed down in later years. Ever since the 
mid-1990s, the rate of employment growth in China began to turn negative (Hu 2003). The rate of 
working age population growth is speculated to turn negative from 2020 (Kwan 2002), and negative 
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population growth is expected in 2030 (Niu 2010). Western-China is experiencing significant 
changes in terms of labour market restructuring, various changes related to social and institutional 
circumstances, and changes in social policies.   
 
Privatisation contributes to weaken the power of trade unions, increase unemployment, reduce 
social welfare, and increased income inequality. In addition, household registration system and 
migration policy lead to systematic discrimination against rural citizens. The Chinese leadership has 
recognised these problems, and have in the recent decade tried to make changes. The goal was to 
reduce inequality, and give higher priority to rural development. President Hu Jintao and Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao launched a new vision of Chinese society entitled “harmonious society” at the 
16th National Congress in 2002. They warned about the danger of social unrest, and proposed the 
goal to build a harmonious society with the middle class as the main body. The previous focus on 
economic growth was complemented with a new focus on overall social harmony (The Central 
People’s Government 2006). There were also discussions to remove rural-urban hukou diversity, 
and give disadvantaged groups such as migrants and peasants the same social rights related to 
wages, social benefits, and education.  
 
For migrants, some earlier exclusive restrictions and regulations have been eliminated, and in some 
cities new restrictions have affected urban citizens, in order to create better chances for migrants 
(Whyte 2010: 21). Since 2007, the governmental authorities have tested to abandon the rural-urban 
restrictions in 12 provinces; and in 2007, the new Labour Contract Law gave migrant workers better 
legal protection of written labour contracts, and security for long-term jobs (Cai et al. 2009). The 
pension system for migrant workers was also tried out in several test locations, where migrant 
workers enjoy the same right as urbanites. For peasants, the Chinese government has implemented 
new rules and regulations in rural areas to improve their economic condition. This includes for 
example to relax or phase out agricultural taxes, increase governmental and state financial support 
for rural schools, reduce and phase out educational tuitions, test new medical insurance systems, 
reduce medical fees in rural areas, and introduce minimum income systems in rural areas (Whyte 
2010: 20). 
 
6.3. Weaknesses and Limitations  
 
This paper covers five social structures, namely education, sector, occupation, rural-urban diversity 
and migration. These aspects are all important when studying income inequality in Western China, 
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and they are sociologically interesting as important categories for dividing individuals and social 
groups. They can create and maintain social boundaries to include individuals characterised with 
certain qualities in more advantaged positions, while blocking others from access to important 
social and economic resources. Privatisation seems to be related to these social structures, which to 
some extent support or reinforce the effect of boundaries. I recognise that each of these five 
structures are complicated, and my strategy to include all five of them can result in a somewhat 
superficial and fragmented study. An alternative way to study income inequality and privatisation 
could be to choose one of these fields, and research it more deeply and detailed. However, my 
thesis can contribute to offer an overview of the general situation in Western China. 
 
On the other side, there can be many other important social factors that are relevant to understand 
the relationship between income inequality and privatisation. However, my main interest has been 
the process of economic transition, and the following consequences of changed patterns for income 
distribution. Although I may loose sight of other important social issues, I believe that the selected 
five social structures can give basic but relevant information of the labour conditions in Western 
China, and how privatisation and income inequality is connected. The statement that privatisation is 
related to greater income differences can only be made when the intermediate mechanisms are 
taken into account. Even though I have found that privatisation is related to income inequality in 
Western China, it is difficult to draw a causal conclusion on whether privatisation had led to higher 
inequality.  
 
6.3.1. Measurement and Interpretation of Privatisation 
 
Several complexities related to privatisation should be discussed. First, my measure of privatisation 
is based on the sum of employed labour in the private sector. If there are more people working in 
the private sector, there will be a higher degree of privatisation in a prefecture. This definition can 
be problematic, because it does not differentiate between various types of private enterprises, and it 
does not say anything about the economic scale of the private companies, their turnover, 
profitability and activity in total, or the size of the private sector compared to other sectors of the 
economy, measured in for example share of GDP. An enterprise with more sophisticated 
technology and modern equipment can be more productive with fewer employees, than businesses 
with many employees but using more traditional technology. Moreover, there are many small-scale 
private enterprises in Western China, such as family or self-employment businesses. These are also 
included in the private sector in my measurement of private sector. These firms are small, and vary 
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from having only one to a dozen employees. Issues related to profit demands, wage systems, 
income level, institutional restraints, and efficiency are very different in such small organisations, 
compared to larger enterprises. Therefore, this definition of privatisation and private sector could 
confuse income level and occupational differences in the private sector. In addition, definitions of 
privatisation and private sector can often overlap each other, and they are therefore highly inter-
correlated in statistic analyses. However, I chose to cover various types and sizes of private 
enterprises in the definition of private sector, in order to include a variety of private employment in 
Western China. The group of small-scale firms and self-employed individuals are also important 
parts of the Chinese economic transition, and to exclude these social groups can lead to bias and 
incomplete analysis.  
 
Second, the effect of privatisation could be superficial. It is a general problem with my analysis that 
privatisation and income inequality does not have a certain causal relationship, and it is limited 
possibilities to find out the direction of causality. I can only state that a higher degree of 
privatisation is somehow related to greater income inequality, but privatisation does not necessarily 
lead to higher income inequality. The relationship between these two variables can be superficial, 
and there can be other underlying factors that are connected to development, which at the same time 
interrelate with privatisation. Furthermore, these factors can be differently configured in different 
prefectures. Focus on privatisation may divert attention away from other interesting and maybe 
more important factors. 
 
A third problem related to privatisation and income inequality is that Medow is a cross-sectional 
survey, and there is little possibility to test development over time. Although there is a positive 
correlation between privatisation and income inequality in my finding, the conclusion of this 
relationship can only be drawn in the specific time of survey.  
 
6.3.2. Definition of the Income Variable 
 
The definition of the income variable in my paper also needs to be discussed. In my income 
variable, there are three components: people with individual wage and income, agricultural 
economy, and household economy. The last two categories consist of individuals within households 
with a common economy, and their individual income is calculated as the average income of the 
whole household income. Sometimes, it is difficult to divide individuals from their family or 
household economy activities, especially in the rural sector. A usual way for peasants to get income 
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is to divide different tasks between family members. For example, men mainly work in the farm 
with cultivation, and women work both in farm and household, with various household tasks such 
as cooking, child caring, feeding livestock, carrying water and gathering firewood, etc (Hu 2007).  
Their income is based on the family unit, in which family members contribute together to the 
household economy. Similar pattern applies to family economies, such as household-based private 
businesses and self-employment. Therefore, it is difficult to standardise income for each household 
member. 
 
This measurement can be less problematic when studying for example urban-rural income 
inequality, sector inequality, and occupational inequality. But when considering income inequality 
within the rural sector, as for example between rural migrants and rural residents, the income 
variable can lead to confused understanding and interpretation. For example, a rural migrant is 
originally defined as a member of her household, and her income in my measure includes both 
average household income and earnings from her current work place. If she does not participate in 
the household economy, her income can be overestimated. At the same time, the income of the 
other family members can be underestimated, since she is counted as one of the household workers 
when calculating average household income. However, migrant workers who live more permanent 
in the place they work may not identify themselves as a part of the original household. There is also 
a situation where many rural migrants are seasonal workers, who participate in the household 
economy, and have other jobs when it is off-season agricultural activities.  
 
Another discussion worth mentioning is how the income variable should be defined. It is much 
argued about whether other factors should be included, as for example welfare support and living 
costs. If regional differences in living costs are not taken into account, income inequality can be 
overestimated. This is because of the higher living costs in urban areas compared to rural. 
Accordingly, if household income is adjusted by controlling for regional living costs, the actual 
income gap between rural and urban areas should be smaller (Li & Luo 2010: 105, Sicular et al. 
2010: 89). Another point is that if factors such as welfare subsidies to urban citizens are not 
included in the income variable, the rural-urban income gap can be underestimated, since rural 
people do not receive welfare benefits to the same extent. Therefore, the actual income gap between 
rural and urban China can be much larger when such public subsidies are included (Li & Luo 2010: 
105-106). 
 
There are great variations and complexities in Western China, which covers a huge geographic area 
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with social and political diversities. My definition of the income variable does not include welfare 
subsidies or consumption structure, and I chose to only look at the income for individuals and 
households to simplify the complexity. It can be problematically connected to how social policy and 
market consumption affects privatisation’s impact on income inequality, but the focus in this paper 
is mainly on income inequality between individuals and their household. Due to the rich data in 
Medow and multilevel analysis that combines analysis on both individual and prefecture level, I 
believe that my definition of income can be valid and relevant for my research theme.  
 
6.3.3. Simplified Variables for Sector and Occupation 
 
The reform in China has made the sector differences more complex, so only dividing between state, 
private, and agricultural sector can be too simplistic. There can be more finely defined groups 
within each sector, and for different groups it could be different operating methods, wage structures, 
and income levels. In fact, the state sector includes both traditional state enterprises with traditional 
work unit systems and egalitarian wage structure, and more opened cooperative state firms that are 
market-oriented and in a competitive labour market. The state sector can also include urban 
collective enterprises and rural collective township and village enterprises. The private sector 
consists of large-scale private businesses as well as multinational companies, and self-employed 
small-scale family firms.  At last, in the agricultural sector, there is both traditional household 
cultivation and large modern agricultural industry, with very different institutional organisation, 
different wage structures and income patterns. To divide all of these different types of enterprises 
and organisations into only three sectors, can be criticised to be an oversimplification, as it 
overlooks the diversity and heterogeneity found inside each group.  
 
In the analysis I worked with a distinction of three occupational classes. The service class includes 
cadre and other leaders, technicians and professions, and white-collar office workers. The working 
class includes service industry workers, blue-collar workers, and other non-agricultural workers, 
and the agricultural class includes agricultural workers. The same problem of ignoring group 
heterogeneity applies to the definition of occupational classes. For example, agricultural workers 
can include several groups of people that can have different class positions: Peasants working with 
various agricultural activities such as cultivation, fishing, and foresting, and working class 
individuals employed in agricultural industries. To include all of these categories in the same class 
of agricultural occupation can lead to the problem of overlooking within-group diversity.  
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6.3.4. Migration Variable 
 
There are also some methodological problems concerning the migrant variables. Medow tried to 
cover migration from both urban and rural areas. The definition of migrant is of a person registered 
in one place, but who works in another. Rural migrants are rural household members who have 
rural hukou. Because of work assignment, they have to live somewhere else, or normally live in the 
household but being outside the commune for periods of time. This definition has a problem: Huge 
groups of rural migrants can be excluded from the sample, for example rural migrants who come 
originally from rural household but now have urban hukou. They are not defined as rural migrants, 
when they do not have a rural household registration. Another group that can be excluded is a 
migrant with rural hukou, but who do not define herself as a member of the original rural 
household. Maybe she prefers another place of residence, or maybe she gets married and has her 
own household in a city. In my sample, the total migration is less than six per cent, and rural 
migrant is only about three per cent. This might be one reason for the insignificant impact that 
privatisation has on income inequality between rural migrants and urban residents. 
 
 6.4. Concluding Remarks and Further Implications 
 
Privatisation has been an important aspect of the economic reforms in China, and Western China 
has taken part in the general economic transition and development. The transformation has 
contributed to create massive economic growth, raised wages, and better living conditions. 
However, income inequality in China has increased rapidly since the reforms started.  
 
Both market mechanisms and the phenomenon of inequality is complicated, and I have tried to 
focus on more limited aspects of these two social dynamics. Privatisation is an important 
characteristic of the market transition. By examining concrete levels of income inequality connected 
to various social structures that individuals are situated in, this study aims to answer a central 
question: Is there a relationship between privatisation and income inequality, through social 
structures such as education, sector, occupation, regional diversity and migration? 
 
The labour market is a central focus point in this study. On one hand, income inequality is related 
differently to labour structure and wage distribution, through the selected social structures. On the 
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other hand, privatisation not only affects and changes the wage strategies directly in labour 
institutions, but also has important influences on the ideology behind rewarding logics and labour 
relationships. Market logics based on incentive and productivity becomes more important for 
income distribution, and it replaces the role of political power and central regulation. In the process 
of privatisation, social structures such as educational attainment and occupational position serve as 
measures for individual ability and productivity. However, these measures may function as social 
categories and boundaries that divide individuals into different groups, and which create and 
maintain both social and economic inequality. Individuals are included in or excluded from certain 
social groups with certain characteristics. In this way, higher privatisation is associated with greater 
income inequality.  
 
My findings in this study point to that there is a relationship between privatisation and higher 
income inequality, based on analyses of 128 prefectures in Western China. However, there are 
uncertainties connected to development tendencies of the cross-sectional data. Although the 
analyses conclude that the income inequality regarding education, occupation, region, and 
migration characteristics increases with more privatisation, it may be concluded differently if 
development is studied over time. Similarly, although the income difference between the privileged 
state sector and the rising private sector is reducing, this may be a reflection of the market transition 
theory point that in the early phases of market transition, inequalities may be reduced between the 
state and private sectors, and that it will rise again in later stages when the private sector becomes 
more dominant.  
 
To explore these issues further, research that studies development over time is needed. This also 
concerns the general debate of development and in what direction transitional China is going. 
Western China may be viewed as being under-developed, and in an earlier phase of economic 
transition compared to the Eastern provinces. Although my study contributes to establish a 
relationship between higher privatisation and higher income inequality (regarding most of the 
included social structures), there are many aspects of the development of income inequality that we 
do not know enough about, and which would be interesting to follow. Further research can give 
more insight into how these processes evolve. Further research on the impact of the Western 
development plan on income inequality would be relevant. It would also be interesting to compare 
uneven development both regionally and nationally in China, for example through studying how the 
relationship between privatisation, wage structures and income inequality has evolved in the eastern 
provinces.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of the Residuals. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of the Residuals after Log-Transformation. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Income Inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of the Outcome Variable after Log-Transformation. 
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Figure 5. Scatter Plot of the residual. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Scatter Plot after Log-Transformation. 
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